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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The theory of optimum currency areas states that the more two countries trade with 
each other, the better candidates they are for a currency union. In terms of the 
endogeneity argument, convergence follows from joining a currency union and the 
integration process itself turns the countries into optimal currency areas. The 
potential increase in trade is regarded as one of the most important benefits of a 
currency union. Indirect evidence from studies on the effect of exchange rate 
volatility on trade does not support this claim. Rose argues that the common 
currency effect on trade is separate from the effect of the elimination of exchange 
rate variability and finds a large positive effect of a currency union on trade. 
Although his methodology has met with crit icism, most studies find a positive 
estimate. A meta -analysis of the studies confirms that a common currency has a 
statistically and economically significant trade-creating effect. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
‘I want the whole of Europe to have one currency; 
 it will make trading much easier.’ 
 (Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769-1821) 
Surprising as it is, these are not the words of a modern day politician who supported 
the formation of the European Monetary Union. The quote is in fact centuries old 
and comes from a letter by Napoleon. The idea that a common currency can have a 
positive impact on international trade is therefore not new. Yet economists have 
only started to examine the effect of common currencies on trade directly in the last 
few years. Napoleon suggested tha t a single European currency would be beneficial 
to trade among European countries. The purpose of this dissertation is to find an 
answer to a broader question that asks whether currency unification in general leads 
to more international trade. If a common currency fosters trade, decision makers 
around the world contemplating the adoption of a common currency should take this 
important benefit into account.  
1.1 Background and definitions 
A range of different currencies characterizes the international monetary system. The 
majority of these are based on independent states, but there are also many examples 
of movement toward multinational currencies, the formation of the European 
Monetary Union and the creation of the euro being the most important. How many 
currencies should there be in the world? Is a country by definition an optimal 
currency area? If the optimal number of currencies is less than the number of 
existing countries, which countries should form currency areas? The branch of 
economic theory that tradit ionally attempted to answer these questions is called the 
theory of optimum currency areas. An overview of the literature on optimum 
currency area (OCA) theory will be presented in Chapter 2. 
OCA theory was first formulated by Robert Mundell (1961:657) who defines a 
currency area as the ‘domain within which exchange rates are fixed’. However, a 
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currency area cannot be regarded as synonymous with a system of fixed exchange 
rates. What Mundell means is an absolutely and irrevocably fixed exchange rate 
system, and not a system with fixed, but adjustable rates, which was the case under 
the Bretton Woods System (Bofinger 1994:39). According to most economic 
textbooks, the definition of a currency area or a monetary union is an area within 
which exchange rates are permanently and irrevocably fixed and there is complete 
liberation of capital movements (Presley & Dennis 1976:8; Visser 2000:158). This 
can be achieved either by maintaining national currencies or by introducing a 
common currency, in which case it is called a currency union, a full monetary 
union, or a common currency area. In other words, a currency union is a special 
case of a monetary union, an area where the different currenc ies of member 
countries have been replaced by one common currency (Visser 2000:158). For 
smaller countries, this set-up usually entails the use of another country’s currency, 
such as the US dollar.  
While the traditional theory of optimum currency areas covers both incomplete and 
full monetary unions, it is more useful to think in terms of a currency union. A 
common currency seems to be a more permanent arrangement than the simple 
fixing of exchange rates. If there are separate national currencies, no guarantee can 
be given that exchange rates are irrevocably fixed. The apparent commitment to 
fixed exchange rates can readily be broken and the various national currencies are 
not seen as perfect substitutes. Therefore, a monetary union without a common 
currency may be subject to speculative attacks and instability when doubts about the 
irrevocability of the exchange rate arise (Visser 2000:160). In addition, it cannot be 
assumed that a totally rigid exchange rate system yields exactly the same benefits 
and costs as a single currency area. Some of the benefits will not be realized unless 
there is a common currency. Therefore, even though the traditional theory of 
optimum currency areas allows for the use of separate national currencies, any 
further reference to a currency area or monetary union in this dissertation will mean 
a common currency area or full monetary union which includes the use of a 
common currency, in other words a currency union. 
The literature on optimum currency areas addresses two main issues, namely the 
costs and benefits of joining a monetary union and the characteristics that are 
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desirable for countries to consider monetary integration. Participating in a currency 
union has its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, a common 
currency eliminates the transaction costs that are incurred when converting 
currencies. Besides the direct savings on transaction costs there are also indirect 
benefits in the form of more price transparency and increased competition. A 
common currency also eliminates the risk arising from the uncertainty about 
movements of the exchange rate. This can lead to increased trade. The positive 
impact of common currencies on trade is an important benefit and comprises the 
main topic of the dissertation. 
On the negative side, the adoption of a common currency implies the loss of 
independent monetary and exchange rate policy, and the loss of real revenues a 
government acquires by using newly issued money to finance its expenditure.  An 
OCA is a currency area for which the costs of relinquishing the exc hange rate as an 
instrument of adjustment are less than the benefits of adopting a single currency. A 
nation facing the option of monetary unification should weigh the costs and the 
benefits and should only surrender its own currency if the benefits outweigh the 
costs.  
The theory of optimum currency areas identifies a number of criteria that are to be 
fulfilled for a common currency arrangement to be optimal. Mundell (1961) 
presented the existence of a high degree of labour mobilit y as the principal criterion, 
arguing that perfect factor mobility is a substitute stabilizing mechanism for 
exchange rates.  In practice, however, labour mobility is generally low and unlikely 
to act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks. Given the 
absence of factor mobility, Kenen (1969) proposes to use the degree of product 
diversification as a criterion, while McKinnon (1963) points to the significance of 
the openness of an economy as a requirement for a currency area. Other criteria that 
have been suggested include the similarity of inflation rates, the similarity of 
industrial structures, high cyclical covariation in economic activities and fiscal 
integration. It should be noted, that in reality, historical, cultural and political factors 
usually play a more important role in the decision about the formation of currency 
unions than economic arguments. 
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The traditional theory of optimum currency areas concentrates on the costs of 
forming a monetary union, neglecting the benefits, and tends to be rather pessimistic 
about the possibility for countries to have a common currency at a low cost. 
Furthermore, the different criteria suggested by OCA theory are difficult or 
impossible to measure and cannot be ranked or weighted against each other. For 
these reasons, OCA theory did not receive much attention for decades. However, in 
the 1990s, plans for the formation of the European Monetary Union rekindled 
interest in OCAs and efforts have been made to formalize the traditional theory by 
integrating and comparing the various criteria suggested. The general equilibrium 
models of optimum currency areas that have been developed provide significant 
new results.  In a formal model, the welfare effects of a currency union can be 
analysed, not only for its members, but also for regions outside the union. It is found 
that a currency union can raise the welfare of regions within a union, but it always 
lowers welfare for the rest of the world (Bayoumi 1994). The idea that a currency 
union may not be beneficial to those left out has not been considered by the 
traditional theory, since it viewed optimisation from the point of view of a single 
nation.  
Numerous studies attempt to identify empirically which countries form optimum 
currency areas. In general, most empirical studies find that the cost of a common 
currency is too high for most regions considered.  However, a country’s decision to 
join a monetary area should consider not just the situation that applies under 
monetary autonomy, it should also allow for the economic effects of a currency 
union.  The various characteristics embodied in the OCA criteria can change over 
time. Macroeconomic convergence may itself be encouraged by the adoption of a 
common currency. Two of the relevant OCA criteria are the intensity of trade with 
other potential members of the currency union and the extent to which domestic 
business cycles are correlated with those of other countries. Entry into a currency 
union may increase international trade, and increased trade integration can lead to 
increased correlation of business cycles. In this way a country could achieve 
convergence ex post, even if it does not meet the criteria of optimality ex ante. 
Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) call this the endogeneity of OCA criteria, arguing 
that instead of being exogenous variables, the different criteria suggested by the 
theory of OCAs are subject to change following the formation of a currency union. 
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Real integration can follow monetary integration and the causality between the two 
works in both ways. Therefore simply looking at historical data gives a misleading 
picture of a country’s suitability for entry into a currency union. The endogeneity of 
the OCA criteria will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, the effect of increased trade integration on the cross-
country correlation of business cycle activity is ambiguous.  The alternative view is 
that as trade becomes more highly integrated, countries specialize more in 
production, and this greater specialization will reduce the correlation of incomes, 
since supply shocks will be less correlated (Bayoumi & Eichengreen 1994; 
Eichengreen 1992; Krugman 1993). This view, known as the Krugman 
specialisation hypothesis, leads to the conclusion that a country might fail the 
optimum currency area criteria ex post, even if it passes them ex ante.  
In terms of the endogeneity hypothesis the adoption of a common currency reduces 
trade barriers and the resulting higher trade level synchronizes business cycles 
across countries, turning a currency union into an optimum currency area. However, 
the whole endogeneity argument hinges on the impact of the currency union on 
trade. Without a positive impact, the argument falls apart, whether or not trade leads 
to cycle correlation (Micco et al 2003:318). The first link implied by endogeneity, 
the effect of common currencies on trade is therefore of vital importance and is the 
main focus of this dissertation. 
1.2 The problem  
Advocates of currency unions argue that one of the most certain advantages of 
adopting a common currency is the increase in international trade. The problem is, 
that until recently there has not been much supporting evidence in favour of this 
argument. Conclusions about the trade-creating effect of common currencies have 
been based on studies investigating the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. 
This has been done under the assumption that a currency union has the same effect 
on trade as the complete elimination of exchange rate volatility. The effect of 
exchange rate volatility on trade will be investigated in Chapter 4. 
While most economists believe that exchange rate volatility reduces the volume of 
trade across countries, there is an ambiguity about the exact nature of the 
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relationship, even on a theoretical level. Flexible exchange rate systems imply that 
economic agents involved in international trade are exposed to exchange rate risk. 
An increase in exchange rate volatility means higher exchange rate risk and reduced 
level of trade by risk-averse agents. However, in addition to a substitution effect that 
will depress the level of trade, increased risk also reduces the expected utility, and 
exporters might trade more to avoid an extreme reduction in their income. If the 
income effect outweighs the substitution effect, the end result could be more trade 
(De Grauwe 1988). For a diversified firm, exchange rate risk is not an extra 
independent risk but a facet of its total risk, and international transactions can 
provide opportunities for diversifying risks arising from domestic operations rather 
than increasing total risk. Therefore, exchange rate uncertainty affects the 
composition of international trade, rather than its overall volume (Willett 1986). 
There is an alternative hypothe sis that states that exchange rate uncertainty can have 
a positive effect on trade. In terms of this hypothesis, changes in exchange rates are 
not simply a source of risk; they also create opportunities to make profits (Broll & 
Eckwert 1999; Franke 1991). Although it is theoretically possible that increased 
exchange rate variability will have a positive effect on trade due to higher profit 
opportunities, this hypothesis is depe ndent on the firm’s ability to vary its output 
quickly and at a small cost, which is not a very realistic assumption. 
Several studies have attempted to quantify the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
trade and the empirical results are just as controversial as the predictions of the 
theoretical models. Most studies fail to find a consistent link between exchange rate 
volatility and trade, some find a negative, but modest effect, and there are some that 
find that the relationship is actually positive. A general problem with these 
empirical studies is that the measures of exchange rate volatility are not necessarily 
good proxies for exchange rate uncertainty. It is not exchange rate variability but 
rather unanticipated variability that decreases trade volumes. Ex post measures of 
exchange rate variability do not necessarily correspond to ex-ante perceptions of 
unforeseen exchange risk (Brada & Mendez 1988:266). 
The main empirical findings support the hypothesis that exchange rate variability 
does not have a significant impact on trade. Even those studies that confirm a 
statistically significant negative effect of exchange rate volatility on trade generally 
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find that the magnitude of the effect is small. Thus volatility studies do not support 
the argument that the adoption of a common currency will encourage trade between 
members of a cur rency union. On the other hand, if sharing a common currency is 
different from reducing exchange rate volatility to zero then it is wrong to draw 
conclusions about the desirability of common currencies on the basis of studies 
investigating exchange rate volatility. It is conceivable that a common currency has 
a much stronger effect on the volume of trade than the complete elimination of 
exchange rate volatility. One has to study the effect of currency unions on trade 
directly in order to be able to judge the desirability of common currencies. 
1.3 Hypothesis and methodology 
The direct study of the trade effect of common currencies has been initiated by Rose 
(2000) whose model will be explained in detail in Chapter 5. Rose’s estimates 
suggest that those countries that share a common currency trade three times more 
than those that have separate currencies. This effect is separate from and additional 
to the positive, but modest effect of the complete elimination of exchange rate 
variability. An important finding of Rose’s study is that the effects of currency 
union and volatility on trade are economically distinguishable. The impact of a 
common currency is significantly larger than the effect of reducing exchange rate 
volatility to zero. The adoption of a common currency implies a serious 
commitment by government to long-term integration and a much lower probability 
of reversal in the future. This could encourage the private sector to engage in more 
trade. Savings on transaction costs and hedging costs also play a role in increased 
trade but can only explain a fraction of the effect. Rose (2000:32) admits that a 
proper explanation of the trade effect of common currencies is lacking but argues 
that the existing evidence of a huge positive impact should suffice to strengthen the 
case for a currency union.  
Rose’s argument is taken as a starting point for further investigation in this 
dissertation. The hypothesis is that a common currency has a significant positive 
effect on trade between the adopting countries.   If the hypothesis is correct, this has 
important implications. What is the economic significance of the trade effect of 
common currencies? Whether a currency union is indeed beneficial to trade is of 
crucial interest, since increased international trade has a positive effect on income, 
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as explained by the principle of comparative advantage and economies of scale in 
specialization. Such arguments suggest that higher trade intensity can induce a one-
off improvement in output. More modern theories of trade suggest that an increase 
in trade might raise the rate of economic growth on a long-term basis. It is argued 
that increased openness implies more competition, more contact with foreigners 
fosters innovation, more technological and managerial knowledge, higher 
productivity, and higher economic growth (Frankel & Rose 2002:444; HM Treasury 
2003, par.2.24). To predict the effect of currency unions on income, the estimated 
effect of currency unions on trade and the estimated effect of trade on growth need 
to be combined. Frankel and Rose (2002) find that the ultimate growth effect 
depends on who is adopting what currency. Simply belonging to a currency union is 
not enough to ensure economic growth; the members need to be natural trading 
partners. 
Rose (2000) answers the question whether countries that share a common currency 
trade more than others that do not. From a policy perspective, one would rather 
want to know the impact of a currency union on those countries that adopt it; 
whether countries trade more with each other as a consequence of joining, and 
whether leaving a currency union reduces their trade levels. Treating exits from and 
entries into a currency union symmetrically and comparing trade for a pair of 
countries before and after the regime change, Glick and Rose (2002) estimate that 
joining a currency union doubles bilateral trade. 
The suggested doubling or even tripling effect of common currencies on trade is 
implausibly large and highly controversial. Many economists following Rose’s 
work have attempted to overturn his result and shrink the currency union effect on 
trade. The mos t common criticism is that most currency union countries in Rose’s 
sample are very small, or poor, or both. Therefore, the estimates are not applicable 
to the monetary integration plans of major economies such as the European 
Monetary Union.  
Several authors criticise Rose on methodological grounds and suggest various 
improvements in their quest towards a superior estimation of the currency union 
effect on trade. These will be discussed in Chapter 6. One of the potential problems 
is non-random selection. The argument is that the probability that two countries will 
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adopt a common currency is not random and may depend on some of the 
explanatory variables, such as the size of the country. Another point of criticism is 
that the results of gravity trade models are subject to simultaneity bias. Besides 
currency unions creating trade it is also possible that countries decide to form a 
currency union because they trade a lot with each other, or both currency unions and 
high levels of trade are jointly caused by some third factor. In these cases currency 
union membership becomes an endogenous variable and the trade effect will be 
biased because of the simultaneity between currency union membership and trade.  
Estimates of the currency union effect on trade may be furthe r biased by the fact 
that the models that are used explain bilateral trade through measures of absolute 
trade costs, while in reality it is relative trade barriers that matter. Incorporating 
relative trade barriers into the analysis reveals that the adoption of a common 
currency has more impact on trade for larger countries than in the case of small 
economies. Furthermore, for countries that already trade a lot, the currency union 
effect on trade is smaller in percentage terms but their welfare benefit from joining a 
currency union will be greater (Rose & van Wincoop 2001).  
The various studies that attempt to improve on Rose’s methodology generally find a 
much smaller effect than the original estimate of tripled trade, but the effect is still 
significantly positive in most cases. In an effort to improve the ability to estimate 
the trade effect of common currencies for major, developed economies, some recent 
research looks for evidence in the past by extending the data set back to the late 
19th and early 20th century when much of the world was tied to gold. While pre-
EMU contemporary currency unions comprise mainly small, poor countries, 
observations on currency unions in the extended data set include economically 
significant nations. Although most studies find that common currency arrangements 
a century ago were associated with trade creation similar in magnitude to the Rose 
effect, it is doubtful whether the historical evidence is relevant to monetary 
unification in the 21st century.  
With the formation of the European Monetary Union and data about its early years 
becoming available it has become possible to study the currency union effect on 
trade in contemporary, economically large, developed countries. The studies that 
have appeared so far on the topic arrive at different estimates but the general 
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consensus is that the impact of the euro on trade is positive, although much smaller 
than the estimated impact derived from evidence on other currency unions. The 
starting date of the EMU is January 1999, when the final irreversible convergence 
rates into the euro basket were announced. Considering that the samples in the 
studies only cover the first four years of the monetary union and for the first three 
years the euro was not even in circulation, the trade effect of the euro, which is in 
the order of 10 percent, is  quite impressive. The timing of the euro effect has also 
received considerable attention. Various authors emphasize that trade among EMU 
members increased in anticipation of the currency union (Barr et al 2003:584; 
Micco et al 2003:333). The possibility of trade diversion has also been examined 
and results suggest that the creation of the euro did not have a negative impact on 
trade between members of the EMU and outsiders (Micco et al 2003:334). A 
comparison of the size of the trade effect across the different members suggests that 
the impact of the euro is fairly widespread but is generally higher for more 
advanced economies (Micco et al 2003:339).  
The qualitative conclusion that a currency union promotes trade has survived the 
European test but the size of the effect has been considerably reduced. Rose (2004a) 
attempts to summarize the current state of the debate and to arrive at a single 
representative estimate of the common currency effect on trade by using meta-
analysis, a quantitative method of literature review. Meta-analysis entails including 
all studies on the topic and treating different point estimates of a given coefficient as 
individual observa tions and then estimating the underlying coefficient of interest 
using this vector of estimates. A significant limitation of the meta-analysis is that all 
studies are weighted equally, while many of them rely on the same dataset and the 
number of genuinely independent observations is much lower. Equal weighting also 
ignores the fact that more recent research on more relevant databases using more 
sophisticated methodologies has typically yielded lower estimates. Keeping these 
limitations in mind, the results of the quantitative survey indicate that the 
hypothesis, that there is no effect of currency union on trade, can be rejected when 
the results from the individual studies are pooled. The pooled effect is not just 
positive but economically significant, ranging from 30 to 90 percent (Rose 
2004a:13). Rose’s meta -analysis of the trade effect of common currencies will be 
presented in Chapter 7. In addition, Rose’s main results are confirmed with a 
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straightforward version of the meta -analysis. The methodology used relies on 
simple sorting techniques, measures of locations and box-and-whiskers diagrams. It 
will be shown that while Rose’s qualitative conclusion about the positive effect of 
common currencies on trade is convincing, the overrepresentation of his own 
studies in the relevant literature lends a significant upward bias to the overall 
estimate.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS 
The economic theory of common currencies goes back to the traditional theory of 
optimum currency areas initiated by Mundell (1961). This chapter provides an 
overview of optimum currency area (OCA) theory, starting with the examination of 
the costs and benefits of adopting a common currency. When a nation relinquishes 
its national currency and adopts the currency of some wider area it gives up its 
independence regarding monetary policy. Mundell (1961) asks under which 
circumstances this cost is minimized and argues that perfect factor mobility is a 
substitute stabilizing mechanism for exchange rates. After analysing how factor 
mobility works as an adjustment mechanism in theory, the empirical evidence on 
international labour mobility is assessed. Numerous other criteria that countries 
should possess if they are to form an optimal currency area have been suggested and 
these are discussed in turn. With the advance of modeling techniques there have 
been attempts to formalize the theory of optimum currency areas. Various general 
equilibrium models have been constructed with the aim to integrate and compare the 
different criter ia suggested by the traditional OCA theory. The most important 
theoretical models and some representative examples of the applied OCA literature 
that try to identify which countries form optimum currency areas are selectively 
reviewed. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the usefulness of OCA 
theory. 
2.1 The benefits of a common currency 
A common currency has important costs and benefits for the adopting countries, 
which may arise at the micro or macro level. The benefits accrue mostly at the 
microeconomic level. A common currency leads to gains in economic efficiency 
emanating from two main sources, the elimination of transaction costs associated 
with the exchanging of national currencies and the elimination of risk coming from 
uncertain future movements of the exchange rate (De Grauwe 2003:60).  
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2.1.1 The elimination of transaction costs  
A common currency eliminates the transaction costs that are incurred when 
converting currencies. The larger the trade and investment flows between the 
countries, the greater the gain from reduced transaction costs (Inter-American 
Development Bank 2002:208). Transaction cost savings benefit businesses as well 
as tourists, and represent the most visible and easily quantifiable gain from a 
monetary union. The EC Commission has estimated these gains to members of the 
European Monetary Union and have found that small, open and less developed 
economies stand to gain the most, around one percent of their GDP. The gains for 
the larger EMU members have been estimated around 0.2 percent of national GDP 
(Emerson et al 1992:63). It should be noted that conversion costs do not constitute a 
pure gain in economic efficiency. When a common currency is introduced, the 
banks and others involved in foreign exchange transactions experience a loss with 
the disappearance of commission revenue. However, the gain for the public is 
greater than the loss of the banks and others because the transaction costs involved 
in exchanging money are a deadweight loss (De Grauwe 2003:61).  
The elimination of transaction costs also leads to an indirect gain in the form of 
more price transparency (De Grauwe 2003:61). Money does not only serve as a 
medium of exchange, it also serves as a unit of account. In a currency union there is 
only one unit of account, which facilitates the comparison of prices and wages 
across borders. The use of a common currency makes markets more transparent and 
reduces the cost of processing information, such as bookkeeping (Visser 2000:159). 
A common currency also reduces the scope for price discrimination between 
national markets. The direct comparability of prices should also increase 
competition, which will benefit consumers who will face the same lower prices in 
the end (De Grauwe 2003:61). 
2.1.2 Gains from less uncertainty 
A common currency also helps to reduce the uncertainty risk regarding exchange 
rate movements. Within a currency union nominal exchange rate uncertainty 
disappears, eliminating intra-area exchange rate risk leading to savings in hedging 
costs (Mongelli 2002:8). This is an important benefit but difficult to quantify. 
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Reduced exchange rate volatility reduces the risk premium demanded by investors 
and therefore encourages investment in the entire area of a currency union. A 
common currency integrates national financial markets, leading to higher efficiency 
in the allocation of capital in the union. Large transactions are less likely to cause a 
price shock in a large union market than in a small national market. In addition, 
financial assets are more liquid in a currency union (Visser 2000:159).  In an 
enlarged foreign exchange market the volatility of prices and the ability of 
speculators to influence prices and disrupt the conduct of monetary policy decrease 
(Tavlas 1993:668). 
2.1.3 Other benefits  
A further advantage of a common currency is that it can reinforce the discipline and 
credibility of monetary policy. If a monetary union has been known for maintaining 
low rates of inflation, than it may be advantageous for a single country to join the 
union in order to increase the credibility of its monetary policy, leading to lower 
inflationary expectations, lower inflation rates and lower wage demands (Visser 
2000:158). However, the success of a currency union depends heavily on the 
credibility of the anchor country whose currency has been adopted by others. The 
formation of a currency union in itself does not guarantee a low inflation rate. The 
choice of a credible anchor is essential. 
Another benefit arising from the adoption of a common currency is that there is no 
need to hold foreign reserves for intra-area transactions. International reserves can 
be pooled and invested in higher yielding, less liquid assets (Visser 2000:159). 
Finally, the use of a common currency can lead to an increase in international trade. 
The trade-promoting effect of common currencies can be very significant and much 
larger than one would expect from the reduced transaction costs and the elimination 
of exchange rate volatility. It is because the trade argument is an important and 
much debated benefit of common currencies that it constitutes the focus of the 
present study. 
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2.2 The costs of a common currency 
While the introduction of a common currency brings numerous benefits, it also has 
its disadvantages that result in certain costs.  A currency union should be introduced 
when the benefits of the union are greater than the costs. Whereas the benefits of a 
common currency arise mostly at the microeconomic level, the costs are mostly 
related to the macroeconomic management of the individual members of the 
currency union.  
2.2.1 Loss of monetary independence and exchange rate policy 
The main cost of a common currency is the loss of independence over monetary and 
exchange rate policy. In a full monetary union the national central banks of the 
individual member countries either stop to exist or have no real power. When a 
country gives up its national currency and joins a monetary union it loses an 
instrument of economic policy. A country that belongs to a monetary union cannot 
use the exchange rate as an instrument for protecting itself from economic shocks 
by devaluations and revaluations. It cannot determine the quantity of the national 
money in circulation, or change the short-term interest rate (De Grauwe 2003:5). 
The costs of a common currency are less severe in the case of symmetric shocks 
affecting all the members of the currency union similarly, when a common policy 
response would be appropriate. If shocks are asymmetric and affect the members 
differently, the inability to use the exchange rate to make the necessary adjustments 
could result in greater volatility in output and employment. Mundell (1961) 
discusses how exchange rate flexibility operates to adju st for disturbances caused by 
an asymmetric demand shock in a two-country model. This can be illustrated with 
the following example. Consider two countries, A and B. Assume that country A 
specializes mainly in the production of raincoats and country B spec ializes mainly 
in the production of sunglasses. The model assumes that wages are rigid in both 
countries. If in a given year the weather is unusually bad, demand for raincoats is 
high and the demand for sunglasses is low. Bad weather is an asymmetric shock, 
since its effect on the economy of country A is the opposite of its effect on country 
B. Given the specialization pattern of the countries, the result of bad weather is a 
shift in demand from goods produced in country B to goods produced in country A. 
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This could lead to higher inflation in country A and more unemployment in country 
B. If the exchange rate is flexible, the currency of country B will depreciate, leading 
to an increase in its exports, demand and employment, while the currency of A 
appreciates. This will later cause a decrease in its exports, and thus lower demand 
and lower inflation. 
If country A and country B form a currency union, the automatic stabilizing 
mechanism of the exchange rate cannot work. With a common currency the two 
countries must have the same level of interest rate, so they cannot use the interest 
rate instrument either.  If country A tries to fight inflation by raising the interest 
rate, country B would also have to increase the interest rate, making the 
unemployment problem even worse. If country B tries to reduce unemployment by 
decreasing the interest rate, the same interest rate level would increase inflation in 
country A. Therefore country A is left with inflation and country B is left with 
unemployment. 
The optimum currency area theory assumes that if a country retains the exchange 
rate as a policy instrument, its currency will only be devalued when economic 
considerations warrant the action. In practice devaluations are not necessarily done 
for the right economic reason and happen more often than warranted. Factors such 
as political instability can greatly increase the likelihood that a country will devalue 
its currency. Systematic devaluations can lead to more inflation without an increase 
in output and employment. They can also cause macroeconomic instability, as 
future devaluations are going to be expected by economic agents. Currency 
devaluation is not an instrument that can be used any time and without cost. If used 
too often, it reduces the credibility of monetary policy.  In such a situation a further 
devaluation of the currency will simply lead to spiralling wage inflation and 
governments may gain nothing from retaining the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument (Guillaume & Stasavage 2000). However, devaluations can still be 
beneficial when countries face major macroeconomic shocks, and relinquishing the 
exchange rate instrument remains an important cost associated with the formation of 
a monetary union (De Grauwe 2003:54). 
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2.2.2 Loss of seignorage 
Another cost of joining a monetary union is the loss of seignorage. Seignorage 
represents the real revenues that a government acquires by using newly issued 
money to finance its expenditure (Obstfeld & Rogoff 1996:527). It is also called 
inflation tax. Seignorage is a major source of government revenues only for 
economies suffering high inflation. Otherwise, seignorage revenues typically 
amount to less than one percent of national GDP (Emerson et al 1992:120), so it is 
not such an important cost of a monetary union.  
2.2.3 Conversion costs  
A further important cost of currency unions arises when the common currency is 
introduced. Conversion costs are more readily quantifiable than the costs associated 
with the loss of the exchange rate policy tool and can be quite high. If a common 
currency is introduced, new bills and coins have to be made available and old ones 
have to be take n out of circulation. Consumers and businesses have to convert their 
bills and coins into new ones, and convert all prices and wages into the new 
currency. These changes involve costs as banks and businesses need to update 
computer software for accounting purposes and update price lists. Vending 
machines, telephone booths, ticket machines and cash dispensers have to be adapted 
or replaced. Finally, economic agents have to get used to gathering information and 
making calculations in the new unit of account (Visser 2000:183). 
2.3 Optimum currency area criteria 
The traditional theory of optimum currency areas stemmed from the debate on the 
merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates and concentrates on identifying the 
characteristics that are relevant for choosing likely candidates for a currency union. 
A number of different criteria have been proposed which should be fulfilled for a 
currency union to be a suitable arrangement. Mundell (1961) defines optimality in 
terms of ability to stabilize national employment and price levels. An economic 
region is an optimum currency area when it exhibits characteristics that lead to an 
automatic removal of both unemployment and inflation. 
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2.3.1 Factor mobility 
Mundell (1961) argues that the existence of a high degree of factor mobility is the 
principal criterion that should determine the optimality of a currency area. If the 
degree of factor mobility between two countries is high, then they are good 
candidates for a currency union, because the mobility of factors provides a 
substitute for exchange rate flexibility in adjusting for asymmetric demand shocks 
and a flexible exchange system becomes unnecessary (Mundell 1961:664).  
The equilibrating mechanism of perfect labour mobility can be illustrated with the 
previously used example of country A, specializing in the production of raincoats, 
and country B, specializing in the production of sunglasses. When workers in the 
sunglass industry in country B become unemployed because of the lack of demand 
due to bad weather, they will move to country A where there is an excess demand 
for labour in the raincoat industry. This will reduce unemployment in country B and 
the increase in the supply of la bour in country A will stop the inflationary pressure 
on wages in the simple example. The adjustment problem for the two countries will, 
in principle, disappear automatically if the mobility of labour is sufficiently high. 
Although Mundell (1961) suggests factor mobility as the criterion for optimal 
currency areas, his analysis focuses on labour mobility. As far as capital mobility is 
concerned, its mitigating effect in the event of payments disequilibria among the 
members of a monetary union is uncertain. The higher the degree of capital mobility 
the greater will be the shift in capital flows, but there is no guarantee that these will 
be of the equilibrating and not of the disequilibrating kind (Fleming 1971:473). On 
the other hand, the mitigating effect of factor mobility is much more certain in the 
case of labour mobility. The greater the mobility of labour the greater the extent of 
the transfer of workers from one country to another and the greater the resulting 
reduction in unemployment and inflation in the respective countries. However, the 
transfer of labour from one country to another is likely to be associated with a 
transfer of workers’ expenditure from the countries of emigration to the countries of 
immigration. This will reduce the stabilizing effect of labour mobility, but it will not 
eliminate it. Fleming (1971:472) also notes that a transfer of labour caused by a shift 
in demand is not necessarily justifiable from a structural point of view, and may 
later have to be reversed. Various authors point out that the migration of labour may 
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carry high costs (Corden 1972:15; Visser 2000:1167). New homes and 
infrastructure need to be built in country A, while living conditions deteriorate in 
country B, which has become depressed. While it is desirable to avoid 
unemployment, excessive movement of labour out of the country should be avoided.  
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted on labour mobility as a possible 
adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks, the majority focusing on Europe and 
comparing it with the US, assuming that the latter approximates an optimum 
currency area.  Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) investigate the degree of labour market 
integration for eight US regions and eight EU countries and find that interregional 
labour mobility appears to be a much more important adjustment mechanism in the 
United States, which has a more integrated labour market than the EU.  De Grauwe 
and Vanhaverbeke (1993) compare interregional mobility to inter-country mobility 
across European countries and show that the yearly flow of migrants between 
countries is less than one tenth of the yearly flow of migrants between regions. 
Puhani (1999) estimates the elasticity of migration with respect to changes and 
unemployment and income for Germany, France and Italy. It is shown that labour 
mobility is highest in Germany, but even there, the accommodation of a shock to 
unemployment by migration takes years, therefore labour mobility in Europe is 
extremely unlikely to act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism to asymmetric 
shocks. Decressin and Fatás (1995) also find that in Europe migration is only 
important four years after a shock, and a decline in regional labour demand is met 
mostly by lower labour -force participation. Buiter (1995) argues that even in the 
United States inter-state labour mobility does not compensate for the absence of 
state-level exchange rate flexibility, since it is rather a more permanent or long-term 
mobility, while the kind of mobility required to compensate fully for the loss of the 
exchange rate tool is a strictly temporary migration. In general it can be concluded 
that Western Europe does not meet the OCA criteria of labour mobility, which is 
hindered by linguistic and cultural differences. However, labour mobility is only 
one of the possible adjustment mechanisms that can make a currency area optimal. 
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2.4 Wage and price flexibility 
Another automatic equilibrating mechanism in the face of an asymmetric demand 
shock would be perfect wage and price flexibility. If prices and wages were both 
entirely flexible, there would be no need for relative exchange rate adjustments in a 
monetary union. Workers, who become unemployed in the depressed country 
because of a decrease in demand for the product that they produce, will reduce their 
wage claims. In the prosperous country where there has bee n an increase in demand 
for a product, there will also be an increase in the demand for labour that will push 
up the equilibrium wage rate. At the same time, this adjustment improves the 
current account of the depressed country and reduces the current account surplus of 
the prospering country. However, this is only a theoretical possibility, since in 
reality wages and prices are not perfectly flexible. Collective bargaining in the 
labour market and monopoly power in the goods market have significantly reduced 
the extent to which wages and prices are flexible (Fleming 1971:471). 
2.4.1 Openness of the economy 
McKinnon (1963) suggests that the most important criterion for the formation of 
optimum currency areas should be the openness of an economy. He argues that the 
more open an economy, the greater the need for fixed exchange rates to prevent any 
price instability caused by exchange rate fluctuations. A corollary of this argument 
is that a small country will be more inclined to join a currency area, since the 
smaller the size of the economy, the more open it is likely to be. 
The appropriate definition of openness is a major practical problem. McKinnon 
(1963:717) himself defines openness as the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods 
in domestic production and consumption. A tradable good can be either an 
exportable or importable good. The higher the ratio of tradable goods to non-
tradable goods, the more beneficial the formation of a currency area would be. In a 
relatively open economy flexible exchange rate changes are less effective in curing 
any trade imbalance. Furthermore, such flexibility is more harmful to domestic price 
stability in a more open economy. This view has been criticized by Corden (Presley 
& Dennis 1976:50), who argues that if the cause of price instability emanates from a 
disturbance abroad, then flexible rates would pr otect the country from such 
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disturbances. If this assumption is made, the more open an economy is, the more 
harmful fixed exchange rates are, which means that McKinnon’s argument is turned 
on its head. If, however, disturbances are assumed to emanate from the domestic 
economy, McKinnon’s argument is valid and openness is a desirable characteristic 
of an economy wishing to enter a monetary union. The openness criteria will be 
revisited in Chapter 3 where it is argued that instead of being a precondition, 
countries become more open as a result of the formation of a currency union, 
because currency union members tend to trade more. 
2.4.2 The degree of product diversification 
Kenen (1969) suggests that the suitability of introducing a currency area is a 
function of the product mix diversity of the economies in question. Highly 
diversified economies are better candidates for currency areas than less diversified 
ones. His major argument is that a highly diversified economy can give up exchange 
rate changes, since it is unlikely to suffer a recession due to a shift in demand away 
from one product group (Presley & Dennis 1976:60).  Although each of its exports 
may be subject to shocks, the law of large numbers will come into play if the shocks 
are independent. In a highly diversified economy one can expect both positive and 
negative shocks and shocks will tend to average out over time.  Aggregate exports 
will be more stable than in an economy less thoroughly diversified.   
When an economy experiences a fall in the demand for its principal export, the size 
of the required change in its real exchange rate depends on the degree of 
diversification. In a single-product economy, workers who lose their jobs due to a 
fall in exports will not be able to be absorbed into the economy, and the real 
exchange rate must change by enough to offset the fall in demand. In a two-product 
economy, with an export good and an import-competing good, the required change 
of the exchange rate will be  smaller, since depreciation will also stimulate demand 
for the import-competing good (Kenen 2000:10). Furthermore, the links between 
external and domestic demand, especially the link between exports and investment, 
tend to be weaker in a diversified economy. The fall in output and employment 
caused by a fall in the demand for one of its exports will not be greatly increased by 
a corresponding fall in total capital formation. Product diversification insulates 
against a variety of shocks, obviating the need to use the exchange rate.  
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The proble m with the product diversification criterion is that there is no stable 
solution if applied in practice (Frankel & Rose 1996). If a country is sufficiently 
diversified to form a currency union with its neighbour, it follows that the larger 
unit that is created will be even more diversified. This would lead to a further 
enlargement of the currency union, until the entire world is using one currency. On 
the other hand, if individual regions are not sufficiently diversified, they should 
break up into smaller currency units. These smaller units would be even less 
diversified and would break up into even smaller units, leading to an endless 
process of dissolution. Therefore no interior solution is an equilibrium. 
2.4.3 Similarity of inflation rates 
According to Fleming (1971:476) members of optimum currency areas should have 
roughly similar inflation rates. If the difference in inflation rates between members 
is substantial for long periods, then fixed exchange rates cannot be maintained. 
Large differences in inflation rates make a common monetary policy difficult. 
Circumstances that favour similarity in wage inflation are similar national 
employment goals, similar rates of productivity growth and similar degree of trade 
union aggressiveness. Similarity in all of these respects is not necessary; differe nces 
in one respect can be offset by differences in another. 
Tavlas (1993:673) argues that the time inconsistency issue reverses the ordering 
between similarity of inflation rates and participation in a currency area, similarity 
of inflation rate being a desirable outcome and not a precondition of such 
participation. Since inflation rates are subject to manipulation, they cannot be used 
as a criterion to decide which countries would make an optimum currency area. 
Instead, countries wishing to form a monetary union should take measures to reach 
converging inflation rates. Countries that have the same historical inflation patterns 
can achieve such convergence relatively easily. In the case of countries with 
different historical rates of inflation, the convergence of inflation rates can be 
expected to be more difficult to achieve. 
2.4.4 Other criteria 
The list of desirable characteristics that prospective currency union members should 
possess is almost endless. For example, it has been suggested that countries with 
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similar industrial structures are better candidates for a currency union because they 
are affected in a similar way by sector specific shocks (Tavlas 1993:667). 
Furthermore, countries may have different industria l structures, but they will still be 
good candidates for a currency union if they exhibit high level of business cycle 
symmetry. High cyclical covariation of economic activities indicates that the 
countries are likely to experience common economic shocks, and this reduces the 
significance of exchange rate adjustments (Jonung & Sjöholm 1998:4). Fiscal 
integration also contributes to the suitability of a common currency arrangement. 
Fiscal integration between two areas increases their ability to smooth out 
asymmetric shocks through fiscal transfers from a low unemployment region to a 
high-unemployment region (Tavlas 1993:667). While it is possible to have a 
monetary union without political union, fiscal integration usually implies that the 
members of a currency union also form a political union.  
The traditional theory of optimal currency areas defines the ideal economic 
conditions for monetary integration. In reality, economic conditions are usually not 
the only factors influencing the decision whether or not a single currency should be 
introduced. Historical, cultural and political factors also play part in influencing the 
decision. In fact, Mintz (Jonung & Sjöholm 1998:4) argues that the most important 
criterion for monetary integration is the politica l will to integrate. Without a strong 
political will by the leaders in government and without public support, there would 
be no real commitment to the currency union, which in turn can lead to the demise 
of the union. Cohen (2001) verifies the importance of political factors in an 
empirical study of seven past examples of formal currency unions and finds that 
political factors dominate over economic ones in successful currency unions. He 
notes that most work on the theory of OCAs concentrates on economic factors 
thought to be decisive in a government’s selection of an exchange -rate policy at a 
particular point in time, rather than on conditions that might ensure the durability of 
a currency union, once made, over time. The evidence suggests that political 
conditions are most instrumental in determining the durability of commitments to 
currency unification. 
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2.5 Formal models of optimum currency areas  
The various contributions to the traditional theory of optimum currency areas that 
have been discussed present verbal arguments for and against monetary integration 
rather than formal models. The different optimum currency area criteria that have 
been suggested are difficult or impossible to measure and cannot be formally 
weighted against each other. In his analysis of the deadlocks in the optimum 
currency literature, Melitz (1995b:493) emphasized the need for a general 
equilibrium approach. In the 1990s, plans for the formation of the EMU led to 
renewed interest in optimum currency areas, and efforts have been made to 
formalize the basic concepts of the traditional theory and to evaluate their relative 
importance. Many economists, including Bayoumi (1994), Ricci (1997) and Beine 
and Docquier (1998) developed general equilibrium models of currency unions, 
allowing for the various criteria that have been set out in the literature on optimum 
currency areas to be integrated and compared.  
In Bayoumi's (1994) model of optimum currency areas the world is made up of a 
number of regions, each specializing in a particular good. Each region has a choice 
between having a separate currency and joining other regions in a currency union. 
Many of the traditional OCA criteria are incorporated in the model and the choice of 
a currency union is shown to depend upon the size and correlation of underlying 
disturbances, labour mobility across regions, the costs of transactions across 
currencies and the interrelationships between the demand for different goods 
(Bayoumi 1994:537). The model also provides insight on the welfare effects of 
currency unions. It is found that a currency union can raise the welfare of regions 
within a union, but it always lowers welfare for the rest of the world (Bayoumi 
1994:552). The reason is that the benefits of the union, in the form of lower 
transaction costs, are limited to the members of the union, while the costs of the 
union, in the form of lower output due to the interaction between the common 
exchange rate and the nominal rigidity, affect both members and non-members. 
While this result depends on the underlying assumptions of the model, the idea that 
a currency union may not be beneficial to non-members is an important issue. A 
further result of the model is that the incentives for a country to join a currency 
union differ from the incentives to admit a country into a union. New entrants gain 
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from lower transaction costs on trade with the entire union, whereas members of the 
existing union only gain on their trade with the new entrants. A small region’s 
incentive to join a union will therefore be greater than the union’s incentive to admit 
the new member. Furthermore, even if a country prefers free-floating exchange 
rates, it may still have an incentive to join a prospective currency union, because it 
would be affected by the welfare losses of the union even if it did not join (Bayoumi 
1994:552). 
Bayoumi's model is an important milestone in the formalization of OCA theory, but 
it considers only the real aspects of currency areas, such as the correlation of real 
shocks, labour mobility, openness and diversification. Monetary aspects and their 
interaction with the real aspects are not analysed in the model. Ricci (1997) attempts 
the simultaneous analysis of both the real and monetary aspects of the OCA 
literature and presents a two-country model to investigate the circumstances under 
which it is beneficial to participate in a currency area. His results are in line with 
most but not all of the traditional arguments.  He finds that the net benefits that a 
country expects from monetary integration increase with the correlation of real 
shocks between the two countries, since the exchange rate becomes less useful as an 
instrument of adjustment. Net benefits also increase with the degree of international 
labour mobility and the degree of adjustment provided by fiscal transfers, as these 
substitute for the exchange rate (Ricci 1997:33). Certain factors decrease the net 
benefits of forming a currency union. One of these is the variability of real shocks, 
which generate adjustment costs in a currency union. The variability of foreign 
monetary shocks is another factor that decreases the net benefits, since these can be 
transmitted to the domestic economy in a currency union. Finally, higher correlation 
of monetary shocks across countries also decreases the net benefits, since the 
probability that these shocks neutralize each other is smaller in a currency union 
(Ricci 1997:33).  
The unexpected result of Ricci’s study is that the effect of the degree of openness on 
the net benefits is ambiguous when both monetary and real shocks are accounted 
for. This is in contrast with the usual argument that more open economies are better 
candidates for a currency union (McKinnon 1963). According to Ricci's analysis, 
the effect of the degree of openness on the net benefits differs depending on the 
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relative importance of the various components of the net benefits (Ricci 1997:32).  
An increase in openness increases the net benefits arising from the elimination of 
the deadweight and efficiency losses associated with multiple currencies, since 
savings on transactions costs are greater in more open economies than in relatively 
closed ones. On the other hand, an increase in openness also increases the relevance 
of trade shocks, which reduce the net benefits of a currency union. The larger the 
adjustment provided by labour mobility and by a fiscal tool, the smaller the negative 
effect of trade shocks on net benefits. Higher correlation between real shocks across 
countries also mitigates the negative effect of trade shocks (Ricci 1997:32). Finally, 
greater openness also increases the relevance of monetary shocks, with uncertain 
effects. If monetary shocks are negatively correlated across countries, net benefits 
will increase with greater openness. If monetary shocks are positively correlated 
across counties, net benefits will only increase if domestic monetary variability is 
higher than the foreign one, otherwise net benefits will decrease. In other words, the 
country with higher monetary instability would gain stability from the formation of 
a currency union, and the more open it is, the  more it would gain (Ricci 1997:34). 
The important implication of Ricci’s (1997) result is that two countries do not 
necessarily agree on the desirability of creating a given currency union, since their 
net benefits will tend to differ. It is conceivable therefore that a country intent on 
forming a currency union with another country will find opposition from the 
intended partner, if the latter is to gain less from the currency union than its 
prospective partner. The conditions under which the two countries have the same 
net benefits are in general too restrictive (Ricci 1997:34). 
Both Bayoumi (1994) and Ricci (1997) present a static model of optimum currency 
areas. This implies that the applicability of the models is limited, since static models 
cannot analyse changes over time. Beine and Docquier (1998) extend Ricci's model 
by introducing the intertemporal dimension, thus allowing a more accurate analysis 
of factor mobility and shock dynamics. If labour mobility is analysed in a dynamic 
model, then it is possible to account for the time needed to move from one country 
to another. A dynamic model also makes it possible to distinguish between 
temporary and permanent shocks. The results of Beine and Docquier’s (1998) 
model a re broadly consistent with those obtained by Ricci (1997) but there are some 
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notable differences. Beine and Docquier (1998:251) find that the cost of a monetary 
union can increase over time if demand shocks become less symmetric as a result of 
closer integration. Regarding the effect of the openness of the economy, Beine and 
Docquier (1998:241) find that it unambiguously increases the desirability of a 
monetary union. However, their model is a barter one, while Ricci's also includes 
the monetary aspects, and monetary shocks have been found to have uncertain 
effects on the net benefits of a monetary union (Ricci 1997:34). 
Beine and Docquier (1998) also assess the Mundellian criterion of labour mobility 
and find that it is an efficient channel of adjustment in the presence of permanent 
shocks. However, in the presence of temporary random shocks, labour migration is 
not an efficient adjustment tool. This result stems from the assumption that 
migrations occur during the period after the decision to migrate is made. The 
authors conclude that labour mobility is a criterion that can be used to establish 
whether a geographic zone is close to an OCA, provided that this zone is subject to 
asymmetric shocks that are permanent and not just temporary (Beine & Docquier 
1998:244). 
Another notable feature of Beine and Docquier’s (1998) model is the estimation of a 
threshold value for transaction costs above which a currency union becomes 
desirable. In the presence of fiscal federalism the formation of a monetary union is 
estimated to be beneficial when transaction costs are higher than 1.2 percent of 
GDP. On the other hand, without the adjustments provided by the fiscal tool, a 
monetary union is only desirable if transaction costs exceed 1.6 percent of GDP. 
The consequences of fiscal federalism are thus found to be highly relevant in the 
decision concerning the formation of a currency union.  
The argument that a currency area may be optimal from the point of view of a single 
country but may not be optimal from the point of view of its partners, has been 
taken up by Demopoulos and Yannacopoulos (2001). They criticize the 
marginalistic approach adopted by Melitz (1995a) that seeks to determine the 
optimum size of a currency area from the point of view of a single country. The 
assumption in the marginalistic analysis is that a given country is too small to be an 
optimal currency area on its own, and it has to be enlarged to reach the optimum 
size. The optimum size occurs when the welfare function of this particular country 
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is maximized. The expansion of a given currency area is treated as a continuous 
variable ranging from zero to one; zero if the currency area does not extend beyond 
the borders of the country in question, and one if all sources of imports and 
competition in trade are included in the union (Melitz 1995a:281). The optimal 
order in which new members are admitted to the union is a central aspect of the 
problem. 
The main drawback of the marginalistic approach is that it cannot be applied in 
cases where a monetary union results from an agreement of the member parties. The 
determination of the optimal area of the currency union for the country in question 
does not necessarily imply that this area is also optimal for its partners. If the 
partner countries find that the proposed area is not optimal for them, they may 
refuse to join a currency area in which the ir benefits are not maximized. In an 
attempt to account for countries’ different benefits, Demopoulos and 
Yannacopoulos (2001) present an alternative view of an OCA based on cooperative 
game theory. They start from the assumption that there is a currency area of a given 
size and try to determine under what conditions this area is optimal. They conclude 
that a currency area is an OCA if the benefits derived by its members are in the 
core, meaning that all members are better off with a common currency. It is argued 
that the existence of the core is independent of the degree of economic similarity of 
the member countries; therefore the traditional OCA criteria may not constitute a 
safe policy guide in determining the members of a successful monetary union. It is 
also found that free factor mobility may strengthen the case for a common currency 
in the presence of international economies of scale, even if the member countries 
are structurally dissimilar (Demopoulos & Yannacopoulos 2001:23).  
Another recent effort at formalizing the optimum currency area theory is the model 
by Alesina and Barro (2002) that seeks to determine which countries are most likely 
to benefit from adopting a foreign currency.  They show that the determination of 
optimal currency areas depends on a number of variables including the sizes of 
countries, their distances, trading costs and correlations between shocks. It is 
established that countries with an inabilit y to achieve monetary and price stability 
on their own stand to benefit from adopting a foreign currency. Monetary 
integration is also beneficial if the economic disturbances of a country are highly 
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correlated with those of the potential anchor whose currency is to be adopted. Small 
countries that are highly dependent on foreign trade or those that are close in 
distance to potential anchors and therefore could potentially trade a lot with each 
other could also benefit from a currency union. In summary, the country with the 
strongest incentive to give up its own currency is a small open economy with a 
history of high inflation and with a business cycle highly correlated with that of a 
large, nearby and monetarily stable country with which it is trading heavily. Given 
these considerations, the most likely currency union will have an anchor country 
credibly committed to price stability, and this anchor will provide the currency and 
the monetary policy for the union. The other, client members of the currency union 
would be small countries close to the anchor, which trade a lot with the anchor 
(Alesina & Barro 2001:17). 
On the basis of this cost-benefit analysis Alesina and Barro try to determine how 
many currency unions there should be in the world. While they do not mention an 
exact number, they suggest that as the number of countries increases and their 
average size decreases, the optimal number of currencies may not only increase less 
than proportionally, but may even fall. They conclude that the tendency to currency 
unification is likely to increase as the number of independent countries increa ses, 
especially if these new countries are small and heavily dependent on international 
trade and financial integration. The number of currencies in the world is therefore 
higher than the optimal number of currency areas (Alesina & Barro 2002: 435). 
2.6 Identifying optimum currency areas 
The theory of optimum currency areas has often been criticized for having little or 
no predictive power. The factors that can be used to consider whether or not an area 
should have a single currency are difficult to measure una mbiguously and cannot be 
formally weighted against each other. Nevertheless, this has not prevented 
economists from attempting to identify which economies would form optimum 
currency areas.  
Ghosh and Wolf (1994) adopt a continuous approach towards determining optimum 
currency areas and seek to determine the optimal number of currencies needed for 
any given country group. They argue that there is no reason to believe that for a 
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region with n countries the optimal monetary arrangement will be either a single 
currency or n independent currencies. They find that there is little correlation 
between geographical proximity and the optimal currency area groupings. If 
potential monetary unions were restricted to contiguous areas, the  cost of adopting a 
single currency would be prohibitively high for most regions considered. Instead, 
optimal currency areas in their model are formed by countries that are 
geographically disconnected.   
In contrast to Ghosh and Wolf (1994), Artis, Kohler and Melitz (1998) tend to 
identify monetary unions more on a geographical basis. They attempt to identify 
optimum currency areas in the world on the basis of only two of the traditional OCA 
criteria, high level of bilateral trade and shock symmetry. They disregard labour 
mobility and fiscal federalism, arguing that “international labour mobility is mainly 
low, even among close trading partners, and fiscal federalism generally does not 
exist at all on a supra-national level” (Artis et al 1998:539). They also mention the 
possibility that the trade criterion alone might be sufficient, since the shock 
symmetry criterion will tend to be met progressively once the monetary union is 
formed. Based on the trade criterion, they identify four large optimum currency 
areas. The first is in Western Europe, the second occupies Mesoamerica and part of 
South America, the third is in the Middle East, and the fourth encompasses the 
ASEAN area. Adding the criteria of shock symmetry reduces the size of the OCAs 
considerably, and the results imply, for example, that the European Monetary Union 
is already too large (Artis et al 1998:566). However, if the trade and shock 
symmetry criteria are endogenous, this judgment could be reversed. The suggested 
positive correlation between monetary union, bilateral trade intensity and symmetry 
of output fluctuations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) also seek to determine optimum currency areas 
on a geographical basis. They explore the incentives for different countries to adopt 
the dollar, the euro or the yen. They find that there appear to be reasonably well-
defined, geographically connected dollar and euro areas, but there does not seem to 
be a yen area. They argue that the differences between their findings and those of 
Ghosh and Wolf (1994) arise because the latter “do not emphasize the link between 
currency unions and trade and because they assume a very high cost from imperfect 
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synchronization of business cycles” (Alesina et al 2002: 17). However, a currency 
union can lead to important trade benefits that can compensate for the loss of 
monetary autonomy. Since trade costs increase with distance, the trade benefit 
would be higher in geographically connected currency areas. The potential trade 
benefit of a currency union is the main focus of this dissertation and its various 
aspects are investigated in the remaining chapters. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The traditional theory of optimum cur rency areas concentrates on identifying those 
specific characteristics that are relevant for choosing the likely participants in a 
currency union. These criteria represent a range of economic conditions, among 
others, the intensity of trade with other potential members of the currency union, 
and the extent to which domestic business cycles are correlated with those of 
potential partners. In general, a country’s costs and benefits from joining a currency 
union depend on how closely integrated its economy is with those of its potential 
partners. However, most of the criteria are difficult to quantify and cannot be 
formally weighted against each other. The old theory lacks a formal analysis for the 
determination of the optimum domain of a currency area. Efforts to formalize the 
basic concepts of the traditional theory produce general equilibrium models that 
integrate the various OCA criteria and provide significant results. An important 
point that emerges is that a currency area may be optimal from the point of view of 
a single country but may not be optimal from the point of view of its partners. This 
has important policy implications and cautions against too much optimism 
regarding the formation of further currency unions in the world. Empirical studies 
trying to identify optimum currency areas in the world provide inconclusive 
evidence but are generally pessimistic. The costs of adopting a single currency are 
too high for most regions. However, the traditional theory of optimum currency 
areas ignores the possibility that the costs and benefits of participating in a currency 
union may change over time. If there is a possibility that costs decrease and benefits 
increase after the formation of a currency union, then instead of asking if a certain 
area forms an optimum currency area, one should rather ask if a proposed currency 
union is a feasible currency area. The possibility that OCA criteria are not static but 
may change over time is discussed in the next chapter. 
 32 
CHAPTER THREE  
THE ENDOGENEITY OF THE OPTIMUM CURRENCY 
AREA CRITERIA 
The causality implied by the traditional theory of optimum currency areas runs from 
economic integration to monetary integration. The more two countries trade with 
each other and the more similar their business cycles are, the better candidates they 
are for a common currency. Empirical studies (see section 2.5) that try to identify 
optimum currency areas assess the various OCA criteria on the basis of past 
information. If the analysis of historical data shows that two countries trade little 
with each other and their business cycles are asymmetric, then they should not form 
a currency union in terms of OCA theory. The conclusion about the non-optimality 
of the currency area is based on the assumption that the various OCA criteria are 
exogenous, unchanging variables. This assumption is challenged by a theoretical 
development that questions the exogeneity of OCA criteria and the one-way 
causality between economic integration and monetary union. The emerging 
argument is that the various characteristics embodied in the OCA criteria can 
change over time once a currency union has been formed. Trade intensity and 
business cycle symmetry may increase as a result of the adoption of a common 
currency. Real integration can follow monetary integration and the relationship 
between the two is characterized by two-way causality. The purpose of this chapter 
is to show that the factors by which the optimality of a monetary union is assessed 
are not static but evolve as a result of the formation of the union.  
A naï ve examination of historical data gives a misleading picture of a country’s 
suitability for entry into a currency union, since optimum currency area (OCA) 
criteria are endogenous (Frankel & Rose 1997:754, 1998:1010). Countries that enter 
a currency union are likely to experience various structural changes. Sharing a 
common currency may bring countries closer together. Countries that fail the 
optimality criteria and should not form a currency union in terms of the OCA theory 
may satisfy the criteria with the passing of time if they go ahead with the formation 
of the monetary union. The famous Lucas Critique provides the theoretical basis for 
the argued two-way causality between real and monetary integration (see section 
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3.1). Most of the endogeneity literature is concerned with two criteria, trade 
intensity and business cycle correlations. There are two opposing views regarding 
the exact nature of the endogeneity of these criteria, each supported by relevant 
empirical studies. The resultant debate together with an attempt to consolidate the 
seemingly conflicting views is presented in sections 3.2 to 3.5. The possible 
endogeneity of other OCA criteria is discussed next. Finally, a theoretical model of 
endogenous optimum currency areas is analysed. 
3.1 The Lucas Critique  
The argument that the various OCA criteria are endogenous is a straightforward 
application of the Lucas Critique of inappropriate policy evaluation based on 
historical evidence only (Lucas 1976:126). The Lucas Critique states that the 
structure of an economy is endogenous to the economic policies applied to it. Any 
new economic policy that is introduced will change the rules of the game. If there is 
a change in economic policy, this will bring structural changes in the economy, 
change expectations and actual behaviour that govern market supply and demand. 
Because of these changes it is impossible to forecast the effects of a policy from 
past evidence.  
The Lucas Critique has generally been regarded as ‘a nuisance that plagues all 
applied empirical research, namely that it has to rely on historical data to predict 
outcomes in future that fails to obey the ceteris paribus clause’ (Schelkle 2001:21). 
However, the Lucas Critique has considerable relevance for decisions about the 
formation of new currency unions or the enlargement of present ones. The 
traditional OCA theory did not distinguish between monetary integration as the 
fixing of a bilateral exchange rate and the market result of fixing it (Schelkle 
2001:21). Policy and policy outcome were regarded as identical, whereas one has to 
distinguish between the policy, namely the unification of monetary policy, and the 
outcome of the policy, for example the synchronization of national business cycles. 
Monetary integration is a fundamental change of the monetary policy regime; 
therefore it is unwarranted to say that a proposed currency union should not be 
formed because the area is not an OCA. An important implication of the Lucas 
Critique is that the listing of OCA criteria to be fulfilled before the formation of a 
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currency union is pointless  (Sc helkle 2001:2). The optimality of a currency area 
can increase as a result of monetary integration. 
3.2 The effect of monetary integration on shock symmetry 
In Mundell’s (1961) classical analysis countries experience an asymmetric demand 
shock. If these countries are in a currency union, then they cannot use independent 
monetary and exchange rate policy to deal with such a shock. It follows that the 
higher the business cycle correlation of two countries the lower the probability of 
asymmetric demand shocks and the better candidates they are for a currency union. 
However, in terms of the Lucas Critique, it is reasonable to expect that a currency 
union will affect the nature and symmetry of shocks that countries face after 
monetary integration has taken place. Normally it is assumed that the effect of 
monetary unification on business cycle correlation works via the trade channel. The 
two main criteria considered in the OCA theory – the extent of trade and the 
correlation of business cycles are not independent from each other and both are 
likely to change after monetary integration. Entry into a currency union may 
increase international trade and increased trade can be expected to affect the nature 
of national business cycles. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the effect of increased trade integration on the 
correlation of business cycles across countries is ambiguous. The few economists 
who have identified the importance of the endogeneity of trade patterns and income 
correlation are divided on the nature of relationship between the two. There are two 
opposing views. 
The one view is that closer international trade could lead to more symmetric 
business cycles. The reason is that integration reflects an intensification of 
intraindustry specialization, which leads to higher diversification of each country’s 
output. As trade links strengthen, income will become more tightly correlated, 
reducing the impact of industry-specific shocks and thereby increasing the 
optimality of a monetary union. The other view is that an increase in international 
trade volumes leads to less symmetric business cycles. Reduced trade barriers can 
result in increased industrial specialization by country and can lead to more 
asymmetric business cycles. These two different views are called the endogeneity of 
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OCA hypothesis and the Krugman specialization hypothesis respectively (Mongelli 
2002). 
3.3 The endogeneity of OCA hypothesis 
The endogeneity of OCA hypothesis is the more generally accepted view about 
shocks in a monetary union. It is also called  ‘The European Commission View’ 
because it was defended in a report by the Commission (De Grauwe 2003:25). In 
terms of the endogeneity hypothesis of OCA criteria, stronger trade links and 
monetary integration synchronize business cycles between countries. Economic 
integration leads to concentration and agglomeration effects, but with increased 
market integration national borders become less relevant in influencing the location 
of economic activities. It becomes more likely that clusters of economic activity 
overlap borders. Regions may still be affected by asymmetric shocks, but if the 
region affected transgresses borders, then the countries concerned will be affected in 
the same way. Therefore the occurrence of asymmetric shocks between countries 
becomes less likely with economic integration (De Grauwe 2003:25). 
The view that business cycles may become more similar across countries when 
countries trade more and the relevance of this for monetary integration has been 
highlighted by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998). They argue that this positive 
relationship is possible if demand shocks predominate or if intraindustry trade 
accounts for most trade (Frankel & Rose 1997:754, 1998:1010). The correlation of 
business cycles is endogenous with respect to trade integration, while trade 
integration is also affected by monetary integration. Strictly speaking, endogeneity 
of the optimum currency area criteria could also mean that these criteria change for 
the worse and render monetary unification less optimal and more costly. However, 
in all work on the topic endogeneity means that the optimality of the monetary 
union is increased after its formation, in most cases implying that business cycles 
become more correlated. This view is known as the endogeneity hypothesis.  
Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) test their more trade – more cycle symmetry 
hypothesis empirically, using a panel of bilateral trade and business cycle data 
covering twenty industrialized countries over thirty years. They estimate regressions 
where the dependent variable is a proxy for the bilateral correlation between real 
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economic activity in two countries and the explanatory variable is a measure of 
bilateral trade intensity. The estimates indicate that the effect of greater bilateral 
trade intensity on the bilateral correlation between real economic activity in a pair of 
countries is strongly positive and statistically significant (Frankel & Rose 1997:758, 
1998:1020).  
The evidence that countries with closer trade links have more highly correlated 
business cycles leads the authors to conclude that a country is more likely to satisfy 
the criteria for entry into a currency union ex post, than ex ante (Frankel & Rose 
1997:759, 1998:1023). In other words, it is possible that countries that historically 
do not satisfy the OCA criteria may satisfy the criteria after joining the currency 
union. The adoption of a common currency encourages trade, which in turn leads to 
more symmetric business cycles. The cost of giving up independent monetary and 
exchange rate policy is lower when business cycles are more symmetric. In this way 
optimality of a currency area can be achieved after its formation. 
The endogeneity hypothesis has met with some skepticism. Imbs (1998) questions 
the findings of Frankel and Rose (1998) and maintains that the claim that more trade 
leads to more synchronized business cycles needs to be qualified. He argues that the 
role that foreign trade can play in the synchronization of national business cycles is 
limited, since both bilateral trade and business cycles ma y respond simultaneously 
to omitted, time-invariant factors, which are of a geographic or institutional nature. 
Even though a fixed exchange rate regime might result in more trade, and thus make 
a common currency endogenously more desirable, the intensity of bilateral trade 
will not have any impact on business cycle symmetry. Instead, the main 
determinants that explain the co-movements of national business cycle indicators 
are relative economic structures, relative sectoral production patterns and relative 
total economy incomes (Belke & Heine 2001:8).  
In a similar vein, Fidrmuc (2004) re-estimates the specification of Frankel and Rose 
(1998) using bilateral levels of intraindustry trade between OECD countries in the 
1990s. The results suggest that intraindustry trade promotes the convergence of 
business cycles between trading partners. However, no direct relation between 
business cycles and trade intensity is found. Although this result seems to confirm 
the OCA endogeneity hypothesis, since intraindustry trade leads to more business 
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cycle symmetry, it also highlights the role of structural variables and specialization. 
It is the particular structure of foreign trade and not the direct effect of bilateral 
trade that promotes the synchronization of business cycles across countries. Fidrmuc 
(2004:11) also emphasizes the point that a currency union will only increase 
cyclical convergence if there is already a sufficient symmetry in the shocks and 
institutional structure across the countries. 
3.3.1 The endogeneity hypothesis and the European Monetary Union   
According to Babetski (2003:9), a natural experiment for testing the endogeneity 
hypothesis would be the case of European Union accession countries (ten of which 
have in the meantime become members of EU with the view of joining EMU in the 
near future). In the past decade trade between the EU and the accession countries 
has significantly increased and many of them have pegged their currencies to the 
euro. If the endogeneity hypothesis is cor rect, then levels of shock asymmetries 
should have decreased between these countries. Babetski (2003) analysis the degree 
of synchronization of demand and supply shocks between the European Union and 
the candidate countries and finds that demand shocks have converged, while supply 
shocks remain asymmetric. Furthermore, an increase in trade intensity is associated 
with higher symmetry of demand shocks but lower symmetry of supply shocks. 
Babetski (2003:3, 20) offers the following economic interpretation of his result. The 
effect of trade on demand shock symmetry is positive, since intraindustry trade 
accounts for a large share of the trade of candidate countries, while supply shock 
asymmetry can be viewed as an indication of restructuring, as the process of 
‘catching up at work’. Productivity gains in accession countries translate into 
increases in per capita incomes. Higher trade intensity, due to an increase in 
intraindustry trade, suggests a positive link between trade and restructuring which 
leads to the observed negative effect of trade on supply shock symmetry.  The 
results also indicate that a decrease in exchange rate volatility is accompanied with 
higher symmetry of demand shocks. Attempts by some accession countries to fix 
their currencies to the euro have contributed to the synchronization of demand 
shocks.  The overall results of the study support the endogeneity of OCA criteria 
hypothesis which states that trade links and monetary integration synchronize 
business cycles between countries. Babetski (2003:21) concludes that - in terms of 
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costs associated with shocks asymmetry - entering the EMU would not be so costly 
for the accession countries. 
Some pre-EMU studies also hint at endogeneity, focusing on the change over time 
in business cycle symmetry across countries. Artis and Zhang (1997) argue tha t 
successful fixed exchange rate regimes impose policy disciplines that lead to 
converging business cycles in participating countries. Looking at the business cycles 
of countries that participated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of pegging 
the exchange rates in preparation for full monetary integration and dividing the 
sample period between a pre- and post-ERM period it is found that ERM members’ 
business cycles have become more similar to the German cycle than to the US cycle 
since the creation of the ERM. The data clearly indicate the emergence of a 
European business cycle (Artis & Zhang 1997:14). The nominal exchange rate peg 
of the ERM agreement and the degree to which these arrangements were credible 
seem to explain this phenomenon. The authors add an important qualification: the 
results do not in themselves support an unequivocal causal interpretation. It is also 
possible that the shift in business cycle affiliation permitted sustained participation 
in the ERM and not the other way around.  They also note that the two 
interpretations are not mutually exclusive, clearly suggesting the possibility of a 
two-way relationship between monetary and real integration. 
Similar conclusions are reached by Fatás (1997) who uses European regional data 
on employment to analyse the level of business cycles symmetry within and across 
countries.  By breaking the sample into two sub-periods one can judge the impact of 
integration and the creation of the European Monetary System. The results show 
that business cycle correlations across countries tend to increase with the process of 
integration while there is a clear pattern of decreasing within-border correlations. 
The increase in the synchronization of business cycles is usually taken as support 
for the existence of OCA endogeneity. Darvas and Szapáry (2004) argue that this is 
not necessarily the case. The authors analyse the evolution of business cycle 
correlations in the euro zone countries and find clear evidence of increased 
synchronization in the run-up period to the EMU. At the same time, however, non-
EMU countries and even the US and Japan to some extent have also shown greater 
co-movement with the euro cycle. This result points to the emergence of a world 
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business cycle. This does not contradict the endogeneity hypothesis, but implies that 
increased synchronization cannot be unambiguously attributed to monetary 
integration.  
3.3.2 The endogeneity hypothesis and developing countries 
A positive link between trade intensity and business cycle correlation would play a 
crucial role when considering the merits of a currency union between developed 
countries that do not seem to meet the OCA criteria. However, it is not clear 
whether the Frankel and Rose (1998) results also apply to developing countries. A 
study by the Inter-American Development Bank (2002) extends the analysis of 
Frankel and Rose (1998) to 147 countries in order to analyse the impact of trade 
integration on business cycle correlation, not only among developed countries, but 
also among developing countries. The results suggest that the impact of trade 
integration on business cycle synchronization between two countries is positive and 
significant for all groups of country pairs, but the effect is much weaker in the case 
of developing country pairs. More trade does not synchronize the business cycles of 
developing countries to the extent, that the formation of a currency union would 
seem warranted if the countries do not pass the optimality criteria ex ante. 
The weak link between bilateral trade intensity and business cycle correlation in 
developing countries could be attributed to the fact that trade between these 
countries is generally of an interindustry nature, as opposed to the largely 
intraindustry trade between developed countries. The intraindustry trade of 
developed countries makes cross -country business cycles more similar via the 
demand channel. The pattern of trade among the countries is therefore important. 
On the other hand, a monetary union may have an impact on business cycle 
correlation that bypasses the trade integration channel. A currency union eliminates 
exchange rate volatility, which in itself can be a determinant of cycle asymmetries 
(Inter-American Development Bank 2002:228). 
Ahumada and Martirena -Mantel (2001) test the endogeneity hypothesis in the 
context of developing countries in South America. They investigate whether the 
estimation of the OCA criteria should be considered in isolation by taking into 
account only historically isolated statistics for the Mercosur regional bloc. 
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Following Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) they jointly estimate two traditional OCA 
criteria, bilateral trade intensity and the degree of business cycle symmetry across 
countries. The results show weak evidence that more trade fosters more symmetric 
business cycles, since only for some cases are statistically significant positive 
estimates found. Furthermore, the effect of higher bilateral trade intensity on the 
correlation of business cycles is quite different in magnitude across country pairs, 
which partly explains the lack of highly significant estimates. The exact nature of 
the endogeneity is uncertain because of the lack of strong evidence, but even the 
weak evidence allows one to conclude that the OCA criteria are not static but evolve 
with trade integration. (Ahumada & Martirena-Mantel 2001:16) 
3.4 The Krugman specialization hypothesis 
There is another way in which the trade -promoting impact of monetary integration 
could affect the optimality of a currency union. In terms of the alternative view, 
which is associated with Krugman (1993), it is theoretically possible that as trade 
becomes more highly integrated, countries specialize more in production, making 
countries more dissimilar. Greater specialization in goods in which countries have a 
comparative advantage will reduce the correlation of incomes, since supply shocks 
will be less correlated.  
Krugman (1993:260) argues that the experience of the US suggests that European 
regions will become increasingly specialized and more susceptible to region-
specific shocks, which will be of a predominantly permanent nature. If higher 
integration leads to regional concentration of industrial activity and more 
asymmetric shocks, this has important negative implications for the cost of 
monetary integration. The Krugman specialization hypothesis leads to the 
conclusion that a country might fail the optimum currency area criteria ex post, even 
if it passes them ex ante. In other words, a currency union that seems optimal 
beforehand might become sub-optimal once it is formed (Schelkle 2001:8). There is 
no guarantee that countries that historically exhibit a high level of business cycle 
symmetry will not become more dissimilar after they form a currency union.  
The problem with Krugman’s view is that it implicitly assumes that regional 
concentration of industrial activity will be confined to separate countries and will 
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not cross national borders (Horvath & Komarek 2002:16). However, in reality 
borders are becoming less relevant in influencing the shape of the concentration 
effects, meaning that asymmetric shocks are not country specific.  
There are other authors who investigate the specialization hypothesis, including 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994:4-5), who maintain that if two economies 
specialize in sectors that respectively produce and use primary products, the 
disturbances they experience will be negatively correlated. Eichengreen (1992:14-
16) compares the incidence and magnitude of shocks in Europe and the United 
States and finds that temporary shocks are larger in US regions because of greater 
regional specialization of manufacturing within the United States. He predicts that 
regional specialization will increase in Europe with increased integration and this 
will amplify region-specific shocks, increasing the cost of monetary unification.  
The idea that specialization works against monetary unification goes back to Kenen  
(1969) who emphasized the point that sectoral diversification reduces the cost of a 
monetary union. In revisiting his original paper, Kenen (2003) cites the empirical 
evidence of Midelfart-Knarvik, who examined trends in the location of European 
industries and found that economies are becoming increasingly specialised. Kenen 
(2003) is of the opinion that the implications of the trade -promoting effects for the 
size and frequency of industry-specific shocks are at best ambiguous. 
3.5 Integrating the endogeneity and the specialization hypothesis  
The endogeneity and the specialization hypothesis are at first sight mutually 
exclusive, since the one claims that more trade will lead to more synchronized 
business cycles while the other claims that trade integration will reduce the extent of 
synchronization. It is, however, possible  to integrate the two views without negating 
the validity of either, since they apply to different types of trade. 
The effect suggested by Krugman operates via interindustry trade while that 
proposed by Frankel and Rose applies to intraindustry trade (Kalemli-Ozcan et al 
2001:109). In their analysis of the economic effects of currency unions, Tenreyro 
and Barro (2003) find that the effect of currency unions on the degree of output 
correlation between countries is negative, which is empirical evidence in favour of 
the specialization hypothesis. The authors argue that the negative effect of currency 
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unions on the extent of output correlation reflects the positive effect of currency 
unions on sectoral specialization, which in turn will decrease the extent of 
correlation. However, they acknowledge that this effect might be different for 
developed countries forming a currency union. If these countries specialize in the 
same industries, they will experience similar sectoral shocks and a higher degree of 
output correlation. In other words, their finding does not invalidate the Frankel and 
Rose (1998) result, but implies that the endogeneity hypothesis is only relevant to 
certain countries. The exact effect will depend on whether interindustry or 
intraindustry trade patterns dominate. If a currency union mainly promotes 
intraindustry trade, then members’ business cycles will become more symmetric and 
the union can become an OCA endogenously. 
Another important point is that trade integration is not the only channel through 
which specialization patterns can be affected. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha 
(2000) empirically substantiate the claim that economic integration leads to higher 
specialization in production through better cross -country income insurance 
facilitated by capital market integration. They also find that higher specializatio n in 
production is associated with less symmetry of output fluctuations (Kalemli-Ozcan 
et al 2001:109). The authors emphasize though that there is no contradiction 
between their empirical findings and those reported by Frankel and Rose (1998), 
because the mechanism suggested is independent of barriers to trade. If the 
formation of a monetary union leads to more capital market integration and 
therefore also to more inter-country risk sharing, then countries will specialize 
more, which is likely to lead to more asymmetric output shocks (Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al 2000:25). The synchronizing effect of more trade intensity can simultaneously 
work in the opposite direction and counter-balance the impact of regional 
specialization. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2001:130) argue that even the fact that more specialization 
means more asymmetric output shocks should not be taken as an argument against 
integration, since it does not imply that income shocks will also be more 
asymmetric. In fact, these may actually be come more symmetric as a consequence 
of extensive cross-country ownership of productive assets, despite the greater 
asymmetry of output shocks. 
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Higher trade intensity increases business cycle symmetry but specialization makes 
cycles more asymmetric. These opposing effects of economic integration on 
business cycle symmetry are further integrated by Hoffmann (2003) who suggests 
that comparative advantage is the driving force for both effects. Comparative 
advantage drives specialization and increases supply side asymmetry. On the other 
hand, more specialization also increases international trade, therefore facilitating 
demand spillovers. In other words, increased specialization will not only decrease 
the symmetry of the supply component of the business cycles but will also increase 
the symmetry of demand components. Which of the two effects will dominate and 
what the net effect on business cycle correlations will be remains an empirical 
question. Hoffmann provides empirical evidence of this mechanism by analysing 
forty years' data for OECD countries. He finds that measures of demand side and 
supply side symmetry are inversely related. Demand side symmetry is positively 
related to openness whereas supply side symmetry is negatively related to openness 
(Hoffmann 2003: 18).  
3.6 The endogeneity of other OCA criteria 
Trade intensity and business cycle correlation occupy a prominent position in the 
endogeneity literature, but this does not mean that the other OCA criteria are strictly 
exogenous. On the contrary, virtually all factors that influence the optimality of 
monetary unification are in turn affected by the existence of such a union.  
Based on the original Mundellian theory it is commonly argued that in the absence 
of interregional fiscal transfer payments the successful stabilization of asymmetric 
shocks in a monetary union requires either fle xible wages or labour mobility, or 
probably both. However, wages are relatively rigid in reality, and the observed 
degree of labour mobility is also generally low. Therefore rigid wages and immobile 
labour stand in the way of successful monetary unions. However, it is conceivable 
that the degree of labour mobility or wage -price flexibility may respond 
endogenously to the elimination of currency fluctuations once a monetary union is 
formed. According to the endogeneity hypothesis, monetary integration could 
increase the mobility of labour across borders and might lessen the degree of wage 
rigidity. In the case of the European Monetary Union, increased harmonization of 
labour regulations could also contribute to this effect (Fukuda 2002:14). 
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Quirici (2003) has empirically tested the endogeneity of real wage flexibility in a 
historical context. Specifically, his study investigates whether the onset of monetary 
union in the US and the Gold Standard in selected countries have made real wages 
more pro-cyclical. He finds that the Lucas Critique argument applies, so that 
monetary unions and credibly fixed exchange rate systems might render wages more 
flexible and substitute for independent monetary policy in macroeconomic 
adjustments to shocks. Quirici (2003) concludes that the degree of real wage 
flexibility depends on the nature of the monetary policy regime and that wage 
formation should not be treated as exogenous. 
Another criterion by which to judge the optimality of a prospective currency area is 
a high level of financial integration. However, the endogeneity hypothesis could 
also apply to this factor. The formation of a monetary union promotes the 
integration of capital markets. If financial markets are more integrated, households 
will diversify their holdings of financial assets to a greater extent and thereby insure 
themselves against asymmetric shocks  (Kenen 2003: 25). This will reduce the cost 
of monetary unification. It is possible that a currency union that seemed to have too 
high costs before its formation may become more optimal after the degree of 
financial integration responded e ndogenously to the formation of a monetary union. 
3.7 A theoretical model of endogenous optimum currency areas 
The endogeneity hypothesis is based on the assumption that a monetary union can 
foster economic convergence and render the union an optimum currency area after it 
has been formed. Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) take the endogeneity argument even 
further by suggesting that a monetary union can be self-validating, independent of 
economic integration. They show that it is still possible for a monetary union to 
satisfy the optimality criterion ex-post, even if monetary integration fails to boost 
economic convergence and intraindustry trade. 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) analyse endogenous optimal monetary unions within a 
general equilibrium two-country model where national welfare is measured by the 
utility of each country’s representative household. In order to distinguish their 
theory from the previous trade-related argument for endogenous optimal currency 
areas, they rule out the possibility of a structural change: each country is perfectly 
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specialized in the production of one good both before and after the formation of the 
monetary union. 
The model yields two equilibria, which define two self -validating currency regimes. 
In the first, the private sector chooses pricing strategies that are optimal in a 
monetary union, presetting prices in consumer currency.  Such strategies make a 
currency area the optimal monetary regime from the policymakers’ viewpoint as 
well, and there is no incentive to pursue independent strategies of national output 
stabilization. Even if national moneta ry authorities remained independent they 
would still choose to implement the same policies.  As a result, national outputs 
become more correlated. The result shows that credible policy commitment to 
monetary integration may lead to a change in pricing strategies, so that the monetary 
union becomes the optimal monetary arrangement in a self-validating way. 
However, the argument for self-validating optimal currency areas could be used in 
the opposite direction, as an argument for self -validating optimal floating regimes, if 
the second equilibrium is considered. In this case firms preset prices in domestic 
currency and let the foreign price adjust according to the law of one price. This 
implies fully inward-looking monetary policies and low correlation between 
national outputs, an equilibrium that is inconsistent with fixed exchange rates. 
The two corner solutions for exchange rate regimes can be Pareto ranked, the 
optimal monetary union being inferior in welfare terms. While this is an important 
result, it is worth emphasizing the main conclusion of Corsetti and Pesenti (2002): 
the best way to guarantee a credible policy commitment to a monetary union is to 
have the monetary union itself in place. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Contrary to the traditional OCA theory that postulates that a high degree of real 
integration is necessary for a monetary union to be successful, it can be concluded 
that the causality between economic integration and monetary integration is two-
way and mutually reinforcing. The endogeneity argument regarding the optimum 
currency area criteria states that trade links and monetary integration synchronize 
business cycles between countries, thus increasing the benefits and reducing the 
costs of sharing a common currency. The theory of endogeneity has had a 
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signif icant impact on OCA theory, as it postulates that countries do not need to meet 
many of the criteria before integration, convergence will follow from joining and 
the integration process itself will turn the countries into optimal currency areas. 
Since it is to be expected that the similarity in a number of the OCA criteria will 
increase as a consequence of membership in a currency union, the case for common 
currencies is stronger than previously thought. Although the alternative view that 
increased trade le ads to more asymmetric business cycles cannot be discounted, the 
empirical evidence is largely but not equivocally in favour of the endogeneity 
hypothesis that increased trade intensity leads to more symmetric business cycles. 
However, this issue will not be pursued any further. For the purpose of this 
dissertation it will be accepted that more trade makes a monetary union more 
optimal. In the discussion of endogeneity the focus was on the link between trade 
integration and business cycle synchronization. The rest of the dissertation will 
explore the first link implied by endogeneity, namely the effect of monetary 
integration on trade. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY ON 
TRADE 
Proponents of currency unions argue that an increase in trade is one of the few 
undisputed benefits of adopting a common currency. The problem is that until 
recently, there has been little evidence supporting this claim. Conclusions regarding 
the effect of common currencies on trade have been drawn from the literature that 
examines the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade since it was generally 
assumed that reducing exchange rate volatility between trading partners to zero was 
the equivalent of establishing a currency union. Many economists and policymakers 
firmly believe that exchange rate volatility reduces the volume of international 
trade. However, empirical studies have not found a consistent link between 
exchange rate volatility and trade. Such effects have been found to be minimal, at 
best. Even the predictions of the theoretical models regarding the effect of exchange 
rate volatility on trade are contradictory. The aim of this chapter is to present a 
survey of the most important theoretical and empirical contributions to the relevant 
literature and discuss the most recent findings about the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on international trade flows.  
4.1 Theoretical models of the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade  
A flexible exchange rate system implies that economic agents involved in 
international trade are exposed to exchange risk. Currency or foreign exchange risk 
concerns the possible impact that fluctuations in exchange rates may have on 
exporters’ income or on importers’ commitments payable in foreign currency. When 
exchange rates show more fluctuation they are said to be volatile. Exchange rate 
volatility is also often referred to as exchange rate uncertainty, although uncertainty 
can be high even when volatility is low. Most studies use the terms exchange risk, 
uncertainty and volatility interchangeably. Intuition and conventional wisdom hold 
that an increase in exchange rate volatility will reduce the level of trade. However, 
despite the general belief that exchange risk is an obstacle to international trade, 
there is a fundamental unresolved ambiguity regarding the effects of volatility in the 
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theoretical literature. Different models show positive or negative impact depending 
on the assumptions made. 
4.1.1 Risk aversion and risk neutrality 
The earliest contributions to the theoretical literature about the impact of exchange 
rate volatility support the negative hypothesis that volatility dampens trade flows, 
which is rationalized by the theory of choice under uncertainty. The analysis of the 
impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade is based on the assumption that a 
firm’s willingness to engage in international trade depends on its assessment of its 
long-term profitability. In the simplest trade models, higher exchange risk is 
expected to increase the uncertainty of profits that can be realized from export sales 
in foreign currency. Hence, risk-averse exporters will reduce their export supply in 
the face of increased exchange rate uncertainty.  
An early example is provided by Ethier (1973) , who develops a model of a risk-
averse firm that has to decide how much to import and how much forward exchange 
cover to take. Assuming perfect advance information about the level of profit at 
different exchange rates, the volatility of the exchange rate does not influence the 
volume of trade, only the amount of forward cover obtained. In the absence of such 
information, however, exchange rate uncertainty will have a negative impact on the 
level of trade, although the significance of this effect declines the more speculative 
the firm is. 
A similar result is obtained by Clark (1973) , who models the decisions of an 
exporting firm that produces a homogeneous good that is sold entirely abroad. As 
the variance of exchange rate volatility increases, so does the uncertainty of 
profitability. When a risk-averse firm faces increasing uncertainty about future 
exchange rates, it will reduce sales to the level where marginal revenue is actually 
higher than marginal cost. This is done in order to compensate for the additional 
risk. Reduced sales lead to a decline in both expected profits and the variance of 
profits. However, the expected utility of the firm will increase. 
The assumption of risk aversion is not sufficient to obtain the result that exchange 
rate uncertainty reduces trade flows.  An increase in risk has both a substitution 
effect and an income effect. When there is an increase in exchange rate volatility, 
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the substitution effect will depress the level of trade, since agents will find trading 
less attractive. Increased risk also reduces the expected utility, and the urge to 
compensate might lead to an increase in trading activity. De Grauwe (1988) models 
a competitive producer who must decide between selling in the domestic or foreign 
market. The producer’s reaction to an increase in exchange rate risk will depend on 
whether the utility function of export income is a convex or concave function of the 
exchange rate, which in turn depends on the degree of risk aversion. For very risk-
averse individuals the income effect might outweigh the substitution effect and they 
might want to export more to avoid the possibility of a drastic drop in their 
revenues. The exact impact of exchange rate volatility on trade depends on the 
properties of the utility function. 
It is also possible to produce a model that supports the negative hypothesis without 
assuming risk-aversion. Demers (1991) assumes risk neutrality for a competitive 
firm that is uncertain about the demand for its product because of price uncertainty 
due to exchange rate volatility. Under such uncertainty firms will reduce production 
levels because of the irreversibility of investment in physical capital, and therefore 
trade flows will also decrease. 
4.1.2 Third country effects and other sources of uncertainty 
The simple models that analyse the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade 
assume that the exchange rate represents the only source of risk to the firm, which is 
unlikely in practice.  For a diversified firm in a multi-country model, exchange rate 
uncertainty may represent a relatively minor and highly diversifiable risk. 
Movements in one exchange rate can be offset by movements in other exchange 
rates or interest rates. Exchange rate risk is not an additional independent risk but a 
facet of the total risk incurred by the firm. International transactions can provide 
opportunities for diversifying risks arising from domestic operations rather than 
increasing total risk. Willett (1986) argues that it is the composition of trade rather 
than its overall volume that is affected by exchange rate uncertainty. Whether trade 
flows decrease or not depends on how international risks compare to domestic risks. 
The similarity of international and domestic risks can be a reason why exchange rate 
volatility has not been found to have a significant dampening effect on trade.  
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Perée and Steinherr (1989) suggest that the empirical estimates of the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on trade may be affected by a third-country effect. When a 
country has a number of trading partners and exchange rate volatility against the 
different currencies increases in varying degrees, the increase in the risk of trading 
is also not the same for all trading partners. Despite the absolute increase in risk, it 
is possible that the country will divert exports towards the country against which the 
risk increase is the smallest. In other words, it is not the absolute level of risk that 
counts, but the relative risk. Perée and Steinherr (1989) suggest that relative risk 
should be incorporated in the empirical studies. 
Similarly, in a multi-country analysis Cushman (1986)  shows that differences in 
bilateral exchange rate risk can lead to trade being deflected away from the 
countries where exchange rate risk increased the most. Therefore, if only the 
bilateral exchange rate risk between two countries is taken into account the 
estimated trade effect can be misleading. Omission of third-country exchange risk is 
a possible reason why some studies find a positive link between bilateral exchange 
rate variability and the level of trade. 
4.1.3 The role of the invoicing currency 
Baron (1976) focuses on how the choice of the invoicing currency affects an 
exporting firm’s production and pricing decisions when exchange rates are volatile 
and the marketplace is not perfectly competitive. Baron shows that exporting firms 
will increase prices when the foreign currency is used to invoice goods.  When the 
home currency is used, firms face quantity risk and their response will depend on 
the properties of the demand curve they face. When demand is linear, the price will 
decline, thereby increasing demand and decreasing the variance of profits. 
The role of the invoicing currency is also investigated by Hooper and Kohlhagen 
(1978). Their theoretical model of the impact of exchange rate risk on trade prices 
and volumes takes normal contract leads and payment lags into account, so that 
variations in future spot exchange rates induce fluctuations in the unhedged profit 
streams of international traders. They find that if traders are risk averse, an increase 
in exchange rate risk will unambiguously reduce the volume of trade, regardless of 
whether the risk is borne by importers or exporters, while the effect on price of 
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traded goods depends upon who bears the risk. An increase in exchange rate risk 
will lead to a decrease in trade prices if importers bear the risk, since import demand 
falls. If exporters bear the risk, the price will rise, as they will charge a higher risk 
premium. 
4.1.4 Hedging opportunities 
The negative hypothesis of no effect of exchange rate volatility on trade is based on 
the simplifying assumption that there are no hedging possibilities. On the other 
hand, models that take hedging into account and assume the existence of a perfect 
forward market conclude that the volume of trade is unaffected by volatile exchange 
rates. Firms, however, may not be able to completely eliminate exchange rate risk if 
forward markets are not fully developed or if there is uncertainty about the amount 
of foreign exchange that needs to be covered (Côté 1994:1) . In many developing 
countries traders lack easy access to forward markets and are unable to hedge 
against exchange risk (Arize et al 2000). Hedging long-term exchange risk can be 
difficult even in developed countries. Forward markets for the major currencies are 
well developed for periods up to one year, but at horizons longer than that the 
availability of hedging instruments is less comprehensive (HM Treasury 2003, 
par.2.7). 
Viaene and de Vries (1992) emphasize that even if there are perfect hedging 
possibilities, the variability of the exchange rate still has an impact on trade flows 
because it affects the risk premium in the forward exchange market. The authors 
show that an increase in exchange rate risk has opposite effects on exports and 
imports. Which side benefits depends on the size of the trade balance, since the 
equilibrium forward rate is determined by the total supply and demand for foreign 
currency. Exporters benefit when the trade balance is negative, and importers 
benefit when it is positive. The trade balance can reverse sign over time; hence the 
authors argue that it is not surprising that empirical studies fail to find a significant 
relationship between volatility and trade.  
4.1.5 Profit opportunities 
There is another strand in the theoretical literature that challe nges the view that 
exchange rate uncertainty is definitely detrimental to trade. According to this 
 52 
alternative hypothesis, exchange rate volatility could have a positive effect on trade 
since it can offer higher profit opportunities for exporting firms (Franke 1991; Sercu 
& Vanhulle 1992). In the basic traditional models firms have to decide the level of 
production and exports before the exchange rate is known, and inventories are 
ignored (Côté 1994:8). When these assumptions are relaxed, changes in exchange 
rates do not simply represent risk, they also create opportunities to make profits. 
When the exchange rate becomes more variable, the probability of very favourable 
exchange rates increases, along with the probability of making high profits. The 
probability of very unfavourable exchange rates also increases, but this does not 
lead to offsetting losses, since the firm is free to stop exporting (Emerson et al 
1992:82).   
Broll and Eckwert (1999)  consider a model of a price-taking, risk-averse firm that 
can produce a good for sale in the domestic or the foreign market. All prices except 
the exchange rate are assumed to be certain. The production decision has to be made 
under exchange rate uncertainty, but the firm is flexible enough to postpone the 
choice between selling in the foreign market or the domestic market until the 
exchange rate uncertainty is resolved. The export strategy is like an option that is 
exercised in favourable conditions. The value of an option increases with its 
variability, therefore the more variable the exchange rate, the higher the value of the 
option and the higher the potential gains from international trade. This positive 
effect on the firm’s utility has to be weighed against the negative effects created by 
greater uncertainty. The net effect of increased exchange risk on the level of trade 
depends on the firm’s attitude towards risk. Broll and Eckwert (1999:183) show that 
an increase in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on the volume of 
production and international trade in economies with low aversion to risk. Hence it 
is theoretically possible that increased exchange rate variability will have a positive 
effect on trade. 
The hypothesis that higher exchange rate variability creates the opportunity for 
higher profits is dependent on firms' ability to vary their output quickly and at a 
relatively small cost. In practice, this assumption may be unrealistic because firms 
are often bound by existing contracts. It may not be easy to vary output, especially 
to reduce it below its average level, since it might be necessary to reduce staff.  If 
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the exchange rate is unfavourable and the option to export cannot be exercised, the 
firm might go out of business, since it may be difficult to expand its domestic 
market (HM Treasury 2003). If the exchange rate is favourable, it is difficult to 
imagine that all firms will be able to increase export at the same time. Overall, the 
proposition that increased exchange rate volatility can be beneficial to trade goes 
against economic intuition.  
4.2 Empirical studies of the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade 
Several studies have attempted to quantify the nature and magnitude of the 
relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade flows. Empirical tests of the 
hypothesis that exchange rate variability has a negative effect on the level of 
international trade provide no less confusing results than the theoretical models. 
Studies often find that the trade effect is of the wrong sign, statistically insignificant, 
or very weak. Results of the different studies are difficult to compare due to 
differences in the sample period, the countries investigated and the methodology 
employed. Empirical results also depend to a large extent on the measure of risk 
used; therefore the issue of exchange risk measurement has to be addressed before 
turning to the discussion of the various empirical studies. 
4.2.1 Measures of exchange rate volatility 
In order to investigate the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade empirically, 
volatility has to be measured. However, there is no unique way of measuring 
exchange risk. Most early studies have measured exchange rate volatility using the 
sample standard deviation method, either the standard deviation of the exchange 
rate or the standard deviation of the percentage change in the exchange rate. The 
disadvantages of this method are that it wrongly assumes that the empirical 
distribution of exchange rate is normal and it cannot differentiate between 
predictable and unpredictable elements in the exchange rate process, leading to 
volatility being overstated (Bah & Amusa 2002:13). In an attempt to measure the 
unanticipated change, some studies use the difference between actual and predicted 
forward rate. Others utilize a time-series model for exchange risk to account for 
trends. McKenzie (1999:100) notes that more recent studies give special attention to 
the specification of the technique by which exchange rate volatility is measured and 
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have more success in deriving a statistically significant relationship between 
volatility and trade. 
The problem is that the different measures of exchange rate volatility used in 
empirical studies are not necessarily good proxies for exchange rate uncertainty. 
The reason is tha t it is not exchange rate variability but rather unanticipated 
variability that depresses trade volumes due to higher risk experienced by traders. 
For example, traders may predict exchange rate fluctuations caused by diverging 
inflation rates, in which case there would be no effect on trade. In practice, ex post 
measures of exchange rate variability may only be roughly related to ex-ante 
perceptions of unforeseen exchange risk (Brada & Mendez 1988:265). Therefore the 
different variability measures used are unlikely to be good proxies for the dispersion 
of economic agents' subjective probability distributions of expected exchange rate 
changes (Willett 1986:S106). Many empirical studies emphasize that the choice of 
the best measure of volatility is crucial, yet they neglect to properly define the 
difference between expected and unexpected volatility (Pickard 2003:10). 
Sharp increases in exchange rate volatility since the early 1970s appear to have had 
few adverse effects on trade volumes. In this period international trade has grown 
faster than world output, just the opposite of what one would expect if increasing 
exchange rate volatility had a negative impact on trade (Moreno 2000). However, 
increasing exchange rate volatility does not necessarily imply increasing 
uncertainty. Exchange rate uncertainty can be high whether exchange rate volatility 
is high or low, or whether the currency is pegged or floating. In principle, a fixed 
exchange rate system should mean the elimination of exchange rate risk, but in 
practice, fixed regimes are vulnerable to sudden collapse. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) find that only six economies with open capital markets, in addition to a 
number of very small economies, maintained fixed exchange rates for longer than 
five years. While there is no observed exchange rate variability under fixed rates, 
there is considerable unanticipated exchange risk because there is uncertainty about 
the timing of devaluation (Brada & Mendez 1988:266). If uncertainty about the 
sustainability of a fixed exchange rate is a deterrent to trade, then the complete 
elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and the irreversibility of exchange rate 
fixing in currency unions can be expected to promote trade. Direct studies 
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investigating the trade effect of common currencies will be discussed in detail in the 
remaining chapters of the dissertation. 
4.2.2 Empirical results  
The empirical literature about the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade is vast. 
This section presents a survey of the literature and highlights the degree to which 
the research results are ambiguous.  
One of the earliest empirical studies on the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
trade was done by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) who tested their theoretical model 
(see section 4.1.3) by analysing US and German trade flows for the period 1965 to 
1975. The empirical result confirms the finding of their theoretical model that 
exchange rate risk has a significantly negative impact on the market price where the 
importers are likely to bear the risk, and a positive impact in cases where the risk is 
borne by exporters. However, they find absolutely no significant effect of exchange 
rate risk on the volume of trade, even after experimenting with alternative risk 
proxies and alternative functional forms of the quantity equation. In their view, the 
absence of a significant impact of volatility on trade volumes might be attributable 
to relatively inelastic export supply in the short run, or to substantial hedging by 
importers and exporters. The conclusion reached by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) 
is representative of the early empirical literature. Along this line, the IMF produced 
a survey in 1984 and found that the majority of empirical studies failed to establish 
a systematically significant relationship between measured exchange rate variability 
and international trade levels (International Monetary Fund 1984:36). 
Studies that do find a statistically significant negative impact of exchange rate 
volatility on trade include De Grauwe and Verfaille’s (1988) investigation of 
bilateral trade among fifteen industria l countries for the period 1975 to 1985. 
Estimates from a cross sectional model show that the level of trade is significantly 
stronger within the European Monetary System (EMS) than outside the EMS. 
Volatility is estimated to have reduced the growth rate of exports outside the EMS 
by approximately 9 percent. Focusing on more recent data, Anderton and Skudelny 
(2001) estimate euro area import demand functions for the period 1989 to 1999. 
They use pooled data across imports of the individual euro area countries from their 
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main trading partners, the US, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, the UK and Switzerland. 
Importers are assumed to use information from the past as well as the current period 
to assess exchange risk, therefore various moving-average measures of volatility are 
used as proxies for exchange risk. The panel estimates imply that extra-euro area 
exchange rate volatility may have decreased extra-euro imports by approximately 
10 percent – up to a maximum of 14 percent in the long run. The authors also 
provide some limited evidence that differences in extra- and intra-area exchange 
rate volatility lead to substitution between extra- and intra-area imports. 
While the majority of studies find an insignificant or a negative relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and trade, a number of authors present empirical 
evidence of the alternative hypothesis that exchange rate volatility might be 
beneficial to trade. Studies which find positive relations include Daly’s analysis of 
bilateral trade between Japan and seven industrialized countries that show s that 
volatility has a significant positive effect on seven import and five export flows out 
of fourteen (Flam & Jansson 2000:7). Asseery and Peel (1991) examine the effect of 
volatility on multilateral export volumes of five industrial countries and find 
significantly positive relations for all countries except the United Kingdom. Kroner 
and Lastrapes (1993) also find that an increase in volatility may be associated with 
an increase in international trade. They find a negative volatility effect only for the 
United States and the United Kingdom, for the other countries the effect of volatility 
on trade is found to be positive. McKenzie and Brooks (1997) find a clearly positive 
association between US-German trade flows and exchange rate volatility.  
The above examples illustrate the ambiguity that characterizes the empirical 
literature on the trade effect of exchange rate volatility. Some studies find no 
significant effect of volatility on trade, others find a significant negative effect, and 
some even find a significant positive effect. However, even when the effect is 
statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect is generally low. 
4.2.3 Volatility and trade in developing countries 
Results of the different empirical studies may differ depending on the countries 
under consideration. There is increasing evidence that the volatility-trade link is 
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significantly negative in developing countries, in contrast to the ambiguous results 
obtained for industrial countries. 
Sauer and Bohara (2001) investigate the differential effect of exchange rate 
volatility in developing and industrialized countries and find a significant negative 
relationship for developing economies. In the South African cont ext, Bah and 
Amusa (2002) examine the impact of exchange rate volatility on South Africa’s 
exports to the United States during the period 1990 to 2001. Estimates indicate that 
volatility exerts a significant negative effect on exports in both the long and the 
short run. 
Numerous studies investigating trade flows in developing countries provide similar 
evidence of a negative relationship between volatility and trade flows.  The different 
studies focus on Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria and Zambia and all conclude that 
exchange rate volatility depresses the export volumes in these countries (Bah 
&Amusa 2002:9).  Arize et al (2000) look at the export flows of thirteen developing 
countries and reach similar conclusions. One possible reason for the consistent 
negative results is the lack of hedging opportunities in developing countries. 
4.2.4 Effect of volatility on different sectors  
Most empirical studies are based on aggregate data, even though this imposes the 
assumption that exchange rate volatility has a uniform effect in different sectors. 
McKenzie (1999) notes that theoretical models predict that firm characteristics and 
market conditions determine the effect of exchange rate volatility, therefore 
disaggregated data should be used. A similar conclusion is reached by Côté 
(1994:23) who suspects that the absence of strong effects is caused by the use of 
aggregate data and argues that a sectoral approach would be more appropriate. 
However, both authors emphasize that the lack of such data constrains research. 
Broll and Eckwert (1999) argue that the fact that no significant negative impact has 
been found on the aggregate level allows one to assume that industries do exist in 
the export sector that are able to take advantage of larger exchange rate fluctuations 
and increase their production. For these industries the volatility-trade link is 
positive, but they cannot be identified from aggregate data. 
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An early example of a sectoral approach is a study by Bini-Smaghi (1991) that tests 
the effect of exchange risk on intra -EMS manufacturing trading for the period 1976 
to 1984. The results support the hypothesis that volatility exerts a negative influence 
on trade. Klein (1990) disaggregates US bilateral exports to seven major 
industrialized countries into nine categories of traded goods. For five categories the 
relationship between volatility and trade is found to be positive and statistically 
significant. In other words, there are certain sectors that are able to take advantage 
of the profit opportunities offered by greater exchange rate volatility. 
A further example of sectoral analysis with mixed results is the study by Bélanger et 
al (1998) that examines trade in several sectors between the United States and 
Canada. The authors find a significant negative relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and trade levels in two sectors; automobiles and industrial supplies. For 
consumer goods and food the effect is positive but not statistically significant. 
McKenzie (1998) analyses both aggregate and disaggregate sectoral trade data in 
the Australian economy. His results suggest that the direction and the magnitude of 
the impact of exchange rate volatility differ between traded good sectors, depending 
on the characteristics of the specific market. The nature of the relationship, 
however, remains difficult to establish. 
The relevance of investigating trade by sectors rather than in aggregate is further 
demonstrated by Rapp and Reddy (2000) who focus on United States sector exports 
to six major industrialized economies. The mix of positive and negative findings 
shows that different sectors react differently to exchange rate volatility. The sectoral 
approach is also used in Wang and Barrett’s (2002) study of Taiwan’s exports to the 
United States. No significant relationship between expected exchange rate volatility 
and trade volumes is found, except for the agricultural sector , where volatility 
reduces the level of trade. In the agricultural sector production decisions precede 
contracting decisions. Farmers typically decide about land allocation and planting 
well before they sell their crop forward, therefore the negative effec t of exchange 
rate volatility on trade conforms to expectations. 
In a recent sectoral study Pickard (2003) investigates bilateral trade flows of certain 
steel products between Canada, Mexico and the United States during the period 
1996 to 2002. The results indicate that the effects of exchange rate volatility on 
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trade flows for this sector are small, but they may differ depending on the presence 
of a well-developed forward market. For the less-developed U.S. -Mexican forward 
currency market the results indicate predominantly negative, weak correlation 
between volatility and trade. For the well-developed U.S.-Canadian forward 
currency market the model results suggest that the relationship between trade and 
volatility is positive, because increased expected exchange rate volatility presents 
profit opportunities for traders who engage in risk-portfolio diversification through 
hedging. 
4.2.5 Modern time-series methods  
One of the reasons why empirical studies of the relationship between exchange rate 
volatility on trade find small or insignificant effects is that most early tests relied on 
time-series data (Frankel & Rose 2002:439). Because of limited data, it is difficult 
to estimate the impact of exchange rate unce rtainty on trade using a time-series 
approach. Using data on bilateral aggregate U.S. exports to the other G7 countries, 
Klaassen (2004) finds that export decisions are affected by the exchange rate about 
one year later. At such a long horizon, exchange rate risk appears fairly constant 
over time, with only temporary deviations from average risk. This explains why it is 
problematic to discover the true effect of exchange rate volatility on trade from the 
limited time-series data that are typically available. 
Early time-series studies fail to consider possible non-stationarit y of variables, 
which might partly explain the ambiguous results. Recent developments in 
econometric methodology allow one to take the non-stationarity of time-series data 
into account. Some recent studies on the effect of exchange rate volatility have 
applied cointegration analysis. The advantage of this approach is that a sharper 
distinction can be made between the short-run and long-run relationships between 
exchange rate volatility and trade. When the trend properties of the data are 
accounted for, results of empirical studies are more clear-cut, and most suggest a 
significant negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade (Flam & 
Jansson 2000:6) 
Strictly speaking, a difference can be made between two types of exchange rate 
variability. One type concerns frequent and non-persistent fluctuations around the 
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equilibrium level, which is referred to as volatility. The second type concerns less 
frequent and more persistent departures from the equilibrium level and is called 
misalignment. The two types of variability create risk for international traders. 
Sekkat (1997:5) argues that each type of variability is associated with a different 
type of uncertainty and exerts a different influence on trade. Most early studies 
concentrated on the impact of volatility, as opposed to misalignment.  Sekkat (1997) 
analyses the impact of both volatility and misalignment on EU trade, testing data for 
France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium. He uses cointegration 
techniques to account for the time-series properties of the data. The results show 
that the type of variability that has a significant effect on trade differs from country 
to country. Volatility is found to have affected trade levels significantly in two cases 
out of five, while misalignment has had a significant impact in four cases (Sekkat 
1997:54). Sekkat concludes that misalignment is a structural determinant of trade 
variables, while exchange rate volatility has only a temporary effect on trade and 
cannot be responsible for a long-term disequilibrium in the trade balance. 
The various studies using cointegration include Koray and Lastrapes (1989)  and 
Lastrapes and Koray (1990) who find a relatively strong and negative long-run 
relation between exchange rate uncertainty and bilateral imports for five 
industrialized countries, and a smaller but still significant and negative short-run 
relation. Flam and Jansson (2000) estimate the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
trade between member countries before the start of the EMU and find that the long-
run relations are mostly negative and in several cases insignificantly different from 
zero. Fountas and Aristotelous (1999) find a significant negative short-run 
relationship between exchange rate volatility and export volumes among Germany, 
France, Italy and the UK. However, they are unable to identify a significant 
negative effect in the long run. Sukar and Hassan (2001) find a significant negative 
long-run relationship between United States exports and exchange rate volatility, 
but in the short run the effect is insignificant.  
Arize (1998a, 1998b) provides more convincing evidence for a long-run negative 
relationship between real exchange rate volatility and import demand. Applying 
cointegration analysis to United States import data, the major finding is that 
exchange rate volatility has a short -run and long-run negative effect on import 
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demand (Arize 1998a). A similar study focusing on eight European countries yields 
comparable results. Volatility is found to have a significant negative effect on trade 
for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain. The estimated 
long-run elasticity of import demand with respect to exchange rate volatility 
suggests that total real exchange rate stability would increase imports by a 
maximum of about 15 percent.  While this is an impressive result, the fact remains 
that in the case of Greece and Sweden the effect of volatility on trade is found to be 
positive and statistically significant (Arize 1998b).  The ambiguity about the nature 
of the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade is not convincingly 
resolved. 
4.2.6 Exchange rate volatility and the gravity model of trade  
From among the great number of volatility studies one group stands  out that has had 
more success in finding a significant negative relationship between exchange rate 
volatility and trade. Studies in this group are based on cross-sectional and panel data 
and the gravity model of bilateral trade. It is worthwhile taking a closer look at the 
gravity model, since not only is it used in various studies to assess the impact of 
volatility, but it is also the chosen framework used in the analysis of the direct 
impact of common currencies on trade, which will be the topic of the next chapter. 
The gravity model has been widely used in empirical studies in international 
economics. It is a simple model that explains the size of international trade between 
countries and has a remarkably consistent history of success. Newton’s theory of 
gravity asserts that the force exerted by two objects is a function of their respective 
masses and the square of the distance between them. Analogously to the Newtonian 
equation, the gravity model of trade explains trade between two countries by the 
combined economic mass (GDP) of the countries and by their geographical 
distance. The idea is that the larger the economy the more it trades in absolute 
terms, and the larger the distance between two countries, the less they trade with 
each other, since distance represents a proxy for transportation cost, which should 
discourage trade (Dell'Ariccia 1999:317).  
The first paper to apply a gravity model to the analysis of the trade effect of 
exchange rate volatility was Abrams (1980) , who found a statistically significant 
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negative impact. Thursby and Thursby (1987) constructed a gravity model to test 
the Linder hypothesis which postulates that trade of manufactured goods between 
two countries is inversely related to the difference in the ir per capita income. The 
explanatory variables in his model include the mean annual variance of the spot 
exchange rate around its predicted trend. This model was tested for 17 countries 
over the period 1974 to 1982. The results show a significant negative relationship 
between the measure of variability and bilateral trade for ten countries, for both real 
and nominal measures of exchange risk.  
In another gravity model Brada and Mendez (1988) examine the effect of the 
exchange rate system on the volume of trade during the period 1973 to 1977 with 
data on 30 developed and developing countries. The authors test whether flexible 
exchange rates reduce the volume of international trade more than fixed rates do. 
The unexpected finding is that bilateral trade flows are higher between countries 
with floating rates than between countries with fixed rates. The authors are careful 
not to jump to the conclusion that exchange rate volatility is beneficial to trade 
though. They argue instead that the link between exchange rate regime and trade 
may not work exclusively through the volatility channel. The exchange rate regime 
may have an effect on commercial policy, which in turn will influence the level of 
trade. Even though exchange rate volatility associated with floating rates has a 
dampening effect on trade, this effect is smaller than that of the restrictive trade 
policy measures that are often imposed under a system of fixed exchange rates. In 
other words, the detrimental effect of restrictive trade policies seems to outweigh 
the beneficial effect of exchange rate certainty on trade in a fixed exchange rate 
system.  
This proposition is supported by historical evidence in a study by Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1995) who analyse the extent to which trade blocks and currency 
arrangements were responsible for the changing patterns of trade in the 1930s. The 
authors estimate a gravity model and find that trade block membership increased 
trade, exchange rate volatility slightly reduced trade, while being on the gold 
standard did not have a conclusive role. Any beneficial effects of exchange rate 
stability were neutralized by trade restrictions. 
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Frankel and Wei (1993) also use a gravity model to investigate the possibility that 
the stabilization of exchange rates during the course of the 1980s significantly 
contributed to the increase in intraregional trade. They uncover a small negative 
effect of bilateral exchange rate variability on bilateral trade. Specifically, they find 
that doubling exchange rate volatility in Europe, as it would if it returned from the 
1990 level to the 1980 level, would reduce intraregional trade volume by an 
estimated 0.7 percent. 
De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000) use a gravity trade model to measure the effect of 
exchange rate variability on trade flows within the EU during the period 1962 to 
1995.They find a significant negative coefficient for the proxy of exchange rate 
variability. They explain this with the fact that hedging possibilities are not 
available in the long run, only in the short run. They also calculate the potential 
exports that would have materialized under zero exchange rate variability between 
all countries. The results suggest that the short-term increase in trade due to the 
elimination of nominal exchange rate variability is lower than 1 percent, which is to 
be understood as a minimum short-term result. The long-term results would 
probably be higher. 
In another study based on the gravity model of bilateral trade Dell’Ariccia (1999) 
estimates that total exchange rate stability could have increased trade among 
Western European countries by about 12 percent in 1994. Potential trade impacts 
are tested with different measures of exchange rate variability, but the choice 
between nominal or real exchange rate volatility does not seem to matter, the 
conclusion is the same in both cases. This estimate of 12 percent could be higher 
than the true impact, due to different forms of bias. There is a possibility that trade 
may influence exchange rate volatility through exchange rate policy. After 
controlling for this simultaneity bias, the estimated impact falls to 10 percent. 
Dell’Ariccia also attempts to control for bias due to omitted variables that may 
determine trade between particular country pairs. Allowing for these country 
specific fixed effects, the estimated impact of exchange rate volatility falls below 5 
percent, but this is still statistically significant. 
Pugh (2002) examines the impact of long-term exchange rate variability on bilateral 
trade between 14 major Western European economies during the period 1984 to 
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1990 using a gravity model. The sample period was chosen to give the clearest 
contrast between members and non-members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of 
the European Monetary System, with half of the countries under investigation 
belonging to the ERM. The major finding is that a reduction in exchange rate 
variability over long periods exerts a positive effect on trade flows. The results 
suggest that non-ERM countries could have achieved an increase of between 6 and 
11 percent in their bilateral trade by shifting to ERM conditions.  
4.3 Conclusion 
The relationship between exchange rate volatility and levels of international trade is 
both theoretically and empirically ambiguous. In theory, increased exchange rate 
volatility might be beneficial to trade if firms are able to take advantage of the 
increased profit opportunities. However, the majority of the theoretical literature is 
in favour of the hypothesis that exchange rate volatility is a deterrent to trade. On an 
empirical level, most studies fail to find a consistent link between exchange rate 
volatility and trade. Although some find a modest negative effect and others even 
find a positive effect, the main empirical findings support the hypothesis that 
exchange rate variability does not have a significant impact on trade. This is bad 
news for the proponents of currency unions, since their arguments are weakened by 
this result. The literature does not provide compelling evidence that exchange rate 
volatility is an obstacle to trade, and by implication, on the basis of volatility studies 
it cannot be convincingly argued that a single currency will promote trade. 
However, this conclusion is based on the assumption that the adoption of a common 
currency is equivalent to the reduction of exchange rate volatility to zero. If this 
assumption is incorrect, then the true effect of common currencies might be 
underestimated. The effect of common currencies on trade has to be studied directly 
in order to be able to judge the desirability of a currency union. The direct study of 
the currency union effect on trade will be discussed in the remaining chapters. 
 65 
CHAPTER FIVE  
THE ROSE MODEL OF TH E COMMON CURRENCY 
EFFECT ON TRADE  
The direct analysis of the effect of common currencies on trade started with the 
pioneering study by Rose (2000) who found that countries that share a common 
currency trade three times more than those that do not. This result is known as the 
Rose effect. In this chapter Rose’s model will be discussed in detail, not only 
because it is the first attempt at a direct analysis of the currency union effect on 
trade, or for the huge and controversial estimate found, but also because the method 
used by Rose has become the standard model used by other researchers in this field. 
Rose (2000) is the standard reference and general point of departure in this recent 
strand of literature on the currency union effect on trade. After the discussion of 
Rose’s original model the chapter presents attempts to provide a theoretical 
explanation for the Rose effect (see section 5.2). Next, the border effect in 
international trade is explained and compared to the Rose effect in section 5.3. The 
significance of increased trade for economic growth is discussed in section 5.4. 
Finally, the impact of the dissolution of a currency union on members’ trade is 
investigated.   
5.1 Understanding Rose’s original model 
As it has been shown in Chapter 4, empirical studies have not been able to find 
major effects of exchange rate volatility on trade. This has led to the general 
consensus that there is not much trade benefit to be expected from the adoption of 
common currencies. However, it is possible that the common currency effect on 
trade is different from the effect that complete exchange rate stability has on trade. 
If that is the case, conclusions drawn about the desirability of currency unions on 
the basis of exchange rate volatility studies are misleading. To determine the effect 
that the adoption of a common currency has on international trade, the direct study 
of the currency union effect on trade is necessary.  
The first paper to tackle the issue of the trade effect of common currencies directly 
was Rose (2000). In a groundbreaking study, he challenged the view that the gains 
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to trade through membership of a currency union are modest. He sought to isolate 
the effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on trade and in the 
process showed that two countries sharing a common currency trade 3.35 times 
more than they would with different currencies. This 235 percent trade -creating 
effect of a common currency is additional to the trade-raising effect due to the 
reduction of exchange-rate variability to zero, which is an obvious result of the use 
of common currencies. 
Rose (2000) exploits a panel of cross-country data drawn from the World Trade 
Data Bank  covering bilateral trade between 186 different trading partners at five-
year intervals between 1970 and 1990. In this data set, there are over one hundred 
pairings and three hundred observations, where both countries use the same 
currency. The word ‘country’ is not used here in the strictest sense of the word, as 
trading partners include dependencies, territories, overseas departments and 
colonies for which there is international trade data. 
Rose (2000) uses an augmented gravity model to estimate the effect of currency 
unions and exchange rate volatility on trade. The gravity model of bilateral trade is 
based on Newton’s theory of gravity and was originally developed by Pöyhönen 
(1963). In a standard gravity model the dependent variable of the equation is the 
natural logarithm of the sum of the trade flows between country pairs. The 
explanatory variables include the natural logarithm of the product of the gross 
domestic products of the country pair in question and the distance between them. 
The natural logarithm of the product of their gross domestic products per capita is 
also included to better represent the combined economic mass.  
Rose (2000) augments the standard gravity model by adding several dummy 
variables to capture trading partners’ cultural and historical links that might have an 
effect on trade levels. The theory behind Rose’s augmented gravity model can be 
formulated as follows. The greater the combined national income of two countries 
and the smaller the distance between them, the more they will tend to trade with 
each other. In addition, two countries can be expected to have a higher level of 
bilateral trade if they share a common land border, if they share a common official 
language, if they belong to the same free trade area, if they are part of the same 
nation or share a common colonial past. 
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The various dummy variables added by Rose are defined as follows. The contiguity 
dummy is equal to one if two countries have a common land border and zero 
otherwise. Sharing a border is obviously expected to have a positive effect on trade. 
The language dummy is equal to one if the trading partners share a common official 
language, and zero otherwise. The inclusion of this variable represents the fact that 
language is an important barrier to trade and sharing a common official language 
accounts for higher trade levels than between otherwise similar country pairs. The 
importance of trade policy is accounted for by including a dummy that is equal to 
one if the trading partners in the pair belong to the same free trade area, which 
would clearly explain part of the trade flows. The same nation dummy is equal to 
one if two trading partners are part of the same nation, if one is a dependency or 
political subdivision of the other, or both are dependencies or subdivisions of the 
same third country. All of these trading units are expected to have higher bilateral 
trade levels for institutional reasons. There is also a same colonizer dummy, equal to 
one if both countries were colonies of the same third country after 1945, and a 
colonial relationship dummy, equal to one if one country colonized the other. In 
both cases higher trade flows might be found for historical reasons. 
Besides adding dummy variables to account for cultural and historical links, Rose 
(2000) goes one step further and probes the question whether monetary variables 
might also affect bilateral trade intensity. The key feature of his model is the 
inclusion of two monetary variables. One is a measure of the volatility of the 
exchange rate between trading partners, specifically the standard deviation of the 
first-difference of the monthly natural logarithm of the bilateral nominal exchange 
rate in the five years preceding the observation. The hypothesis is that exchange rate 
volatility is a barrier to trade; therefore the coefficient on this variable is expected to 
be negative. In other words, it is assumed that the more stable the exchange rate 
between the currencies of the two countries is, the higher their bilateral trade level 
will be. 
The inclusion of a measure of volatility is not radically new, gravity models 
analyzing the effect of volatility on trade discussed in Chapter 4 also included such 
measures. The real novelty of Rose’s model is the second monetary variable, which 
is a currency union dummy. The value of this dummy is equal to one if trading 
 68 
partners share the same currency, and is zero if both have their own separate 
currencies. If sharing a common currency is not equivalent to zero exchange rate 
volatility, and a currency union has a trade-creating effect, then the coefficient on 
this variable is expected to be positive. This is the main hypothesis that Rose tests, 
whether two countries sharing a common currency tend to trade more than 
otherwise similar country pairs. 
The estimates of Rose’s augmented gravity equation are statistically significant and 
have the expected signs. As far as the standard components of the gravity equation 
are concerned, both higher GDP and higher GDP per capita increase trade, while 
greater distance between countries is associated with lower trade levels. The 
magnitude of these gravity effects is similar to existing estimates. The contiguity, 
language, free trade area, same nation, same colonizer and colonial relationship 
dummies all have statistically and economically significant positive coefficients, 
consistent with intuition. 
Rose’s main result, however, concerns the statistical significance and large 
economic size of the coefficient for the currency union dummy, which is around 
1.21. In order to obtain the trade effect of currency union, the coefficient needs to be 
transformed, since bilateral trade is measured in logs.  Since exp (1.21) = 3.35, this 
implies that two countries that share a common currency trade over three times as 
much as do otherwise similar countries with different currencies (Rose 2000:17). 
Rose performed extensive sensitivity checks. He found that his results are robust to 
changes in sample of countries, the definition of a common currency, the measure of 
exchange rate volatility, the measure of distance, plus inclusion of possibly omitted 
variables and the use of different estimation techniques. Still, the estimated 235 
percent trade-creating effect seems implausibly large, and even Rose (2000:32) 
warns that it should not be taken too literally. Since many of the countries in Rose’s 
sample are small, poor, or both, any extrapolation of the results to EMU may be 
inappropriate (Rose 2000:15). Nevertheless, Rose’s result is compelling evidence 
that a currency union has a strong effect on trade.  
In contrast to the large value obtained for the coefficient for the currency union 
dummy, the estimated coefficient on the exchange rate volatility variable is small, 
although statistically significant. The estimate shows that hypothetically reducing 
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exchange rate volatility to zero percent would increase trade by 13 percent only.  
Rose (2000:17) concludes that in contrast with most of the existing literature that 
presumes that a common currency is equivalent to reducing exchange rate volatility 
to zero, it is clearly not the case. This conclusion is important since it implies that 
the volatility studies discussed in Chapter 4 underestimate the trade effect of 
common currencies. The effects of currency union and volatility are economically 
distinguishable. Sharing a common currency has an impact on trade that is over an 
order of magnitude larger than the effect of reducing exchange rate volatility to 
zero.  
Parsley and Wei (2001) reach similar conclusions about the differential effect of 
reduced exchange rate volatility and a common currency. In their study of the effect 
of currency volatility on goods market integration, they make a conceptual 
distinction between an instrumental versus institutional stabilization of the exchange 
rate. Instrumental stabilisation refers to reducing volatility through intervention in 
the foreign exchange market or via monetary policies. Institutional stabilization 
refers to reducing volatility through establishing a currency board, dollarization or 
adopting a common currency. The authors find that reducing nominal exchange rate 
variability reduces relative price variability. Goods market integration increases 
over time and is inversely related to exchange rate variability. If the method used to 
reduce variability is of an institutional type, then the stimulus to goods market 
integration is much greater than in the case of instrumental stabilization. In other 
words, the impact of a common currency goes far beyond the impact of merely 
reducing exchange rate volatility to zero.  
5.2 Theoretical foundations of the Rose effect 
The studies of Rose (2000) and Parsley and Wei (2001) confirm that drawing 
conclusions about the effect of common currencies based on studies on the effect of 
exchange rate volatility is unwarranted. Rose’s empirical results indicate that there 
is good reason to believe that common currencies can provide greater stimulus to 
international trade than merely reducing exchange rate volatility to zero via an 
instrumental stabilization. Having accepted that a common currency encourages 
trade, one needs to ask why. 
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Three mechanisms are usually suggested by which the adoption of a single currency 
might be expected to increase bilateral trade among the members: reduced exchange 
rate uncertainty, reduced transaction costs and heightened competition through 
increased price and cost transparency (HM Treasury 2003, par.2.3) In terms of 
Rose’s (2000) model, reduced exchange rate uncertainty falls away as a candidate to 
explain the Rose effect, since the very essence of the study was to separate the 
exchange rate effect from the common currency effect. The effect of reduced 
exchange rate uncertainty is additional to the Rose effect. Reduced transaction costs 
definitely play a role in increased trade, however, the estimated potential savings in 
transaction costs through elimination of national currencies have been estimated at 
less than 1 percent of GDP (Emerson et al 1992:21). Savings like that could not 
possibly account for the huge increase in trade suggested. Finally, the significance 
of increased price and cost transparency is also uncertain.  
Although Rose does not provide a specific reason, why sharing a common currency 
has such a big effect on trade, he does mention some possibilities in the way of a 
tentative explanation (Rose 2000:32). First, a common currency represents a serious 
commitment by government to long-term integration. The adoption of a common 
currency implies a greater degree of commitment and a much lower probability of 
reversal in the future. This could encourage the private sector to engage in more 
international trade. Second, sharing a common currency provides the obvious 
benefit of foregoing the cost of hedging exchange rate risk. Although the cost of 
hedging seems to be low, it is possible that hedging exchange rate risk is not as 
simple as commonly believed. Third, a common currency could lead to greater 
financial integration, which would in turn stimulate international trade in goods and 
services. More generally, as recognized by Mundell (1961:662), the more widely a 
currency is used the greater its usefulness and the more it facilitates trade. While all 
these factors may play a role, according to Rose (2000:32) it is wisest to conclude 
that we simply do not know why a common currency encourages trade. The 
evidence that it does so, and that the impact is huge, should suffice to strengthen the 
case for a common currency. 
Rose’s controversial result gave rise to a whole new strand of economic literature, 
with numerous economists investigating the trade effect of common currencies. The 
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majority of the currency union literature has an empirical focus and is not explicitly 
grounded in theory (Smith 2002:3). A notable exception is the study by Baldwin 
and Taglioni (2004) who attempt to provide a theoretical explanation of the Rose 
effect. The authors argue that the Rose effect is nothing more than a convex relation 
between volatility and trade. Rose (2000) finds that the volatility term is negative 
and the currency union dummy is positive in his model. This implies a simple form 
of convexity. Reduced volatility increases trade in a log-linear fashion right up to 
zero volatility and an extra increase in trade only appears when the volatility reaches 
zero. In other words, the linear volatility term predicts a steady increase in the log 
volume of trade and the currency union dummy predicts a jump in trade just as 
volatility reaches zero. Baldwin and Taglioni (2004) suggest that there are two 
sources of this convexity. First, a reduction in volatility induces existing firms to 
export more since exporting becomes a less risky business. Second, a reduction in 
volatility induces more firms to begin exporting. Volatility is a greater hindrance to 
exports for small firms than large firms, so reduced volatility especially promotes 
small firms’ exports. Given that most firms are small, the extra exports induced by a 
marginal reduction in volatility may increase as the level of volatility falls. This can 
account for the convexity of the trade-volatility link implied by the Rose effect. 
5.3 Border effect versus Rose effect 
Rose’s (2000) results suggest that the existence of separate national currencies is a 
significant barrier to trade. At the same time, a number of studies have shown that 
there is a clear tendency to trade much more within countries rather than across 
borders because national borders inhibit economic integration. This phenomenon is 
referred to as the border effect or the home bias in trade. The home bias has 
received much attention because it cannot be easily explained by geographic, 
linguistic or trade policy variables. The question that arises is whether the Rose 
effect could explain the home bias, since one of the possible explanations for the 
large border effect is the existence of separate national currencies. Therefore it is 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the home bias puzzle in the context of an 
investigation of the trade effect of common currencies. If Rose (2000) is right, and 
the impact of common currencies on trade is indeed large, than a large part of the 
home bias in trade is explained by his results. 
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The first study to report a strong border effect on trade was McCallum (1995). He 
investigated the trading patterns of US states and Canadian pr ovinces using a 
gravity model of bilateral trade and data for 1988. He specified a particularly simple 
equation with the log of bilateral trade as the dependent variable and only three 
regressors: log GDP of the trading regions, the log of the distance between them and 
a dummy variable indicating whether the trade flows were interprovincial or 
between a US state and a Canadian province. He found that Canadian provinces 
trade more than twenty times more with other provinces than with US states of 
comparable economic size and distance (McCallum 1995:616).  The magnitude of 
this result is far above expectations.  
Nitsch (2000) applies a similar methodology in his analysis of the border effect in 
Europe. According to his estimates, an average EU country purchases seven times 
more from domestic producers than from equally distant foreign ones. He finds 
significant regional variations in the size of the home bias, ranging between 1.8 for 
the Netherlands and 68 for Portugal. Another study by Head and Mayer (2000) 
estimates the border effect for EU countries as 14 on average. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) provide a critique of the methodology used in 
the above studies. They argue that trade between two regions depends on their 
bilateral trade barrier relative to the average barrier of the two regions to trade with 
all their partners. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) call this average barrier the 
multilateral trade resistance. McCallum (1995) and other subsequent studies based 
on the same methodology did not include multilateral resistance variables and this 
imparts a significant upward bias in the estimate of the size of the border effect. The 
inclusion of multilateral resistance terms causes the estimate of the home bias for 
Canada to fall under 11, but even that is surprisingly large. The other reason why 
McCallum’s estimate of the home bias is so large is that the Canadian economy is 
relatively small. Any barrier between Canada and the US means a considerable 
reduction in the relative cost of trade between regions within Canada, because 
average trade costs are higher for nearly all other trading partners. Because of the 
larger size of the US economy, the same barrier has less impact on its multilateral 
resistance and trade between states is less affected. In fact, re-estimating 
McCallum’s regression with US data, it is found that trade between US states is 
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only 1.5 times greater than trade between US and Canada. Applying their approach 
to 1993 data, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) find that national borders reduce 
trade between the US and Canada by 44 percent, while reducing trade among other 
industrialized countries by 29 percent. 
Although the estimates show large variation, it is clear that the border effect is large. 
The general consensus is that internal trade is disproportionately large compared to 
international trade. Explanations are not easily found, in fact, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000) pose the huge home bias as one of their six puzzles of open economy 
macroeconomics. The existence of different legal frameworks across countries and 
advertising tools operating primarily at a national level have been offered as 
probable explanations why integration is so much higher between provinces of a 
country than between countries (HM Treasury 2003, par.5.5). The more obvious 
explanation is the fact that provinces share a common currency while trade across 
international borders usually involves trade between different currencies. To see 
how much of the home bias is due to separate currencies, the impact of a currency 
union needs to be estimated directly. 
Rose and Engel (2002) test the hypothesis that the large size of the border effect is 
mostly the consequence of having different national currencies. Specifically, the 
authors ask whether countries that make up a currency union are as integrated as 
regions within nations. They follow Rose (2000) in the specification of the gravity 
equation and estimate it using 1995 data from the World Trade Data Bank. The 
results are similar to that of Rose (2000), and suggest that trade is three times as 
intense for members of a currency union than for countries with their own 
currencies. While this estimate seems provocatively high, the authors point out that 
it is small compared with the size of the home bias in international trade discussed 
above. Similar conclusions are reached by de Sousa and Lochard (2003) based on 
evidence from the CFA Franc zone in West and Central Africa. They find a positive 
impact of currency unions on trade, but the border effect remains large even after 
controlling for the currency union effect. Other factors, including tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade, heterogeneous levels of development or informal institutions 
seem to matter much more in explaining the extent of trade. This is taken as 
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evidence for the desirability of promoting economic integration before the adoption 
of a single currency.  
Rose and Engel (2002) and de Sousa and Lochard (2003) find that members of 
common currency areas trade less among each other than regions of individual 
countries. Although membership in a common currency area does increase trade, it 
does not increase it nearly enough for common currency areas to resemble 
countries. In other words, the border effect is much larger than the currency union 
effect and there is a sharp distinction between the regions of a single country and 
nations forming a monetary union. It seems that external constraint disappears 
completely between regions but might survive between nations forming a monetary 
union, despite the use of a common currency. Flandreau and Maurel (2001) note, 
that ironically, the survival of barriers to integration would be a reason why 
monetary unions could be more stable: because of the relatively moderate 
integration specialization will not be extreme and therefore the countries are more 
likely to stay together. In conclusion, members of currency unions are more 
integrated than countries with their own currencies, but less integrated than regions 
within a country. The common currency effect on trade therefore provides only a 
partial explanation of the home bias in international trade. 
5.4 Economic growth and the Rose effect 
The Rose effect implies that the adoption of a common currency dramatically 
increases the volume of trade. If Rose’s (2000) estimates are correct, this has 
important implications for the potential welfare of countries contemplating 
monetary unification, since increased international trade has a positive effect on the 
level of real income. The proposition that more trade leads to more income derives 
from the principle of comparative advantage of classical trade theory or igin.  
Furthermore, new trade theories emphasize the role of economies of scale in 
specialization and the promotion of intraindustry trade. Such arguments suggest that 
higher trade intensity can induce a one-off improvement in output but do not imply 
continuous improvement in economic growth. However, there are a number of other 
channels through which an increase in trade might raise the rate of economic growth 
on a long-term basis. For example, increased openness implies increased 
competition, which can lead to more economic activity. Intensive interaction with 
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foreigners also encourages innovation and the adoption of new ideas, resulting in 
more technological and managerial knowledge, higher productivity, and ultimately 
higher economic growth (Frankel & Rose 2002:444; HM Treasury 2003, par.2.24). 
Numerous empirical studies have attempted to quantify the relationship between 
trade and income and most of them confirm a positive statistical association 
between trade and the performance of the economy in the lo ng run, even after 
holding constant for other important determinants of economic growth (Rodrik 
1993). 
Frankel and Rose (2002) provide evidence for the argument that currency unions 
improve income and maintain that the resulting economic growth is due to increased 
trade among the currency union members. Trade is good for growth, both in theory 
and according to statistical evidence, and this is also true for trade due to the use of 
common currencies. The authors quantify the implications of currency unions for 
trade and income on the basis of a panel data set including observations at five-year 
intervals from 1970 through 1990, in other words, the study is based on the 
combined data set of Rose (2000) and Rose and Engel (2002).  
In the first stage of their analysis Frankel and Rose (2002) estimate the effect of 
common currencies on bilateral trade using the gravity model of trade. The 
specification of their equation differs only slightly from Rose’s (2000) original 
model in that they define two separate dummy variables to correspond to different 
types of common currency arrangements; a currency union dummy and a currency 
board dummy. The estimates of the currency union and currency board coefficients 
are positive, statistically significant and large. Although there is no undeniable 
theoretical reason why the effect of currency boards should be exactly the same as 
that of currency union, the coefficients of the two variables are also similar in size 
and imply a threefold trade -enhancing effect. This should not come as a surprise, 
given the fact that this study is not independent from Rose’s original study. Frankel 
and Rose (2002) also examine the possibility that the use of a common currency is 
more beneficial to bilateral trade in very small countries than in larger ones by 
dropping very small countries from the sample but they find no evidence that the 
currency union effect varies with country size. 
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In the next stage of their analysis Frankel and Rose (2002) investigate the effect of 
increased trade on economic growth. Their estimates suggest that every one percent 
increase in total trade (relative to GDP) raises income per capita by at least one-
third of a percent over a twenty-year period (Frankel & Rose 2002:461).  
In the final stage of their analysis Frankel and Rose (2002) combine the estimated 
effect of currency unions on trade and the estimated effect of trade on growth in 
order to predict the effect of common currencies on output. The predictions are 
based on the estimate that a currency union triples trade among its members, and the 
ultimate growth effect depends on who is adopting what currency. The adoption of 
the dollar should raise an average country’s income by about four percent over 
twenty years, but the effect could be as much as twenty percent in the case of small 
countries relatively close to the United States. Similar effects can be expected in the 
case of small Eastern European countries that adopt the euro. The authors test and 
find no support for the common argument that currency unions improve income 
through other channels such as central bank credibility. The effect appears to come 
via trade. However, simply belonging to a currency union in itself has no effect on a 
country’s growth. Members of a currency union need to be natural trading partners 
for the growth effect to materialize (Frankel & Rose 2002:438). The conclusion is 
therefore that geography is an important factor that should be considered in a 
country’s choice of an anchor. The benefits of adopting the currency of a large 
neighbour are generally greater than the benefits of adopting the currency of a 
small, distant country.  
Frankel and Rose (2002:458) add some important qualifications to their results. 
First, given the fact that theirs is primarily a cross-sectional study, it is impossible to 
tell if the beneficial effects of currency unions on trade come quickly or only with 
very long lags. Second, the decision to adopt a common currency could be 
endogenous, meaning that the observed correlation between currency unions and 
trade could be the result of a third, unknown factor. Finally, most currency unions 
are either formed by very small or very poor countries or by very poor countries 
(dependencies) adopting the currencies of larger ones. Hence the estimates may not 
be applicable to larger countries. The inapplicability of the results to major 
economies is the most common criticism directed against Rose’s work, yet he did 
 77 
caution against extrapolating his general result to the EMU countries in his original 
paper (Rose 2000). This is an important point that needs to be reiterated; estimates 
based on the available sample cannot be used to make inferences about the effects 
of a currency union on trade and growth among developed countries. 
5.5 The effect of common currencies on non-members 
The evidence discussed so far indicates that currency union membership has a 
considerable impact on trade between members. An important question that arises is 
what the implications would be for countries outside a currency union. Trade 
diversion away from non-members is an intuitively probable consequence that 
might be expected as a result of the formation of a currency union. Frankel and 
Rose (2002) investigate whether the stimulus to trade between members of a 
currency union might come at the expense of trade with non-members. Interestingly, 
no evidence is found that membership of a common currency union diverts trade 
away from non-member countries; on the contrary, the evidence points towards 
trade creation. 
In order to test the sensitivity of the results to the specification of their model, 
Frankel and Rose (2002) add a dummy variable that is equal to one if two countries 
do not share a common currency, but at least one of them is in a currency union 
with a third country. The coefficient on this variable is positive, suggesting that 
currency unions raise members’ trade with non-members, rather than diverting trade 
away from non-members. In other words, members of a currency union have higher 
overall openness. A similar conclusion is reached by Melitz (2001), who notes that 
the creation of a common currency lowers trade barriers in general, not only for the 
members of the currency union. 
The effect of the formation of a currency union on trade between members and non-
members is a central issue for countries that are reluctant to join such a union. A 
typical example would be the United Kingdom; a country that might experience a 
decrease in its trade, should the expanded trade within the EMU come at the 
expense of non-members. Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) estimate in a cross 
sectional study that while EMU promotes trade among members, there is no 
diversion away from the UK. In his investigation of the UK decision regarding 
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EMU, Frankel (2003) is also of the opinion that there is no evidence that Britain 
would be worse off rema ining outside the union than it would be if EMU had never 
happened. The lack of trade diversion implies that non-members have nothing to 
fear from the formation of currency unions, but it also lowers the incentives for non-
members to join existing currency unions, if they are to enjoy the benefits anyway. 
With no trade diversion, free-riding for countries that stay out of a monetary union 
becomes a possibility. Free riders will share the benefits but not the costs of a 
common currency. 
5.6 The effect of currency union dissolutions on trade  
The studies discussed so far are based on cross-sectional analysis of trade data at a 
given point in time. They answer the question whether countries that share a 
common currency trade more than others that are not members of a currency union. 
From a policy perspective it is not the right question to ask. What one would really 
want to know is the impact of a currency union on those countries that adopt the 
common currency; whether countries trade more with each other if they form a 
currency union, and whether leaving a currency union reduces the volume of trade 
between ex-partners. When the question of a causal link between the adoption of a 
common currency and increased trade is considered, an obvious approach is to 
examine a bilateral trade time series that includes both pre- and post-union 
observations. Rose (2000) found that this was not feasible when using the World 
Trade Data Bank because there is such little time-series variation in currency union 
membership after 1970. Persson (2001) is also of the opinion that the effect of a 
common currency on trade must be identified from the cross-sectional variations 
since there are very few regime changes. 
  
In spite of these difficulties, Pakko and Wall (2001) stress the importance of relying 
on time-series rather than cross-sectional variation and attempt to exploit the little 
time-series variation there is in the data used by Rose – only eight cases when 
countries either joined or left a currency union. In order to capture the dynamic link 
between common currencies and trade Pakko and Wall (2001) add pair-specific 
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fixed effects to Rose’s model, that is they introduce a comprehensive set of dummy 
variables –  one for each pairing of countries. 
The fixed effects approach assumes that, for each pair of countries, there is likely to 
be a unique set of reasons for trade volume to differ from the average. According to 
Pakko and Wall (2001) the main benefit of this approach is that it avoids the 
estimation bias that can arise because of misspecified or omitted time-invariant 
factors that are correlated with bilateral trade volume and with other explanatory 
variables. This is achieved by controlling for all factors that are fixed over the 
sample period, not only those included in the estimation. The fixed effects approach 
has the additional benefit of not relying on distance as a measure of relative trading 
costs. Pakko and Wall (2001:40) list a number of reasons why distance is a poor 
indicator of such costs. Distance across land and distance across an ocean will not 
have the same cost implications, neither will distance across undeveloped countries 
and distance across developed countries. Furthermore, distance between single 
points within two countries is not the same as distance between points spread across 
the countries. 
When Pakko and Wall (2001) use the fixed effects approach to estimate the effect of 
currency union membership on trade, they find that the estimated coefficient on the 
common currency dummy is negative. Their estimate indicates that two countries 
that share the same currency trade only 69 percent of what they would if they had 
different currencies. In other words, the formation of a currency union decreases 
members’ trade by 31 percent. This result is dramatically different from Rose’s 
estimate, however, it is not significantly different from zero statistically. The 
negative result could stem from attempting to estimate a coefficient from too few 
observations. Pakko and Wall (2001:40) admit that their approach is not ideal 
because of the small number of observations, but they feel it is sufficient to 
demonstrate the fragility of Rose’s result. In their view their empirical estimates 
suggest that a common currency may lead to significant reductions in trade and 
therefore they conclude that Rose’s results are not robust with respect to a general 
specification of time-invariant determinants of trade volume.  
As a result of the above criticism, Glick and Rose (2002) use the fixed effects 
estimator proposed by Pakko and Wall (2001) on a much larger data set to estimate 
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the effect of currency unions on trade. They use the IMF Direction of Trade data 
set, which has enough time-series variation to make the use of a fixed effect 
estimator feasible, namely 146 switches in currency union status. However, most of 
these switches are currency union dissolutions. Because of the lack of observations 
on currency union entries, Glick and Rose (2002) are forced to treat exits from and 
entries into currency unions symmetrically. By comparing trade for a pair of 
countries before and after the regime change and assuming symmetry, the authors 
estimate that joining a currency union causes bilateral trade to rise by about 90 
percent , in other words trade almost doubles. In their sensitivity analysis of the 
estimates Glick and Rose (2002) separate currency union exits from entries and find 
that the exit effect on trade is bigger than the entry effect. They argue that this 
difference is caused by the fact that exits from currency unions tended to take place 
early in the sample while entries into currency unions occurred late, so the effect of 
lags might bias the effect of entry downwards compared to the effect of exits. 
Even if currency union exits and entries are accepted as symmetrical, the time-series 
evidence about the doubling effect of common currencies on trade is much weaker 
than the tripling effect suggested by Rose’s (2000) original cross-sectional study. 
One reason for this difference could be that the different approaches used in the 
studies ask different questions from the data. Rose’s (2000) original cross-sectional 
study asks how much more two countries trade if they use the same currency, while 
the time -series approach asks what happens to trade when a currency union 
dissolves or is created. Glick and Rose (2002) answer the latter, relevant policy 
question and find that adopting a common currency nearly doubles trade. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the main questions and findings of the studies by 
Rose and co-authors discussed in this chapter. A comparison of the estimates clearly 
shows that including time -series data in the analysis has considerably reduced the 
estimated trade effect. The near-doubling effect of common currencies suggested by 
the time-series analysis is not as implausible as the tripling effect, but is still very 
large. 
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Table 5.1  Summary of findings of Rose and co-authors  
Study Data CU 
effect 
Research question 
and answer 
Comments 
Rose 
(2000) 
cross-
sectional 
235 % Do two countries 
sharing a common 
currency trade more? 
Yes. 3 times more. 
A currency union is not the 
same as a fixed rate regime and 
has a much stronger effect on 
trade. 
Rose & 
Engel 
(2002) 
cross-
sectional 
235 % Is the border effect 
the consequence of 
having different 
national currencies? 
Only partly.  
Currency unions triple trade. 
The border effect is much 
larger than the currency union 
effect. 
 
Frankel 
& Rose 
(2002) 
cross-
sectional 
290 % Does a common 
currency mean more 
trade and higher 
economic growth? 
Yes. 
Effect of currency boards and 
currency unions  similar. 
No evidence of trade diversion. 
A currency union should raise 
members’ income by 4-20 % 
over twenty years. 
Glick & 
Rose 
(2002) 
panel 92 % Do two countries that 
adopt a common 
currency trade more? 
Yes. Trade doubles. 
Result is conditional on 
assuming symmetry between 
entering and leaving a currency 
union. 
 
5.6.1 Currency union dissolution versus decolonization 
Although entry into and exit from a currency union cannot be expected to have a 
symmetrical effect on trade, the extension of the analysis to currency union 
dissolutions does have the advantage of making time-series studies feasible. 
However, Bomberger (2002) criticizes Glick and Rose (2002) for not distinguishing 
between currency union dissolution and decolonization. He argues that exchange 
range regime transitions are highly concentrated in a group of former colonies that 
attained independence. Compared with the rest of the sample, trade declined heavily 
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for all countries in this group including those that never had a currency union or 
never abandoned one. Hence the large estimates of the currency union effect are in 
fact the consequence of the disintegration of trade after decolonization, and have 
been misinterpreted by Glick and Rose  (2002). Exits from a currency union often 
correspond to the breakup of a colonial re lationship, and the adoption of more self-
reliant, inward-looking policies in the wake of colonialism (Honohan 2001:458). 
Trade can be expected to decline under such circumstances. Pain (2002) also notes 
that in many cases the dissolution of a currency union has coincided with other 
economic or political events that would have had a considerable effect on trade, for 
example the civil wars in the wake of the decolonisation of Angola and 
Mozambique, where one would not ascribe the subsequent decline in trade with 
Portugal to the adoption of separate currencies.  In view of the above criticism, the 
time-series evidence based on changes in currency union status is highly 
contestable. If leaving a currency union is found to have a negative effect of a 
certain size on a country’s trade, it cannot be simply assumed that joining a currency 
union will have a trade enhancing effect of the same size.  
The relationship between the adoption of different currencies, political 
disintegration and trade has been further investigated by Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 
(2003). They assess the impact of disintegration on trade among the former 
constituent republics of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia using a 
gravity trade model. They find evidence of a strong home bias in the former 
federations. Trade between the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia and between 
republics of the Soviet Union was approximately 43 times greater than trade with 
otherwise similar countries at the time of disintegration. At a factor of about 24, the 
home bias was lower in Slovenia and Croatia. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) find that 
disintegration was followed by a sharp deterioration of bilateral trade intensity in all 
former federations, but the legacy of common past remains strong. In 1998 trade 
flows among the former constituent republics were still between two to thirty times 
greater than normal trade. The authors point out that their results are broadly 
consistent with earlier findings on currency unions. They find that bilateral trade 
intensity declines by about factor three in the first years of existence of the new 
independent states. However, they also emphasize that the effect of adopting 
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different currencies cannot be separated from the effect of political disintegration, as 
both effects happened concurrently.  
5.6.2 The Irish experience 
Thom and Walsh (2002) criticize Glick and Rose (2002) for a different reason. They 
argue that generalizations based on broad panel studies are irrelevant to EMU 
because of the different characteristics of the countries involved. Thom and Walsh 
(2002) suggest that the break-up of the long-standing currency union between the 
Irish pound and sterling in 1978 is a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of a 
currency union on trade and that the result of their case study would be much more 
relevant to EMU. A further advantage of studying the  Irish case is that the 
dissolution of the currency union was an exogenous event, whereas other changes in 
exchange rate pegs were brought about by changes in trade patterns. 
Thom and Walsh (2002) estimate a model of Anglo-Irish trade over the period 1950 
to 1998 and test for evidence of a structural break in the relationship between 
income and trade after 1978. They also use a panel regression of Irish trade with the 
main trading partners to estimate the effect of the sterling link on the pattern of Irish 
trade. However, none of the tests provided firm evidence that the dissolution of the 
sterling link significantly lowered bilateral trade. While they caution that findings 
based on the collapse of a currency union cannot be extrapolated to predict the 
effects of the creation of a new one, they feel confident that their result raises doubt 
about how much trade will result from the adoption of the euro.  However, the 
conclusions of Thom and Walsh (2002) cannot be reasonably generalized. The case 
of Ireland-UK seems atypical in not showing the decline in trade that is generally 
observed.  Glick and Rose (2002) maintain that it is the use of a broad data set with 
many currency union transitions that accounts for the differences between the 
results of the two studies. They also emphasize that at the time of the dissolution of 
the currency union Ireland was also small and poor, so the case study is no more 
relevant to economically large modern countries than the Rose (2000) large panel 
study. On the other hand, Melitz (2003) is of the opinion that the Irish case study of 
exit from a monetary union provides one of the most significant empirical results 
inconsistent with those of Rose and co-authors. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The study of the effect of common currencies on trade has been initiated by Rose 
and together with his co-authors he reached some important results. Rose estimated 
that exchange rate volatility has a small negative effect on trade that is largely 
consistent with findings of the extensive literature on the topic. More importantly, 
he separated the currency union effect on trade from the effect of exchange rate 
stability and showed that the impact of common currencies on trade is huge. 
Therefore a fixed rate regime is not the same as a currency union. The adoption of a 
common currency can reduce some of the barriers to trade, but the exact reason 
behind the currency union effect on trade is unclear. Even though the mechanism at 
work is not properly understood, the impact of common currencies deserves serious 
attention, since increased trade intensity can foster higher economic growth. 
However, the study of the trade effect of common currenc ies is impeded by the fact 
that there are very few examples of currency union formations. One line of research 
therefore attempted to draw conclusions about the currency union effect on trade on 
the basis of the effect of currency union dissolutions, but the effect of joining or 
leaving a currency union cannot simply be considered to be symmetrical. 
Furthermore, the evidence is based mostly on the experience of small, poor, 
developing countries, therefore it has no relevance to the monetary unification plans 
of major, developed economies. Attempts to solve these difficulties will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
TOWARDS A SUPERIOR ESTIMATION OF THE ROSE 
EFFECT  
According to Rose’s initial research, currency union membership doubles or even 
triples trade. This controversial result stimulated a great number of economists to 
carry out similar studies. To date there are more than thirty studies on the currency 
union effect on trade. Several authors have attempted to overturn Rose’s result and 
shrink the currency union effect on trade, leading a full-scale attack on the general 
methodology applied in his studies. Section 6.1 discusses important points of 
criticisms that have been raised and various methodological improvements that have 
been suggested. Section 6.2 provides historical evidence of the Rose effect based on 
the gold standard era, while section 6.3 investigates the most recent evidence of the 
trade effect of common currencies in the context of the European Monetary Union.  
6.1 Criticism of Rose’s methodology 
Critics raised a number of concerns about Rose’s methodology. Potential problems 
include non-random selection, simultaneity and aggregation bias. A large part of the 
literature on the currency union effect on trade represents an attempt to solve these 
problems. This section examines whether correcting for the different sources of 
potential bias reduces the estimated trade effect. 
6.1.1 Non-random selection 
One of the main points of criticism is that the conclusions of gravity-based models 
of currency unions and trade are probably affected by selection bias. Persson 
(2001:436) notes that the estimates might be seriously biased if the members of 
existing currency unions are non-randomly selected and explains his concern in 
medical terms. If one regards a currency union as a treatment, then one would want 
to test its effect on two groups of patients who were similar in all respects, except 
that one received the treatment while the other did not. However, if the two groups 
differ systematically in some other respect, then one cannot tell whether any 
 86 
observed difference in the health of the two groups is really the result of the 
treatment. 
As far as the trade effect of currency unions is concerned, a selection bias arises if 
the characteristics of countries adoptin g a common currency appear to be 
systematically different from the characteristics of countries outside the union. 
Persson (2001) argues that the likelihood that two countries will adopt a common 
currency is not random, and may depend on some of the explanatory variables, such 
as the size of the country. The bias resulting from non-random selection can be 
aggravated by the non-linearity of some of the explanatory variables. While size, for 
example, may affect bilateral trade, it is possible that the effect of size on trade is 
different at different sizes. The combination of non-random selection and non-
linearities can result in seriously biased estimates of the currency union effect. 
Persson (2001) proposes a novel methodology to solve the problem of non-random 
selection. As a first step, he compares the characteristics of currency union countries 
with the characteristics of countries that have their own separate currency. He uses 
Rose’s original dataset, and compares the mean averages of various variables for the 
two different country groups. A clear contrast can be seen between the two groups. 
Countries that are members of a currency union are more likely to be economically 
small, poor and in geographical proximity to each other. They also tend to share a 
border and a common language, belong to a free trade area, be part of the same 
nation and have the same colonizer or have a colonial relationship. Since the 
differences are statistically significant, it is safe to conclude that there is a 
systematic difference between the characteristics of currency union countries and 
those of other countries. 
Next, Persson (2001:439) uses a matching approach to compare the bilateral trade of 
the currency union country pairs and the bilateral trade of similar country pairs that 
are not in a currency union. He treats two country pairs as being similar, if in the 
absence of the currency union, the currency union pair would have the same amount 
of bilateral trade as the other country pair. Persson (2001) estimates the probability 
that a particular country pair will have a common currency, using nine of the 
regressors that appear in Rose’s gravity equation as explanatory variables. The 
estimated probability that a particular country pair will have a common currency is 
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the so-called propensity score of the country pair. Then, currency union pairs are 
ranked by their propensity scores and divided into subgroup, using the stratification 
method. The non-currency union country pairs are sorted into those same subgroups 
on the basis of their propensity score. These other pairs are treated as the 
comparison group. The comparison of the two groups shows that the currency union 
effect on trade is only 13 percent, and this result is not statistically significant. 
In a slightly different method, Persson (2001) twins each currency union pair with 
the non-currency union pair that has the propensity score closest to that of the 
currency union pair. Those closest country pairs become the comparison group. This 
method, known as the nearest matching method, yields a trade enhancing effect of 
66 percent. Persson (2001) concludes that the currency union effect on trade is 
considerably less dramatic than Rose’s (2000) early result suggested. 
However, Persson’s attempt to improve Rose’s methodology has been criticized. 
Kenen (2002:5) has two objections to the Persson methodology. The first objection 
is that the regressors include GDP and GDP per capita, which may not directly 
influence trading costs per se, they appear in the standard gravity equation for quite 
different reasons. The second objection is that the propensity scores provided are 
estimates of the probability that a particular country pair will share a common 
currency. Because propensity scores attach to country pairs, it is implicitly assumed 
that the measured characteristics of the two countries comprising a country pair 
jointly and symmetrically determine the probability of having a common currency. 
However, in the case of unilateral currency unions the decision whether to dollarize 
or not has more to do with the characteristics of the country intent on dollarization 
than with the characteristics of the chosen anchor country.  
In order to account for the different country characteristics, Kenen (2002) proposes 
a country-based, asymmetrical approach. He estimates the probability that a 
particular country will deliberately adopt some other country’s currency or join a 
multilateral currency union. For this purpose, the currency-union dummy needs to 
be redefined, since now it does not refer to a country pair but to a single country. 
For example, the currency union dummy is equal to one for a country such as 
Panama, which uses the US dollar, but is zero for the United States. In the case of a 
multilateral currency-union, the currency-union dummy is one for every member 
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country. A set of single-country regressors, such as output, population, ex-colony 
and island are also defined. Some of the dummies used in Rose’s gravity equation, 
such as common language or distance, do not have an analogue in the single-
country approach. The distribution of the propensity scores obtained shows that 
currency-union countries in general have a high propensity score, while other 
countries normally score low. This difference between the distributions of the two 
country groups highlights the usual criticism directed against Rose’s results. 
Currency union countries are indeed atypical, and the Rose (2000) regression results 
cannot be used to predict the trade -creating effect of common currencies for other 
groups of countries. Members of EMU in particular all have propensity scores lower 
than five percent. 
Once the propensity scores are obtained, Kenen (2002) uses a simple analogue to 
Persson’s (2001) stratification method in order to form a comparison group of 
country pairs that are similar to the currency-union pairs. Computing and comparing 
the means of the logs of trade flows for the two groups, he obtains results similar to 
those of Persson. The mean of the trade flows between currency-union pairs is not 
significantly different from the mean of the trade flows between the country pairs 
that form Kenen’s comparison group. However, when Kenen re-estimates Rose’s 
gravity equation using the subset of country pairs comprising his currency-union 
pairs and his comparison group, he obtains a significant, though smaller trade-
raising effect than in Rose (Kenen 2002:10). In other words, he confirms both 
Persson’s and Rose’s results. He explains this anomaly by the use of different data 
sets. Another reason is the different strategy used. Persson’s trade based strategy 
yields the same group currency union country pairs as Kenen’s country based 
strategy, but the resulting comparison groups are obviously different. Furthermore, 
Persson (2001) obtains his gravity equation using the country pairs selected by the 
nearest-matching method and not the stratification method, and Persson himself 
suggests that this may explain why his currency union coefficient is not statistically 
significant. Persson prefers the nearest-matching method and feels that it provides a 
better -balanced data set, because the number of countries in the currency union 
group and in the comparison group is similar and the comparison group does not 
dominate the re-estimation of the gravity equation. On the other hand, Kenen (2002) 
argues, that the comparison group becomes too small if the nearest-matching 
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method is used. Rose (2001) suggests that the matching method discards much of 
the relevant information and that is the reason why it fails to find a significant 
currency-union effect. 
Another author concerned about selection bias in Rose’s specification is Melitz 
(2001). He argues that countries will only form a currency union if they have close 
economic or political ties with one another. If Melitz is correct, then the estimated 
high coefficient of the currency union dummy may be due to correlation with other 
variables, such as membership in regional trade agreements or colonial relationship. 
This could well be the case since the coefficient of Rose’s currency union dummy is 
higher than those for political union or free trade area, while it is unlikely that 
removing the frictions of separate currencies could promote trade more than 
removing protective trade barriers or entering into a political union. 
In order to test the hypothesis that membership in currency unions, free trade areas 
and political unions tends to overlap, Melitz (2001) separates common currency 
pairs into two groups. The first group is labelled as Strict Currency Unions and 
consists of country pairs that are not members of a political union or a free trade 
area and do not have an ex-colonial relationship. The rest belong to the second 
group labelled Combined Currency Unions. If Rose’s interpretation of the 
coefficient of Currency Union is correct, one would expect the coefficient of 
Combined Currency Union to be much higher than that of Strict Currency Union, 
since it should reflect the combined effect of currency union and political union or 
free trade area. But this is not the case. The difference between the two coefficients 
is much smaller than expected. In a further test Strict Currency Union is even more 
narrowly interpreted and country pairs with a past common colonizer are also 
excluded, with little change in the results. The coefficient of Combined Currency 
Union is not high enough to admit the additional effect of political union and free 
trade agreement. This, however, should not be interpreted as a confirmation that 
currency union does not raise trade at all, it only means that the extent of the impact 
is not as huge as Rose’s original estimate. Melitz (2001) compares the different 
coefficients and concludes that the use of a common currency doubles trade, a result 
that is similar to the findings of Glick and Rose (2002). 
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6.1.2 Simultaneity bias 
Another point of criticism directed against the gravity model of trade deals with the 
likelihood of simultaneity bias. Simultaneity bias means that the dependent variable 
is not simply a function of the explanatory variables in an equation, but some of the 
explanatory variables are a function of the dependent variable or of each other at the 
same time. In such cases where the estimation ignores the possibility of a two-way 
causality between the dependent variable and one or more of its explanatory 
variables, simultaneity bias occurs. Regarding the relationship between trade and 
common currencies, in terms of causality, there are two other possibilities besides 
currency unions creating trade. It is possible that countries decide to form a 
currency union because they trade a lot with each other (the traditional optimum 
currency area argument), or both currency unions and high levels of trade are jointly 
caused by some third factor (Yetman 2002). In the latter two cases, currency union 
membership becomes an endogenous variable and estimates of the impact it has on 
trade will be biased because of the existing simultaneity between trade and currency 
union membership.  
The problem of endogenous selection into a currency union has been stressed by 
Tenreyro (2001). She attempted to correct for this source of bias by identifying the 
factors that play a role in the decision to form a currency union, but do not have an 
independent impact on bilateral trade. Compatibility in legal systems, cultural links, 
sharing a common language, geographic proximity, better infrastructure and tied 
bilateral transfers are given as examples of factors that may increase the propensity 
to form a currency union as well as increase bilateral trade. This correlation could 
lead to a positive bias of the estimates. Other variables, such as market 
concentration, may lead to a negative bias. Higher levels of monopoly distortion in 
the economy could cause higher inflation rates and thereby increase the need to join 
a currency union in an effort to reduce inflation. By contrast, higher mark-ups tend 
to discourage trade (Tenreyro 2001:4). From the analysis of these factors the 
probability that two countries will adopt a common currency is estimated. The effect 
that such a union will have on the bilateral trade of the country-pair is then 
estimated simultaneously with the estimation of probabilities.  
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Rose (2000) dismissed the possible endogeneity of the currency union dummy as 
purely hypothetical, arguing that trade considerations have been almost irrelevant to 
a country’s decision to join or leave a currency union. It is, however, possible, that 
the simultaneity problem is more relevant in a historical context. There appears to 
be evidence, that countries may have joined the gold standard as a result of their 
trade dependence on other countries that changed to gold (Estevadeordal  et al  
2003:376). 
6.1.3 The treatment of zero trade flows  
Tenreyro (2001) raises a further economic concern that is a possible source of bias 
in Rose (2000) and other simple OLS estimates of the trade impact of currency 
unions, namely the treatment of zero trade flows. Databases on bilateral trade 
include many economically small countries that traded in some years and not in 
others. In a gravity model of trade, such as Rose (2000), (log)trade is normally the  
dependent variable. Zero-valued trade flow entries present a problem for 
econometric estimation, because the log-linear specification does not allow for 
them. The common practice has been simply to exclude country pairs with no trade. 
Countries in currency unions tend to be economically smaller and exhibit a more 
irregular pattern of trade than the average, therefore ignoring zero-valued 
observations results in an upward bias in the estimated effect of currency unions on 
trade. 
Tenreyro (2001) addresses the issue of zero-valued entries by averaging trade flows 
over five-year periods. The results suggest that incorporating the information in 
zero-valued trade has a huge impact on the size of the estimate, lowering the impact 
of common currencies on trade from approximately 200 percent to 100 percent. 
Correcting for both simultaneity and zero observations shrinks the effect on trade to 
about 60 percent, and the estimates are not significantly different from zero. 
Tenreyro concludes that the lack of statistical significance implies that the trade 
effect of common currencies might not be as large and robust as previously 
reported. 
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6.1.4 Multilateral trade resistance  
A further criticism directed against the methodology of the gravity-based studies is 
that their estimates may be biased because gravity models do not correspond to the 
underlying trade theory. Gravity models explain trade between two countries 
through measures of absolute trade costs, while in reality it is relative trade barriers 
that determine the level of trade (HM Treasury 2003, par.5.21). Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001) attempt to control for this bias by using a model in which bilateral 
trade depends on the trade barrier between pairs of countries relative to the 
multilateral, or average trade barrier against all other countries. They apply the 
gravity equation of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) and add country-specific 
fixed effects that are assumed to represent a country’s multilateral trade resistance, 
while the existing factors such as common language or membership of a free trade 
area indicate whether there is reduced bilateral trade resistance. With this model it is 
possible to estimate the currency union effect on trade  even for countries that have 
never been in one. It also provides an estimate of the tariff-equivalent of the national 
money barrier. 
The inclusion of relative trade barriers leads to some important results. One insight 
is that any reduction in barriers to trade through the adoption of common currencies 
will have more impact on larger countries than on smaller countries. This is because 
relative trade resistance is reduced more in the case of large countries than for 
smaller countries. In the case of small countries, changes in bilateral barriers have a 
proportionately larger effect on multilateral resistance. Another conclusion of the 
model is that for countries that already trade a lot, formation of a currency union 
may lead to a smaller percentage increase in trade. The reason is that the reduction 
of bilateral trade barriers also reduces multilateral resistance; therefore relative trade 
barriers do not fall by much, so trade does not increase by a large amount. Finally, it 
is also claimed that welfare is inversely related to multilateral trade resistance. This 
implies that even though countries that already trade heavily will experience a 
smaller increase in trade, their welfare benefit from joining a currency union will be 
greater. When a common currency is adopted, the more firms take part in 
international trade, the greater the benefit from reduced transaction costs associated 
with the use of separate currencies. 
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Rose and van Wincoop (2001) estimate the model using 1980 and 1990 data for a 
set of 143 countries. The results suggest that trade barriers associated with national 
borders are halved when countries join a currency union, significantly raising trade 
and welfare. National money indeed appears to be a barrier to international trade. 
Giving up national money and adopting a common currency may lead to a 50 
percent increase in trade. While still impressive, this result is much smaller than 
those suggested by previous studies. It appears that the inclusion of a multilateral 
resistance term reduces the size of the currency union effect and previous estimates 
may have been biased because of omitting this key variable. 
6.1.5 Industrial versus developing countries 
Another source of possible bias in the estimation of the currency union effect on 
trade is the lack of differentiation. Rose (2000) does not distinguish between 
developed and developing countries, or between small and large countries in his 
analysis. However, it is conceivable that the effect of adopting a common currency 
will be different for industrial countries and developing countries because the latter 
are rarely able to invoice their trade in their own currency, mainly because of the 
low credibility of their currency, little bargaining power and uncompetitive products 
(Saiki 2002:2).  
Saiki (2002) investigates the increase in trade resulting from the adoption of a 
common currency in the case of developing countries that previously practiced local 
currency pricing, in other words, exporters set their prices in importers’ currency. 
Local currency pricing is common when developing countries export to industrial 
countries, because their products are hardly differentiated and they are in 
competition with other developing countries. These countries have an incentive to 
devalue their currency to remain competitive. When exporters engage in local 
currency pricing in order to expand their market share, exchange rate volatility is 
not an issue for importers, since prices are set in their currency. If the developing 
country in question adopts the importing country’s currency, the trade effect is 
much smaller than in the case of similar country pairs where exports used to be 
invoiced in exporters’ currency. In addition, it is imports from, rather than exports 
to the anchoring country that get a positive effect from a common currency. Saiki 
(2002) runs separate regressions for exports and imports and finds that the effect on 
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the anchoring country’s imports is very small or even negative. A negative effect is 
found in the case of countries exporting to the US, 80 percent of whose imports are 
denominated in the US dollar. The negative trade effect is possibly the result of the 
overvaluation of the currency and devaluation of export competitors’ currencies. If a 
currency union promotes imports from but discourages exports to the anchoring 
country, then the joining country will suffer from a current account deficit and thus 
its currency will be overvalued, eroding the country’s competitiveness. Saiki 
(2002:16) calls this the self-fulfilling overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
A further conclusion drawn by Saiki (2002:16) is that adopting a common currency 
will only have a positive effect on trade if there are appropriate institutional 
arrangements. He finds a clear difference between countries under currency union 
arrangements with the United States and France, the common currency effect on 
French trade being stronger. Saiki ascribes this to the historical and institutional 
relationship of CFA countries with France. Such a relationship is generally lacking 
between the United States and those countries that adopted the dollar. Appropriate 
institutional arrangements are therefore needed in  order for the dollarization of the 
developing countries to be successful.  
6.1.6 Unilateral versus multilateral currency unions 
Country pairs that share a common currency cover a large number of different 
experiences of monetary integration. Some of them are small, poor, distant 
dependencies, typically islands that use the currency of their former colonizer or 
present home country. Others are countries that unilaterally declare the adoption of 
the currency of a larger country. Finally, there are multilateral cur rency unions 
among regional neighbours. There is no reason to believe that the trade effect is the 
same for the different groups (Nitsch 2002a). It is debatable, whether the experience 
of overseas territories, where the use of a common currency is due to historical 
accident and is not the result of independent choice provides any valuable lesson for 
current monetary integration schemes. 
In the standard gravity trade model in the literature, in other words Rose’s (2000) 
model, multilateral currency union members, unilaterally dollarized countries and 
overseas territories with the same currency are grouped together. The underlying 
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assumption is that the common currency dummy specifically reflects the effect that 
a common currency has on trade and not the nature of the overall link between 
countries, which is captured by a host of other variables. However, various authors 
have raised their concern that the grouping together of different currency union 
arrangements can lead to aggregation bias. Levy-Yeyati (2001), Nitsch (2002a) and 
Klein (2002) attempt to control for this aggregation bias by disaggregating the data 
in various ways. They estimate the trade effect of different types of currency unions 
and find considerable variation.  
Levy-Yeyati (2001) proposes separating multilateral currency unions from 
unilateral currency unions in order to correct for aggregation bias. Members of a 
multilateral currency union are in a symmetric relationship, while in a unilateral 
currency union a distinction can be made between a ‘parent’ –  the large country 
whose currency is adopted by smaller countries, and the ‘siblings’ –  the small 
countries that unilaterally adopt the currency of a larger country. If one can find 
significant difference in the estimated effect of a common currency on trade 
between multilateral currency union and parent -sibling (or sibling-sibling) pairs, 
this would imply that the common currency dummy might in part reflect omitted 
variables that are correlated with bilateral trade flows and not fully captured by the 
other dummies. 
There are several reasons why such a differential effect might be expected. The 
creation of a multilateral currency union involves not only monetary but other 
institutional policies that might augment the common currency effect, and one could 
expect currency union members to trade more with each other than unilaterally 
dollarized countries. On the other hand, most siblings are sub-national entities wit h 
strong political and institutional links with the parent country, and one could expect 
them to trade more with each other, since their relationship is somewhat like that 
existing between provinces of the same country. 
Levy-Yeyati (2001) empirically tests the sensitivity of the reported common 
currency effect to the way in which a common currency is introduced. He extends 
Rose’s (2000) specification by adding country effects and decomposing common 
currency pairs into two groups, namely pairs of countries within a multilateral 
currency union and other common currency pairs. The results imply that the 
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common currency effect on trade differs appreciably between country pairs that 
belong to a multilateral currency union and other common currency pairs. The 
common currency effect for the latter group is similar to Rose’s (2000) original 
estimates, but in the case of multilateral currency union members it is considerably 
smaller, the implied trade enhancing effect is 65 percent. Levy-Yeyati (2001) 
further decomposed the non-multilateral currency union pairs into two subgroups: 
parent-sibling and sibling-sibling pairs, but failed to find any significant difference 
between the magnitude of the coefficients. However, the fact that the size of the 
coefficient is significantly lower for the multilateral currency union group suggests 
that using the estimates of the standard Rose model to assess the trade -promoting 
effect of a common currency could lead to a substantial overestimation of the actual 
effect.  
Another author concerned about the possibility of aggregation bias is Klein (2002) 
who investigates the effect of dollarization on trade and argues that the results from 
wide samples used by Rose and his co-authors may not give an accurate assessment 
of the dollarization effect, just as they might not give reliable estimates of the EMU 
effect. A currency union and dollarization are theoretically different. A currency 
union entails the establishment of a new central bank, while dollarization involves 
the adoption of the currency of another country, typically the US dollar. Klein 
therefore chooses to work with a smaller sample, focusing on bilateral trade 
between country pairs in which one country is the United States or in which one 
country adopted the US dollar. Klein investigates the post Bretton Wood era from 
1974 to 1997, since the effect of dollarization on trade is expected to be stronger 
when the rest of the world is not on a dollar -based exchange rate standard.  
According to Klein (2002) one might expect to find larger estimates of the currency 
union effect on trade in the sub-samples concentrating on the United States than in 
wider samples covering all common currency agreements, since countries in 
sustained dollar currency unions are presumed to benefit most from membership. 
The regression results indicate just the opposite. Following the methodology applied 
by Glick and Rose (2002), the coefficient on Klein’s currency union dummy is only 
about one-third as large using the United States sample than in the full sample. If an 
even smaller sub-sample is taken, considering only country pairs in which one is the 
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United States and the other is a Western Hemisphere country, reflecting current and 
potential candidates for dollarization, the currency union coefficient is only one-
fifth of its full sample value, and loses much of its statistical significance. The 
bottom line is that there is little robust evidence that dollarization promotes greater 
trade with the United States for the adopting countries. These results are in contrast 
with those of Rose and his co-authors. The source of the difference is that Klein 
focuses on samples that may better represent the behaviour of potential candidates 
for dollarization. 
In a further test Klein (2002) examines whether there is a distinct difference 
between the trade effect of dollarization and of having a fixed exchange rate, since 
only a few countries dollarized, but a significant number of nations pegged their 
currencies to the US dollar at some time during the post Bretton Woods era. Klein 
augments his regression specification by a separate dummy variable denoting the 
presence of a sustained fixed exchange rate that is not a currency union. However, 
no significant evidence is found that the effects of dollarization on trade are 
different from that of a sustained fixed exchange rate. This result contrasts with the 
evidence presented by Rose (2000), namely that a common currency is a much more 
serious commitment than a fixed rate. 
The main conclusion of Klein’s study, that adopting the US dollar has no significant 
effect on trade with the United States, seems to be in contrast with the conclusion 
reached by Levy-Yeyati (2001), who confirms the strong trade effect of common 
currencies in the case of non-multilateral currency unions, that is for parent-sibling 
pairs and sibling-sibling pairs. However, the adoption of the US dollar and the use 
of the currency of the home country or former colonizer by a dependency fall both 
under the parent-sibling category. The large trade effect associated with this group 
might be attributable to the experience of the overseas territories, and not to that of 
dollarized countries, in which case the two results can be compatible.  
The only industrial country other than the United States that had sustainable 
currency unions with more than one country in the post Bretton Woods area is 
Australia. The estimates of gravity trade regressions for Australia suggest that a 
non-industrial country that adopts the Australian dollar experiences a tenfold 
increase in its trade with Australia (Klein 2002:15). Naturally, this result should not 
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be applied to other countries, since it is based on the experience of three small 
island nations, namely Tonga, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. 
Klein’s (2002) results are consistent with those of Nitsch (2002b) who corrected a 
number of data errors in Rose’s (2000) data set and found that the trade-multiplying 
effect varies across different currencies, ranging from no effect for countries which 
have adopted the US dollar to extremely high estimates for countries adopting the 
Australian dollar. Nitsch (2002a) argues that because of these huge differences it is 
advisable to examine the effect of the various currency unions separately. Nitsch 
(2002a) investigates the effect of multilateral currency unions on trade by focusing 
on two existing multilateral currency unions, the CFA franc zone and the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union and estimates their effect on intraregional trade. 
Focusing on intraregional trade allows a direct comparison of a country’s trade with 
a currency union member and an otherwise similar country using a different 
currency. The CFA franc zone has fourteen members. The CFA franc is issued 
separately by two sub-zones, in West and Central Africa respectively, it is 
exchangeable one-for-one agains t each other and collectively pegged to the euro. 
The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) comprises eight small island 
territories and the currency is linked to the US dollar. In both groups members trade 
relatively little among themselves. They produce mainly primary goods and trade 
with industrial countries. Given these country characteristics, the intra-union trade 
benefit of monetary integration seems limited, but the percentage change in trade, in 
other words the common currency effect, can still be significant. 
Nitsch (2002a) uses the augmented gravity model of Rose (2000) and runs separate 
regressions for the two regions. The results imply that CFA franc countries trade 
about 55 percent more with each other than with a typical non-union country in 
West and Central Africa. The estimate for the ECCU is smaller and statistically not 
significantly different from zero. The conclusion is that multilateral currency unions 
have, on average, a positive effect on intraregional trade, but the magnitude of the 
effect is considerably lower than Rose’s estimate of factor three, confirming other 
estimates of positive but moderate effect of common currencies on trade. A further 
conclusion drawn from the investigation of the extent to which the currency union 
effect differs across country pairs is that economically large countries seem to 
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benefit more from a common currency. A possible reason for this finding could be 
that large economies tend to have a diversified production structure and may 
function as suppliers for the region. 
A summary of the methodological contributions and the preferred estimates of the 
currency union effect on trade of the different studies discussed above are provided 
in table 6.1. Although the various studies arrive at highly divergent estimates 
depending on the methodologies used and the countries considered, the estimates 
are generally much lower than the original Rose result.  
Table 6.1. Summary of representative currency union studies 
Study Trade 
effect 
Comments 
Persson 
(2001) 
13 % - 
66% 
Corrects for non-random selection and non-linearities 
with matching technique. 
Kenen 
(2002) 
239 % Uses a country-based strategy to estimate the 
probability of joining a currency union. 
Melitz 
(2001) 
100 % Separates pure currency union effect from the impact 
of political ties or free trade areas. 
Tenreyro 
(2001) 
60 % Corrects for endogeneity by estimating the probability 
that two countries will adopt a common currency 
simultaneously with the effect of such a union on trade. 
Solves the problem of zero trade by averaging trade 
flows over five years. 
Rose & van 
Wincoop 
(2001) 
50 % Incorporate relative trade barriers. 
More impact on larger countries. 
Effect smaller for countries that already trade a lot, but 
their welfare benefit will be greater. 
Saiki (2002) 75 % Local currency pricing reduces the effect. 
It is imports from rather than exports to the anchoring 
country that increase. 
Appropriate institutional arrangements are needed for 
positive effect. 
Levy-Yeyati 
(2001) 
65 % Trade effect for multilateral currency unions is smaller 
than in the case of unilaterally dollarized countries. 
Klein (2002)  65 % Effect of dollarization not distinct from the effect of a 
fixed dollar exchange rate. 
Nitsch 
(2002a) 
55 %  The effect differs across country pairs. 
Economically larger countries benefit more. 
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6.2 Historical evidence: the gold standard era 
One of the major criticism of Rose’s study was that his sample is dominated by 
small, poor, developing countries, therefore it has no relevance to the monetary 
unification plans of major, developed economies. The reason for this is that in the 
contemporary, post-war data there is a shortage of observations of monetary regime 
changes. To overcome this difficulty some recent research (Estevadeordal et al 
2003; Flandreau & Maurel 2001; López-Córdova & Meissner 2003; Ritschl & Wolf 
2003) sought answers in the hist orical experience by extending the data set back to 
the late 19th and early 20th century, when much of the world was tied to gold. This 
line of research is motivated by the belief that the historical experience of 
economically large, developed countries could be more relevant to present-day 
monetary integration among developed countries than the contemporary experience 
of small, poor countries.  
Flandreau and Maurel (2001) examine the late 19th century European experience. In 
this period a variety of monetary arrangements were in place that can be ranked 
according to the different degrees of monetary integration they implied. The 
Habsburg Empire was a full monetary union between Austria and Hungary. The 
gold standard represented a lesser degree of monetary integration, best compared to 
contemporary currency ba nds or target zones. Within the gold standard group, the 
Latin and Scandinavian Unions gave legal tender to the gold coins issued by 
member states but were not full monetary unions. Flandreau and Maurel (2001) 
apply the gravity model of trade and use separate dummies to indicate membership 
in the Habsburg Empire, the gold standard, the Latin Union and the Scandinavian 
Union to capture the trade effect of different monetary arrangements.  Annual panel 
data are used for sixteen countries for the period 1880 to 1913. Their results indicate 
that the Austro-Hungarian monetary union improved trade between member states 
by a factor of 3.2. The gold standard was associated by a much smaller but still 
significant increase in trade of factor 1.36. The Scandinavian Union also impacted 
trade favourably. Together with the effect of the gold standard its members 
experienced a trade increase of factor 2.61. The Latin Union, however, did not 
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improve trade between its members, since exchange rate fluctuations were not 
eliminated. 
Flandreau and Maurel (2001) conclude that tight monetary integration one century 
ago had the same surprisingly high impact on the volume of international trade that 
Rose (2000) found in the contemporary context. They also offer an economic 
interpretation of their finding. They argue that monetary integration fosters capital 
market integration in general and portfolio diversification in particular. It also 
promotes macroeconomic coordination by assigning to participating regions 
common rules and targets, which in turn increase business cycle symmetry. When 
two countries have similar cycles, booming domestic demand will be matched with 
booming foreign demand, and bilateral imports and exports move in pace. This 
means that the constraint on the current account is weakened, the financing of 
imports via exports is facilitated, and bilateral trade increases as a result. 
Another study by Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor (2003) investigates the rise and 
fall of global trade from 1870 to 1939. During the great trade boom from 1870 to 
1913 a great number of countries joined the gold standard.  The authors test the 
hypothesis that a large part of the change in trade volumes previously attributed to 
the dramatic changes in transportation costs and commercial policy was due to 
changes in payment frictions, that is the gold standard effect.  
In order to test their hypothesis, Estevadeordal et al (2003) augment the traditional 
gravity equation with a gold dummy which is equal to one if both members in a 
country pair are on the gold standard, and zero if one or both are on a float. An 
average bilateral tariff level is included as a measurement of policy frictions.  
Gravity equations are estimated for 1913, when the gold standard was widespread, 
for 1928, when it was partially rebuilt, and for 1938, when it was virtually dead. The 
preferred estimates of  the gold standard impact are obtained by pooling the data. 
This ensures time variation in the data and a more reliable estimation of the effect of 
going on and off the gold standard. The authors find that the gold standard had a 
statistically and quantita tively significant effect on bilateral trade volumes. The 
results indicate that country pairs which jointly tied their currencies to gold traded 
almost twice as much -72 percent more - than country pairs in which at least one 
member was not on the gold standard (Estevadeordal  et al 2003:375). This estimate 
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is lower than the illustrious threefold increase found by Rose (2000), but it must be 
kept in mind that the gold standard represents a lower level of monetary integration 
than a currency union. The authors also compare the gold standard effect with the 
impact of tariffs and transport costs. They conclude that in the 19th century the 
effect of the gold standard was just as important as the decrease of transport costs 
and significantly more important than tariff policy in boosting trade (Estevadeordal  
et al 2003:394-395). 
Another recent study examining the classical gold standard era from 1870 to 1910 
makes use of four regressors to differentiate between various monetary standards 
(López-Córdova & Meissner 2003). In addition to the gold dummy there is a silver 
dummy, equal to one if both countries used a silver standard, a bimetal dummy to 
indicate a bimetallic standard, and a monetary union dummy, equal to one if a 
common currency was legal tender in both countries. Positive and statistically 
significant coefficients are found on ‘gold’, ‘silver’ and ‘monetary union’. The 
estimates indicate that countries on the gold standard traded about 60 percent more 
than with partners not on the gold standard. The silver standard had a doubling 
effect on trade, however, the number of countries on silver was very small. 
Bimetallism did not seem to be a significant factor encouraging trade, either because 
there are only a few observations or because of its inherent instability. Countries in 
a monetary union, controlling for all other effects, traded more than two times more 
with each other than with other countries. Combining the gold standard effect with 
the monetary union effect appears to have increased trade by 200 percent (López-
Córdova & Meissner 2003:348).  
Given the similarity of these results and the estimates of Rose (2000), there seems to 
be an astonishing long-run stability in the effects of monetary integration. López-
Córdova and Meissner (2003) consider the possibility that unobserved country-pair 
or country characteristics are responsible for the high estimates. In an alternative, 
country-pair fixed effects specification, the trade-creating effect of the gold standard 
falls to about 30 percent. However, combined with the impact of a monetary union 
there is still evidence that there is a very large association between trade and 
monetary regime coordination. Based on their findings, López-Córdova and 
Meissner (2003:351) estimate the contribution of the gold standard to global 
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integration and find that global trade could have been about twenty percent lower 
during the period examined if no country had joined the gold standard. 
A further study seems to confirm the results of the other historically based studies. 
Ritschl and Wolf (2003) examine the era after the Great Depression of 1929, when 
the gold standard collapsed and only five countries remained on gold until 1935/6. 
As a substitute, several regional currency and trade blocks were formed, such as the 
sterling block and the reichsmark block. These currency areas are not currency 
unions in the strict sense, nevertheless a similar augmented gravity model as in 
Estevadeordal et al (2003) seemingly reproduces the standard, very high trade-
promoting effect among their members, ranging from factor 3.16 for the 
Reichsmark block to 3.49 for the Sterling block (Ritschl & Wolf 2003:14). 
However, the authors warn that it would be wrong to conclude from their result that 
regional currency unions and trade blocks in operation in the 1920s and 1930s had a 
major trade-creating effect. Ritschl and Wolf (2003) examine the behaviour of the 
different currency arrangement dummies over time in order to isolate the treatment 
effect of actually introducing the currency arrangements. They define two dummy 
variables for each currency area. The first dummy is equal to one while the formal 
currency arrangement is operative. The second is equal to one for the whole sample 
period for the same country group, capturing any trade increase before the formation 
of a currency block. The results reveal that there is strong evidence of endogeneity. 
Already in the 1920s, trade among member states of the later currency blocks 
formed in the 1930s was sometimes two to three times higher than a gravity model 
would predict. In most cases, the formal establishment of these blocks had only 
insignificant effects on the coefficients. According to Ritschl and Wolf (2003:21), 
even the post-war currency arrangements are visible in the inter-war data. 
It seems that not only do currency areas create trade, but trade also creates currency 
areas, which is in line with the theory of optimum currency areas (see Chapter 2). 
Ritschl and Wolf (2003:23) conclude that the Rose effect suffers from endogeneity 
bias. They argue that optimum currency unions are formed, not to increase trade, 
but because trade is already high. Therefore they caution against too much optimism 
in generating trade through establishing currency unions. 
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An illustrative summary of the main research results of historical studies is provided 
in table 6.2. The size of the estimated trade effect in these studies indicates that 
extending the data set back to the late 19th and early 20th century has provided 
more evidence on the strong correlation between currency arrangements and trade 
intensity. At the same time, the possibility of a strong endogeneity bias has been 
emphasized, questioning yet again the direction of causation between trade and 
common currencies. While it is certainly remarkable that common currency 
arrangements a century ago were associated with trade creation similar in magnitude 
to the Rose effect, there is no guarantee that this historical evidence would be 
applicable to contemporary monetary integration. 
Table 6.2    Summary of trade effects of monetary integration in historical studies 
Study Years 
covered 
Countries 
in sample 
Trade effect  Comments 
Flandreau & 
Maurel (2001) 
1880-
1913 
16 
European 
countries 
from 36 %  
(gold standard)  
to 220 %  
(Habsburg 
union) 
Monetary integration 
weakens the current 
account constraint by 
fostering business cycle 
co-movements. 
Estevadeordal, 
Frantz & 
Taylor (2003) 
1870-
1939 
40 
countries 
72 % 
(gold standard)   
Gold standard much 
more important than 
tariff policy and just as 
important as decreasing 
transport costs in 
promoting trade. 
López-
Córdova & 
Meissner 
(2003) 
1870-
1910 
 
23 
countries 
from 30 % 
(gold standard)  
to 200% 
(monetary 
union) 
Twenty percent of 
increase in world trade 
during this period was 
due to the gold standard.  
Ritschl & Wolf 
(2003) 
1928-
1938 
29 
countries 
216 %  
(Reichsmark) 
248% (Sterling ) 
Strong evidence of 
endogeneity: trade 
creates currency areas. 
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6.3 Recent evidence: the European Monetary Union  
The most often mentioned economic benefit of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) is that it enhances trade between the participating countries. Rose’s (2000) 
initial study and the ensuing literature were motivated by the aspiration to estimate 
the impact that the euro will have on trade. The time has come when it is not 
necessary to extrapolate from evidence on other currency unions any more. It 
became possible to estimate the effects of the euro on trade directly when data for 
the early years of the European Monetary Union became available. The physical 
introduction of the euro happened only in January 2002, but one may use the period 
after the announcement of the final irreversible convergence rates into the euro 
basket of the eleven original participating members as the starting date of the 
European currency union, that is from January 1999. By focusing on the experience 
of the EU countries, a growing number of recent studies provide evidence on the 
common currency effect on trade in economically large, developed nations that 
decided to participate in a currency union by a deliberate policy choice, and not by 
historical accident. 
One of the most notable attempts to provide some answers about the euro effect on 
trade is the study by Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003). The authors use the most 
recent IMF Direction of Trade data on annual bilateral trade for 22 developed 
countries from 1992 to 2002 and form two different samples of industrial countries 
in their analysis. One sample includes all industrial countries in the data set while 
the other is restricted to countries that are members of the European Union. While 
the first sample is larger, countries in the second one are more homogeneous, 
geographically close and all belong to the same single market. Since countries in the 
second sample tend to share similar experiences, there is less danger that the results 
will be biased because of omitted variables that would have a differential effect on 
trade for certain country pairs. 
The estimates obtained for the euro’s impact on trade range between 4 and 16 
percent, depending on the sample and the various methodologies used (Micco et al 
2003:343). This effect is not nearly as impressive as the early Rose (2000) 
estimates, but it is still statistically significant and economically important, 
particularly if one considers that the sample only covers the first four years of the 
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monetary union, and the fact that for the first three years the euro was not even in 
circulation. However, Viaene (2003:346) is skeptical whether the positive trade 
effects will be maintained in the long run. She argues that during the last part of the 
sample there was strong economic growth worldwide and the euro was depreciating 
with respect to the US dollar and other currencies, and both of these factors tend to 
encourage more trade with the rest of the world.  
Micco et al (2003) go further than simply establishing that the euro boosts bilateral 
trade. They are particularly interested in the timing of the euro’s impact. To achieve 
this the EMU dummy is defined so that it takes the value of one when the two 
countries in the pair belong to the EMU, even for the years before the formal 
creation of the EMU. The aim is to follow the trade performance of the countries 
that joined the EMU over time by looking at the changing value of the coefficient 
for the EM U dummy. If the EMU has an effect on trade the coefficient should be 
higher after the creation of the monetary union (Micco et al 2003:331). The results 
show that EMU countries were already trading more amongst themselves than with 
other countries before the creation of the EMU. As expected, the trade effect 
increases in 1999 with the formal creation of the currency union, but the real jump 
in the value of the coefficient is observed in 1998. The question is why trade among 
EMU countries started to increase before 1999. One reason is that it was in 
anticipation of the formation of the EMU. The elimination of capital controls and 
the intensification of policy and central bank coordination gave stimulus to trade. 
The authors ascribe the jump in 1998 to the fact that it was a crucial year in the 
process of monetary unification. It was then that EMU became an absolute certainty 
with the official creation of the European Central Bank (Micco et al 2003:333). 
Another question that arises is whether the impact of EMU applies to all members, 
or whether the results are due to the experiences of just a few of them. Micco et al 
(2003:339) find that the results are very robust to the exclusion of one country at a 
time, but significant differences arise from the exclusion of certain groups of 
countries. If relatively less developed EMU countries are excluded, the estimated 
trade effect increases. On the other hand, if the original six EU members are 
excluded from the sample, the size of the EMU coefficient becomes smaller. These 
 107 
results imply that while the impact of EMU is fairly widespread, it is generally 
higher in the case of the more advanced economies.  
Another question is, whether the increase in trade comes at the expense of other 
countries. To check for possible trade diversion, Micco et al (2003:334) add a new 
EMU dummy to the specification, defined as equal to one when only one of the 
countries in the pair uses the euro. If the adoption of the euro is similar to 
preferential trade liberalization in leading to trade diversion away from non-
members of the currency union, than the coefficient on this dummy should be 
negative. However, just the opposite is found.  The authors conclude that the 
formation of the EMU does not cause trade diversion but instead increases 
members’ trade with the rest of the world.  However, this result is based on the 
analysis of 22 industrialized countries. The impact of EMU on member countries’ 
trade with developing countries cannot be addressed with such a data set, although it 
is of great political relevance (Midelfart 2003:344). 
Another EMU study by Bun and Klaassen (2002) follows a slightly different 
approach. Theirs is a dynamic model that explains annual bilateral exports from the 
domestic to the foreign country from lagged exports, GDP, the real exchange rate, 
its volatility, an EMU dummy and several trade integration dummies. The inclusion 
of lagged exports allows for the existence of persistent trade flows and improves on 
the usual model specifications. 
Another difference is, that while Micco et al (2003) concentrate on the total impact 
of the euro, Bun and Klaassen (2002) separately identify the impact of exchange 
rate volatility on trade. The euro effect can come through two channels, the first 
channel is the real exchange rate volatility, the second is the pure common currency 
effect representing other changes, such as the perfect credibility of the nominal 
exchange rate fix, the reduction of transaction costs and capital market integration. 
These effects are represented by the change in the EMU dummy from zero to one. 
Based on a sample that includes yearly data from 1965 to 2001 for all EU countries, 
Canada, Japan and the US, Bun and Klaassen (2002) find that the trade -enhancing 
effect of the reduction of the real exchange rate volatility is statistically insignificant 
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and economically minor. This could be explained by the fact that volatility between 
current EMU members had already been low before EMU (Bun & Klaassen 
2002:14). In contrast, the coefficient for the EMU dummy indicates that other 
changes induced by EMU, such as perfect credibility of the nominal exchange rate 
fix, the reduction of transaction costs and capital market integration have a 
statistically and economically significant effect on trade. This result confirms the 
findings of Rose (2000), namely that the introduction of a common currency is 
qualitatively different from a mere reduction of exchange rate volatility to zero (see 
section 5.1). 
Bun and Klaassen (2002:14) find that the total euro effect on trade was 4 percent in 
the first year of the EMU. The long run effect is estimated to accumulate to about 40 
percent, half of which will be achieved by 2006. The results are in line with earlier 
studies regarding the significance of the currency union effect. The substantially 
lower size of the estimate is most probably caused by the different types of currency 
union countries analysed: EMU versus currency unions involving developing 
countries. While the estimates are significant, their standard errors are economically 
substantial. This estimation uncertainty is due to the short period of the sample, and 
the authors suggest that the estimates should be updated when more EMU data 
become available in time. 
Yet another estimation of the trade gains arising from the creation of the EMU was 
done by de Souza (2002), who uses a very simple gravity equation to capture the 
effect of the variables that are of interest. The results from the estima tions based on 
the 15 EU countries for the period 1980 to 2001 indicate the lack of a consistent 
relationship between EMU and trade. De Souza (2002:14) provides various 
explanations. One hypothesis is that the period corresponding to the fixing of the 
exchange rates is not an adequate proxy for the introduction of the monetary union. 
Another hypothesis is that forward-looking agents anticipated and discounted the 
increase in trade associated with EMU membership. EU integration is a long, 
phased-in process, and all the trade gains from monetary union could have been 
realized before EMU entry. To test these two hypotheses formally, the regressions 
are re-run,  this time treating EMU  not as  a single  event  but as part of a long-term 
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integration process. This is represented by a series of continuous cross-country 
interest rate differentials. To account for the anticipation effects of monetary 
integration, this continuous variable was calculated for the whole sample. The 
assumption is that the gradual emergence of the monetary union can be 
approximated by a reduction in the interest rate differentials to zero. The results 
show that regardless of EMU participation, a reduction in differentials is associated 
with an increase in trade (De Souza 2002:20). The conclusion drawn is that while 
treating EMU as part of a long-term integration process shows a stronger evidence 
of trade effect, the increase in trade does not seem to be caused by a specific 
exchange rate arrangement, but by the credibility of the arrangement. A credible 
exchange rate mechanism can therefore substitute for an institutionalized monetary 
union. De Souza (2002:21) cautions policy makers, neither to underestimate the 
timeframe, nor to overestimate the potential economic benefits from any single 
component of a regional integration process.  
Another recent study by Barr, Breedon and Miles (2003) estimates the impact of the 
euro on trade among EMU members with a standard gravity model on a panel 
consisting of 17 European countries and data from 1978 to the first quarter of 2002. 
The authors are particularly concerned about the endogeneity issue: do EMU 
members trade more as a result of the adoption of the euro, or did they form a 
monetary union as a result of intensive trade links? If countries that expect a 
considerable increase in their trade in any event are more likely to form a currency 
union, then the estimated relationship between trade and currency unions cannot be 
interpreted as a currency union effect (Barr et al 2003:580). Even the use of fixed 
effects does not solve the endogeneity problem if the omitted variable predicts both 
the decision to join a currency union and higher trade. Barr et al (2003) argue that 
this can only be solved by an instrumental variable, something that predicts entry 
into a currency union, but cannot have been influenced by the potential trade 
increase. When they apply the original Rose (2000) specification to their data, the 
common currency effect on trade is estimated at 29 percent. Similar results are 
obtained with the instrumental variable approach, using co-movements of output 
and prices as indicators of the propensity to form a currency union. The results 
suggest that it is membership of EMU that  is responsible  for almost all the increase 
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in trade within EMU and not the other way around. However, this does not mean 
that all trade creating is the direct effect of entering EMU. It is possible that the 
countries that expected to join the currency union altered their policies in a way that 
stimulated trade, so that a part of the trade effect is indirectly the result of EMU. 
The use of time dummies reveals that EMU had an effect on trade well before it 
happened, suggesting that the policy preparations for the single currency have 
encouraged trade as well  (Barr et al 2003:584). 
Barr et al (2003) note that their model only estimated the trade impact with EMU 
countries, and that it is theoretically possible that the trade impact is due to trade 
diversion away from countries outside EMU with comparative advantage similar to 
that of EMU countries. However, they give some reassuranc e that this is not the 
case. Assuming that EMU has no effect on trade between non-EMU members, if 
there were trade diversion, trade between EMU members and non-members would 
decrease after the creation of the EMU relative to trade between non-members. The 
authors re-estimate the model with a separate dummy variable for trade between 
members and non-members of EMU but do not find a significant negative effect 
(Barr et al 2003:585). However, the lack of trade diversion does not mean that 
countries could not have done even better by joining the monetary union. The 
authors estimate the trade impact of staying out of EMU for Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. While they find a much smaller estimate than implied by the 
Rose estimate, it is still dramatic, especially for the UK. The 29 percent pure 
currency union effect combined with a 43 percent exchange rate volatility effect 
indicates that British trade could have increased by 72 percent if the UK had not 
opted to stay out of the monetary union (Barr et al 2003:585).  
A more recent study on the effect of the euro on trade covers four years with the 
new common currency (Flam & Nordström 2003). The authors estimate a gravity 
equation with country-pair fixed effect dummies to capture all factors that are 
particular to the pair. The novelty in their specification is the use of unilateral trade 
instead of bilateral trade as the dependent variable. The use of exports as the 
dependent variable makes it possible to separate euro effects on exports from euro 
to non-euro countries on the one hand, and exports  from non-euro  to euro countries  
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on the other hand. Flam and Nordström (2003) use a panel of 20 developed 
countries and yearly data from 1989 to 2002.  Trade between the three EU countries 
that did not adopt the euro (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom), and 
between them and seven non-EU developed countries serve as the benchmark 
against which trade patterns of EMU members are compared. Estimates of the 
model indicate that the introduction of the euro has increased trade between euro 
countries by 15 percent on average for the period 1998 to 2002 compared to the 
benchmark for the period 1989 to 2002. The euro effect on trade between members 
and non-members of the currency union is found to be 8 percent. Estimating the 
euro effect by year-dummies shows that there is a clear increasing trend starting in 
1998, and later years show a significantly greater increase in trade volumes than 
early years of the euro period. Flam and Nordström (2003:19) maintain that the 
rising trend indicates that the effects are indeed caused by the introduction of the 
euro. Common currency effects are realized gradually, since producers need time to 
adjust production and supply patterns to the currency union. Flam and Nordström 
(2003) further argue that increasing vertical specialization could be the reason for 
the relatively large increase estimated for trade between EMU members and 
countries outside the union. Vertical specialization is less costly with a single 
currency and makes goods produced inside the euro area more competitive.    
Another innovation of Flam and Nordström (2003) is that besides the aggregate 
estimates they also estimate euro effects on different sector exports in order to see 
whether the effects are present in certain sectors and absent in others. The sector 
estimates show wider distribution and less significance than the aggregate estimates. 
Significant euro effects are found for beverages and tobacco, chemical products and 
manufactured goods. Products in these sectors are either differentiated or require 
relatively much processing. It is argued that the concentration of significant euro 
effect to these sectors is not random but indicates that the trade effect is caused by 
increasing vertical specialization across countries in the case of manufacturing and 
by relatively high investments in marketing and distribution for differentiated 
products. 
Finally, Flam and Nordström (2003:18) calculate what would happen to trade if 
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom joined the European currency union. 
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They predict that the leve l of trade would be about 8 percent higher on average in 
the first five years after the adoption of the euro and about 10 percent higher in the 
fifth year. Of this increase only one percent is due to the elimination of nominal 
exchange rate volatility, the  rest is attributed to the common currency.  
De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) also examine the impact of EMU on trade. They 
consider 11 exporter countries (members of EMU) and 32 importer countries (EMU 
11 plus 21 other countries) during the period 1980 to 2000. They find that the 
adoption of the euro has had a positive but modest impact on bilateral trade between 
European countries. Their estimate of about 9 percent is much lower than previous 
estimates in the literature on a larger and more heterogeneous set of countries. 
Theirs is a short-run estimate, and they suggest that the long-run effect could 
accumulate to 16 percent, which is still much lower than the estimates of pre-EMU 
studies. According to the authors one reason for this divergence is that the euro was 
adopted after a long-term process of European integration and tra de links were 
already very close because of cultural and neighbourhood factors. EMU countries 
shared several policy decisions before they gave up their own national currencies. 
The creation of the European Monetary System at the end of the 1970s and the 
institution of the Single Market in the 1980s and the macroeconomic convergence 
path to the euro adoption during the 1990s all contributed to the increase in trade 
relations among EMU members (de Nardis & Vicarelli 2003). 
Table 6.3 provides a summary of the main results of the EMU studies discussed 
above. While the estimates vary, the general consensus seems to be that the euro’s 
trade impact is positive but modest in size compared to the estimated impact derived 
from evidence on other currency unions. 
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Table 6.3    Summary of currency union trade effects from EMU studies  
 
Study Years 
covered 
Countries 
in sample 
Trade 
effect  
Comments 
Bun and  
Klaassen 
(2002) 
1965-
2001 
EU 15     
US, Japan,  
Canada 
4 %- 
40 % 
Effects accumulate in the long term.  
Exchange rate volatility already low 
before EMU, effect comes via other 
channels: credibility, transaction costs 
savings, capital market integration.  
De Souza 
(2002) 
1980-
2001 
EU 15 none No effect if EMU viewed as single event. 
More proof if EMU viewed as process. 
More trade conditional on credibility, not 
on specific exchange rate arrangement.  
Barr, 
Breedon 
and Miles 
(2003) 
1978-
2002Q1 
11 EMU 
ins 
6 EMU 
outs 
29 % Trade increases in anticipation of EMU. 
No evidence of trade diversion, but EMU 
outs (UK, Denmark, Sweden)  could have 
traded more, had they also joined. 
De Nardis 
and 
Vicarelli 
(2003) 
1980-
2000 
32 
countries 
9 % Impact limited because trade links were 
already very close due to a long process 
of integration. In the long run, effect may 
be higher. 
Flam and 
Nordström 
(2003) 
1989-
2002 
20 
developed 
countries 
15 % 
 
Exports from euro to non-euro countries 
and exports from non-euro to euro 
countries both increase. 
Increasing vertical specialization. 
Micco, 
Stein and 
Ordoñez 
(2003) 
1992-
2002 
22 
developed 
countries / 
 EU 15 
4 %- 
16 % 
No evidence of trade diversion. 
Trade increases in anticipation of EMU. 
Effect higher for more developed 
countries. 
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6.4 Conclusion  
Rose’s methodology has been criticized on various points. Numerous authors 
embarked on a mission to shrink the trade effect of currency unions by attempting to 
correct for different methodological problems, such as non-random selection, non-
linearities, simultaneity and aggregation bias. Although the resulting estimates of 
the trade effect of common currencies are highly divergent, they are generally much 
lower than Rose’s original estimate. As noted by Smith (2002:22), the nature of the 
criticism is such that one’s prejudices will largely determine whether one believes 
currency union has a significant effect on trade. One cannot ignore however, that 
even those studies that claim to have succeeded in shrinking the currency union 
effect, generally find a positive estimate. While Rose’s original estimate of factor 
three is highly improbable, if in reality the impact is just a small fraction of that, it 
can still have a material effect on trade and growth. It would be foolish to claim that 
the results lead to the policy implication that countries should form currency unions 
to increase their trade and economic growth. However, it is clear, that trade 
implications are a factor that should be considered in a country’s decision to join a 
currency union, together with other factors. How much weight should be attached to 
this specific factor, is debatable, and will depend on the characteristics of the 
specific countries involved.  
In order to seek a better answer to the impact of common currencies on international 
trade one strand of the literature investigated the gold standard era. The noteworthy 
finding of most of these studies is that monetary integration a century ago had a 
trade-promoting effect similar in magnitude to the Rose effect. The gold standard 
proved to be more important than tariff policy and just as important as decreasing 
transport costs in fostering trade. It seems that the gold standard was responsible for 
about twenty percent of the global trade boom in the early 20th century. However, 
there is also evidence that the various currency areas of the era were formed because 
of existing strong trade links, and not the other way around. The strong correlation 
between currency arrangements and trade intensity has survived the historical test, 
but the direction of causation is uncertain. There is also no assurance that the 
historical evidence would be applicable to contemporary monetary integration, since 
so much has changed in a century. 
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Undoubtedly, the most exciting strand of literature on this topic is the one that 
extends the data set to the most recent years and which focuses on the European 
Monetary Union. From the various EMU studies the general consensus emerges that 
the euro’s trade impact is positive but modest in size compared to the estimated 
impact derived from evidence on other currency unions. It remains to be seen 
whether the effect is low because there is not much data yet. It is possible that more 
trade will be created in the long run. However, it is also possible that EMU is a 
special case and the bulk of the trade-creating effect had been realized before the 
adoption of the euro, in anticipation of EMU. 
From the present survey of the different studies that have estimated the effect of 
common currencies on trade it is apparent that although the range of the estimates is 
extremely wide, the size of the estimates seems to be getting smaller. The Rose 
effect appears to have passed both the historical and the most recent euro test. While 
there is no agreement on the exact size of the trade effect, the qualitative conclusion 
that a currency union promotes trade still stands. Attempts to arrive at a single 
representative estimate of the Rose effect will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
META-ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF COMMON 
CURRENCIES ON TRADE 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, a substantial number of papers have 
provided estimates of the effect of common currencies on trade. The question to be 
addressed in this chapter is how to evaluate the various research results in a formal 
and objective way and whether it is possible to arrive at a single representative 
estimate of the Rose effect. One answer lies in meta-analysis, a quantitative method 
of literature review, which is discussed in section 7.1. Examples of the application 
of meta-analysis in the field of economics are given in section 7.2. Section 7.3 
presents Rose’s different versions of the meta-analysis of the effect of common 
currencies on trade. In section 7.4 an attempt is made to confirm the results of 
Rose’s meta -analysis using simple sorting techniques, measures of location and 
graphical representations of the estimates. Section 7.5 discusses the limitations of 
meta-analysis, such as publication bias and variable quality of the primary studies. 
Section 7.6 sums up the results of the meta -analysis of the Rose effect. 
7.1 The techniques of meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis uses various quantitative techniques to evaluate and combine 
empirical results from different studies. It is best seen as a statistical approach 
towards literature review (Florax et al 2002). The idea behind meta -analysis is that 
if a number of independent studies have been conducted on a particular subject, 
using different data sets and methods, then combining their results can provide more 
insight than simply listing individual results. Meta-analysis entails including all 
studies on the topic, published or not. In this way the  potential bias introduced by 
any non-random selection of studies is reduced. The different point estimates of a 
given coefficient are treated as individual observations. One can use this vector of 
estimates to estimate the underlying coefficient of interest, to test the hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero and to link estimates to features of the underlying studies. 
Meta-regression, in particular, is a form of meta -analysis especially designed to 
investigate empirical research in economics. In meta-regression analysis, the 
dependent variable is a summary statistic drawn from each study, while the 
explanatory variables include characteristics of the method and data used in these 
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studies (Stanley 2001:131-132). In other words, the estimates are regressed on the 
characteristics of the studies from which they were drawn. Thus, meta-regression 
analysis can explain to what extent different methods and data sets influence the 
results of individual studies. 
7.2 Meta-analysis in economics  
As a research method, meta-analysis has been widely applied in psychology, 
education and medical research. In the field of economics, the use of meta-analysis 
is a relatively new phenomenon, and not so widespread. However, it is gaining 
popularity. It was first used in environmental economics in the 1980s. The first 
study is a survey of property value studies estimating the impact of airport noise, 
and the meta-analytic innovation consists in merely providing an average Noise 
Depreciation Index over studies (Florax et al 2002: 9). Van den Bergh et al (1997) 
discuss a number of different applications of meta-analysis in environmental 
economics, the topics ranging from tourism multipliers to transport externality and 
policy issues. Although meta -analysis is most prevalent in environmental 
economics, it has also been applied in other areas, such as labour economics. For 
example, Weichselbaumer and Winter -Ebmer (2003) use meta-analysis to estimate 
the international gender wage gap. Regarding the analysis of international trade, 
meta-analysis has been used to assess the effect of environmental regulation on 
competitiveness and international trade flows (Mulatu et al 2001). 
7.3 Rose and the meta-analysis of the trade effect of common currencies 
In a quest to summarize and evaluate the various research results in a formal and 
objective way, and to arrive at a single representative estimate of the common 
currency effect on bilateral trade in general, Rose turned to meta-analysis for a 
solution. He performed various versions of the meta-analysis, necessitated by the 
continuously increasing number of studies on the topic. His meta -analysis of 19, 24 
and 34 studies respectively (Rose2002a, 2002b, 2004a) are discussed in turn.  
7.3.1 Rose’s original meta-analysis of 19 studies 
In his first meta -analysis Rose (2002a ) synthesizes the estimates of the trade-
creating effect of currency unions contained in 19 different studies. For each study 
the most preferred or most representative estimate of the effect of currency union on 
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bilateral trade is chosen. Pooling these estimates and their standard errors across 
studies, the null hypothesis, that there is no effect of currency union on trade, is 
tested. Rose (2002a) finds that the null hypothesis can be rejected at standard 
significance levels. The pooled effect is not just positive but economically 
significant, and is consistent with the hypothesis that currency union raises trade by 
an economically significant amount. The combined estimate implies that a currency 
union approximately doubles trade among its members. It is also shown that the 
conclusions remain the same if the six studies written or co-authored by Rose are 
dropped from the meta-analysis. The sensitivity of the meta-analysis to individual 
studies is tested by omitting studies from the meta-analysis one by one, and no 
single study is found to be especially influential in driving the results. 
Ideally, variations in the point estimates of the different studies could be explained 
using multivariate meta -regressions with the different study characteristics as 
explanatory variables, but this is not feasible when there are only 19 studies. In an 
attempt to link estimates to features of the individual studies Rose (2002a) performs 
a series of single-independent -variable meta-regressions where the dependent 
variable is the set of 19 estimates from the different studies and the independent 
variable is a single feature of the underlying study. The independent variables in the 
different regressions include those study characteristics that are thought to be 
consequential, such as the number of observations in different data sets, the number 
of countries and the number of years investigated, and the standard error of the 
estimated coefficient. Dummy variables are used to indicate whether the study is 
contemporary or based on data before World War Two, whether it is based on cross-
sectional or panel data and whether Rose is the author. The meta -regressions yield 
three results. First, there is no positive relationship between the number of 
observations and the estimated trade effect of currency unions. The lack of a 
positive relationship between sample size and the estimates is worrying, since it 
casts doubt on the authenticity of the underlying empirical phenomenon (Rose 
2002a:8). Second, studies co-authored by Rose have consistently higher point 
estimates. Finally, there is no strong relationship between characteristics of studies, 
such as time span or nature of the data set, and point estimates. This is a 
disappointing result, since the meta-analysis failed to discover a consistent link 
between features of the studies and the estimates. The estimates are heterogeneous, 
in other words, effect size estimates vary between studies to a greater extent than 
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expected on the basis of chance alone. However, the reason for the heterogeneity of 
the estimates remains a mystery.  
7.3.2 Rose’s second meta-analysis of 24 studies 
As more studies on the trade effect of common currencies appeared, Rose (2002b) 
repeated his meta-analysis, this time with 24 studies on the topic. The five new 
studies that have been added to the original sample of 19 studies display 
heterogeneous estimates of the trade -creating effect of common currencies, ranging 
from 8 percent (Bomberger 2002) to 376 percent (Alesina et al 2002). The total 
range of all estimates has therefore increased, but the inclusion of the five new 
studies did not have any effect on the results of the original meta -analysis (Rose 
2002a). The null hypothesis that there is no effect of currency union on trade  can 
still be rejected at standard significance levels and no consistent link between study 
characteristics and estimates is found. Even the combined estimate remains 
unchanged and implies that a currency union has a doubling effect on bilateral trade 
among its members (Rose 2002b). 
7.3.3 Rose’s third meta-analysis of 34 studies 
The most recent meta -analysis of the trade effect of currency unions provides a 
summary about the current state of the debate on the basis of 34 studies (Rose 
2004a). The various single-independent-variable regressions used in the first meta-
analysis (Rose 2002a) are applied to the larger set of studies and two new 
regressions are added, necessitated by the different characteristics of the 10 new 
studies, many of which investigate the trade effect of the euro directly. The two 
additional features under scrutiny are whether the focus of a study is on EMU 
observations and whether the focus is on the short run. Rose (2004a) then combines 
the most statistically significant independent variables in a multivariate meta-
regression. Focus on EMU observations, short-run focus, Rose as author and cross-
sectional versus panel data are the four study characteristics used as explanatory 
variables in the multivariate regression. Compared to the two earlier versions of the 
meta-analysis (Rose 2002a, 2002b), the new finding of the meta-regression is that 
studies with an EMU focus consistently find a lower effect of currency union on 
trade, either because there is little data yet on the EMU era or because the  effect is 
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indeed small (Rose 2004a:9). Given the consistently lower estimates of the euro 
studies, it is impossible to arrive at a single representative estimate of the common 
currency effect on bilateral trade in general. It might well be the case that the trade-
creating effect differs across the different currency unions. Rose (2004a:13) 
concludes that the combined estimate implies that a currency union increases trade 
by between 30 percent and 90 percent. 
7.4 A simple version of the meta-analysis of 34 studies 
Rose (2002a, 2002b, 2004a) used regressions and complex statistical tests in his 
different versions of the meta -analysis of the trade effect of common currencies. It 
is interesting to examine whether elementary statistical techniques lead to the same 
or different conclusions. In this section a simple meta-analysis is presented, using 
sorting techniques, measures of location and box-and-whisker plots to represent the 
data graphically (Steffens 1991). As a first step, the 34 studies that provide 
estimates about the effect of common currencies on bilateral trade are tabulated 
along with the most representative estimates of the coefficient of interest - as chosen 
by Rose (2004a) - in table 7.1. Since the studies measure bilateral trade in logs, the 
trade effect is not obvious from simply looking at the estimates. In order to make 
the data more meaningful, the exponent ial of the estimate is shown in the next 
column. For example, if the estimate of the coefficient is 1.1, exp(1.1)=3 , which 
implies that currency unions triple trade. 
For ease of reference the trade multiplying factors are further converted into 
percentage  values in the next column, shown in bold. Factor 3 therefore becomes 
200 percent, indicating that if two countries form a currency union their bilateral 
trade will increase by 200 percent. This is the estimated trade -creating effect of 
common currencies, and studies have been arranged on the basis of this percentage 
value in descending order. This results in a ranking of estimates from highest to 
lowest. It can be seen that the highest estimate is 376 percent (Alesina et al 2002) 
while the lowest estimate is minus 31 percent. Both are extreme estimates, therefore 
the range, the difference between the largest and smallest estimate value, does not 
say much about the remaining estimates. The highest estimate is extreme in the 
sense that its distance from the second highest estimate is greater than any distance 
between two consecutive estimates. The lowest estimate is extreme in the sense that 
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it is the only one with a negative sign. All the other estimates indicate a positive 
relationship between the adoption of a common currency and the level of bilateral 
trade. 
Table 7.1   Studies ranked according to the size of the estimated trade effect   
Rank       Author Year Estimate exp 
(estimate) 
  
Estimated              
    trade 
    effect  
     (%)  
Rose  euro 
1 Alesina, Barro & Tenreyro 2002 1.56 4.759 376   
2 Melitz 2002 1.38 3.975 297   
3 Frankel & Rose 2002 1.36 3.896 290 Ö  
4 Kenen 2002 1.2219 3.394 239   
5 de Sousa & Lochard 2003 1.21 3.353 235   
6 Rose 2000 1.21 3.353 235 Ö  
7 Rose & Engel 2002 1.21 3.353 235 Ö  
8 Flandreau & Maurel 2001 1.16 3.190 219   
9 Rose  2004b 1.12 3.065 206 Ö  
10 Honohan 2001 0.921 2.512 151   
11 Rose & van Wincoop 2001 0.91 2.484 148 Ö  
12 Nitsch 2002b 0.82 2.270 127   
13 Rose 2001 0.74 2.096 110 Ö  
14 Subramanian & Wei 2003 0.732 2.079 108   
15 López-Córdova & Meissner 2003 0.716 2.046 105   
16 Melitz 2001 0.7 2.014 101   
17 Glick & Rose 2002 0.65 1.916 92 Ö  
18 Nitsch 2002a 0.62 1.859 86   
19 Saiki 2002 0.56 1.751 75   
20 Persson 2001 0.506 1.659 66   
21 Klein 2002 0.5 1.649 65   
22 Levy Yeyati 2003 0.5 1.649 65   
23 Tenreyro 2001 0.471 1.602 60   
24 Smith  2002 0.38 1.462 46   
25 Bun & Klaassen  2002 0.33 1.391 39  Ö 
26 
Estevadeordal, Frantz & 
Taylor 2003 0.293 1.340 34   
27 Barr, Breedon & Miles  2003 0.25 1.284 28  Ö 
28 de Souza 2002 0.17 1.185 19  Ö 
29 Flam & Nordström 2003 0.139 1.149 15  Ö 
30 Tom & Walsh  2002 0.098 1.103 10   
31 Micco, Stein & Ordoñez 2003 0.089 1.093 9  Ö 
32 Bomberger 2002 0.08 1.083 8   
33 de Nardis & Vicarelli 2003 0.061 1.063 6  Ö 
34 Pakko & Wall  2001 -0.378 0.685 -31   
 Mean                114      
 Median               89 First quartile  34   
 Third quartile   206 Interquartile  range 172   
 122 
 
Simply adding together all the percentage estimates and dividing this total by the 
number of studies gives the mean estimate, which implies a 114 percent increase in 
trade associated with the adoption of a common currency. Another measure of 
location, the median, divides the estimates into two equal parts. Half of the 
estimates are larger than the median and half of them are smaller. Since the number 
of studies in the meta-analysis is even, the median is taken as the average of the two 
middle values (92 percent estimated by the Glick and Rose (2002) study ranked 
17th and 86 percent estimated by Nitsch (2002a) ranked 18th) and is therefore 89 
percent. In a symmetric distribution the mean and the median are equal. In this case 
the mean is larger than the median, indicating that the distribution is skewed 
upwards, and that some of the extremely high estimates are outliers. Given the 
skewed distribution of the estimates, the median is a better choice than the mean, 
provided one insists on arriving at a single estimate. In fact, the median value of 89 
percent is very close to the upper value of the estimated trade effect of currency 
unions that Rose (2004a) arrived at in his meta-analysis, namely that a currency 
union increases trade by between 30 percent and 90 percent. 
In order to get more information about the distribution of the estimates, the sample 
of studies is further divided into four equal parts. The values that subdivide the 
estimates are called quartiles. The first quartile (Q1) is the 9th lowest estimate, 
which is 34 percent, arrived at by Estevadeordal et al (2003). The second quar tile 
(Q2) is equal to the median and is therefore 89 percent. The third quartile (Q3) is the 
9th highest estimate of 206 percent by Rose (2004b). The interquartile range, in 
other words the values for the middle 50 percent of the estimates from Q1 to Q3, 
range from 34 percent to 206 percent. The interquartile range excludes the top 25 
percent and bottom 25 percent of the values and is therefore unaffected by extreme 
estimates (Steffens 1991: 86). 
The quartiles discussed above are displayed graphically in a box-and-whisker plot in 
figure 7.1. The vertical axis covers the range of estimates. The ‘box’ displays the 
three quartiles, with a horizontal line across it at the median. The ‘whisker’ from the 
box out to the extremes depicts the distances from the two outer quartiles to the 
lowest and highest estimates. 
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Figure 7.1 
Box-and-whisker plot of the estimates of the trade effect of common currencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The plot reveals a number of interesting characteristics about the distribution of the 
estimates. The upper whisker (Q3 to the highest estimate of 376 %) is longer than 
the lower whisker (Q1 to the lowest estimate of -31%). This confirms that the 
distribution is skew. Similarly, the position of the median line is not in the middle of 
the box and indicates an asymmetric distribution. Half the studies find that the 
trade-creating effect is larger than 89 percent and the highest estimate is more than 
four times greater than the median value. In spite of this wide range, basically all 
studies in the top half say the same, that the trade effect of a currency union is huge. 
Whether it is a tripling or a quadrupling effect does not seem to make that much 
difference, although the former estimate would be in the box and the latter quite 
high up on the upper whisker. Estimates from the bottom half of the studies seem to 
be more homogenous at first glance, because the range is smaller. However, the 
economic interpretation of the estimates reveals that this is not the case. While the 
values are numerically closer to each other, some estimates in the bottom half of the 
whisker would be interpreted as a significant effect while others would be seen as a 
modest effect. Estimates along the lower whisker range from modest to no effect at 
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all. It must be noted, that although Pakko and Wall (2001) (at the bottom of the 
whisker) arrived at a negative estimate of -31%, they did not actually conclude from 
this that a common currency decreases the volume of bilateral trade, but that it 
simply has no effect on trade levels. 
7.4.1 Searching for links between estimates and study characteristics  
One of the purposes of meta -analysis is to try and link estimates to study 
characteristics. In terms of the box-and-whisker plot it means that one looks for 
reasons why some estimates are in the box while others are on the whisker. In table 
7.1 - alongside the estimates - it is shown for each study whether Rose is the author 
and whether the focus is on the euro. It is evident from the table that all Rose studies 
are in the top half of the ranked studies, four of them in the upper part of the box 
and two of them on the upper whisker. Since all Rose studies find higher estimates 
than the median, it can be concluded that studies co-authored by Rose have 
consistently higher estimates. Regarding the EMU studies it is interesting to note 
that all of them are among the lower ranked studies. Five of the six studies 
investigating the trade effect of the euro are located along the lower whisker and the 
sixth is in the bottom half of the box. It is therefore safe to say that studies with an 
EMU focus consistently find a lower effect of currency union on trade. These 
findings are therefore in accordance with the results of Rose’s meta-analysis. 
It would be interesting to find more links between study characteristics and the size 
of the estimated trade effect. Rose (2002a, 2002b, 2004a) has tried his best but 
failed to do so, therefore it should not come as a surprise that a simple ranking of 
estimates and a box-and-whisker plot cannot reveal further relationships. As a 
tentative effort, studies have been ranked in ascending order according to the 
standard error of the estimate (see table 7.2). An inspection of the ranking reveals 
that the two studies which have the highest standard error of the estimated 
coefficient, at the bottom of the list, happen to be the ones with the highest and the 
lowest estimate respectively (compare table 7.1). It appears that the most extreme 
estimates come from the studies with the worst fit and least precision. Hence there is 
good reason to consider them as outliers that can seriously distort the picture and 
they should rather be ignored. In the case of the lowest estimate (Pakko & Wall 
2001) the reason for the large standard error and the negative estimate could be that 
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the authors tried to do time-series analysis on the basis of just a few observations. In 
the case of the study by Alesina et al (2002) it is not clear why the standard error 
and the estimated currency union effect are so large. It can be further seen that euro 
studies in general display relatively low standard errors of the estimate, probably 
because European countries are relatively homogenous and can be expected to 
experience reasonably similar trade effects from the adoption of the euro. 
Table 7.2   Studies ranked according to the size of the standard error of the estimate 
Rank Author Year Estimate 
standard 
error  
    % 
increase 
in trade 
Rose 
co-
author Euro 
1 Flam & Nordström 2003 0.139 0.02 15  Ö 
2 Micco, Stein & Ordoñez 2003 0.089 0.025 9  Ö 
3 de Nardis & Vicarelli 2003 0.061 0.027 6  Ö 
4 Barr, Breedon & Miles  2003 0.25 0.033 28  Ö 
5 Bomberger 2002 0.08 0.05 8   
6 Glick & Rose 2002 0.65 0.05 92 Ö  
7 Rose 2001 0.74 0.05 110 Ö  
8 Flandreau & Maurel 2001 1.16 0.07 219   
9 Subramanian & Wei 2003 0.732 0.08 108   
10 Bun & Klaassen  2002 0.33 0.1 39  Ö 
11 Smith  2002 0.38 0.1 46   
12 de Sousa & Lochard 2003 1.21 0.12 235   
13 Rose  2004b 1.12 0.12 206 Ö  
14 Rose 2000 1.21 0.14 235 Ö  
15 Estevadeordal, Frantz & Taylor 2003 0.293 0.145 34   
16 Melitz 2002 1.38 0.16 297   
17 Saiki 2002 0.56 0.16 75   
18 Nitsch 2002a 0.62 0.17 86   
19 Frankel & Rose 2002 1.36 0.18 290 Ö  
20 Rose & van Wincoop 2001 0.91 0.18 148 Ö  
21 López-Córdova & Meissner 2003 0.716 0.186 105   
22 Tom & Walsh  2002 0.098 0.2 10   
23 Melitz 2001 0.7 0.23 101   
24 de Souza 2002 0.17 0.24 19  Ö 
25 Levy Yeyati 2003 0.5 0.25 65   
26 Persson 2001 0.506 0.257 66   
27 Klein 2002 0.5 0.27 65   
28 Nitsch 2002b 0.82 0.27 127   
29 Kenen 2002 1.2219 0.305 239   
30 Tenreyro 2001 0.471 0.316 60   
31 Rose & Engel 2002 1.21 0.37 235   
32 Honohan 2001 0.921 0.4 151   
33 Alesina, Barro & Tenreyro 2002 1.56 0.44 376   
34 Pakko & Wall  2001 -0.378 0.529 -31   
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7.4.2 The size of the typical estimate  
As far as the exact size of the trade effect of common currencies goes, it is not 
possible to say for certain that the typical value is somewhere in the box of the box-
and-whisker plot, since most euro studies are on the lower whisker, outside the box. 
The first quartile of 34 percent is very close to the lower value of the estimated trade 
effect of currency unions that Rose (2004a) arrived at in his meta -analysis, which is 
30 percent. However, this estimate disregards almost all the euro studies. It is 
almost certain that as time goes by more studies will appear estimating the trade 
effect of the euro, and it is reasonable to assume that these estimates will also be 
below the median. This will cause the box to slide down along the whisker. While 
the 90 percent upper limit of the currency union effect on trade suggested by Rose 
(2004a) seems reasonable, putting the minimum effect at 30 percent seems a bit too 
optimistic. 
If the meta-analysis of the original 19 studies and that of the currently available 34 
studies are compared the tendency of decreasing estimates is not that obvious. Table 
7.3 shows the ranking of the estimates of the original 19 studies with the different 
quartile values. When the box-and-whisker plots of the original and the extended 
group of studies are displayed next to each other (see figure 7.2), one can see that 
the upper whisker got longer and even the box has become bigger, indicating a 
larger interquartile range. This implies that there is even less agreement about the 
size of the effect of a currency union on trade than earlier. This is in contrast to the 
emerging conclusion from the qualitative survey of the literature that points towards 
a more modest effect of currency union on trade. One reason for this could be that in 
the qualitative survey the focus was on the criticism of the Rose effect (see Chapter 
6).  
Another interesting point arising from the comparison of the two versions of the 
meta-analysis is that the mean value of the estimates is 114 percent, whether all 34 
or only the 19 original studies are considered. However, the median estimate has 
fallen from 101 percent to 89 percent with the addition of the 15 recent studies. 
While the whole box has not slid down, its midline (indicating the median) and its 
bottom (showing the first quartile) are positioned significantly lower on the whisker 
(see figure 7.2). This might give some indication that the typical size of the 
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estimated effect of a currency union on trade has indeed decreased with more 
studies available  on the topic. 
 
Table 7.3   Ranking of the estimates of the 19 original studies 
 
Rank Author Year 
Estimated 
increase in trade    
(%)  
1 Frankel & Rose 2002 290 
2 Rose 2000 235 
3 Rose & Engel 2002 235 
4 Flandreau & Maurel 2001 219 
5 Honohan 2001 151 
6 Rose & van Wincoop 2001 148 
7 Nitsch 2002b 127 
8 Rose 2001 110 
9 López-Córdova & Meissner 2003 105 
10 Melitz 2001 101 
11 Glick & Rose 2002 92 
12 Nitsch 2002a 86 
13 Persson 2001 66 
14 Klein 2002 65 
15 Levy Yeyati 2003 65 
16 Tenreyro 2001 60 
17 Estevadeordal, Frantz & Taylor 2003 34 
18 Tom & Walsh  2002 10 
19 Pakko & Wall  2001 -31 
    
 mean value  114 
    
 median value  101 
    
 third quartile  151 
    
 first quartile  65 
    
 interquartile range  86 
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Figure 7.2 
Box-and-whisker plots of the estimates of the trade effect of common currencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4.3 Rose’s influence on the typical estimate 
In order to investigate Rose’s influence on the value of the most typical estimate of 
the trade effect of common currencies, a subset of studies is formed that excludes 
the ones by Rose. These studies are tabulated and ranked according to the size of the 
estimates in table 7.4. The vital quartile values are calculated and on the basis of this 
information a box-and-whisker plot is drawn. Figure 7.3 compares the box-and-
whisker plots of the full set of 34 studies and the subset that excludes Rose’s 
studies. It is clear from this graphical representation of the estimates that Rose’s 
studies have a significant influence on the typical size of the estimated effect that a 
currency union has on the level of international trade. 
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Table 7.4  Non-Rose studies ranked according to the size of the estimate 
Rank Author Year 
Estimated 
increase in 
trade    (%)  
1 Alesina, Barro & Tenreyro 2002 376 
2 Melitz 2002 297 
3 Kenen 2002 239 
4 de Sousa & Lochard 2003 235 
5 Flandreau & Maurel 2001 219 
6 Honohan 2001 151 
7 Nitsch 2002b 127 
8 Subramanian & Wei 2003 108 
9 López-Córdova & Meissner 2003 105 
10 Melitz 2001 101 
11 Nitsch 2002a 86 
12 Saiki  2002 75 
13 Persson 2001 66 
14 Klein 2002 65 
15 Levy Yeyati 2003 65 
16 Tenreyro 2001 60 
17 Smith  2002 46 
18 Bun & Klaassen  2002 39 
19 Estevadeordal, Frantz & Taylor 2003 34 
20 Barr, Breedon & Miles  2003 28 
21 de Souza 2002 19 
22 Flam & Nordström 2003 15 
23 Tom & Walsh  2002 10 
24 Micco, Stein & Ordoñez 2003 9 
25 Bomberger 2002 8 
26 de Nardis & Vicarelli 2003 6 
27 Pakko & Wall  2001 -31 
    
 mean value  95 
 median value  65 
 third quartile  127 
 first quartile  19 
 interquartile range  109 
 
If Rose’s studies are not taken into consideration, the box slides down along the 
whisker. This indicates that the more representative half of the non-Rose studies 
typically finds a lower estimate than the middle 50 percent of the studies including 
Rose. The median estimate (Q2) falls from 89 percent to 65 percent, the typical high 
estimate (Q3) falls from 206 percent to 127 percent, and the typical modest estimate 
(Q1) falls from 34 percent to 19 percent. 
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Figure 7.3 
Box-and-whisker plots of trade effect estimates with and without Rose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since every fifth study on the topic is associated with Rose, it might be wise to try 
and arrive at a combined estimate on the basis of the subset of studies excluding 
Rose. The aim is not to disregard his research, but his overrepresentation in the 
sample is just too high. The without-Rose interquartile range is from 19 percent to 
127 percent. Since many of the studies date back to the pre-EMU era and therefore 
disregard important recent evidence, it seems reasonable to take the without-Rose 
median of 65 percent as the upper value for the trade effect. The tentative 
conclusion from this simple meta -analysis is therefore that a currency union is 
typically associated with a significant increase in trade, ranging from about 20 
percent up to about 60 percent. 
7.5 The limitations of meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis has the potential advantage of offering a more objective and more 
systematic approach towards analyzing sources of variation in previously obtained 
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research results than the traditional qualitative literature review (Florax et al 
2002:1). However, there are also serious potential problems that can lead to biased 
estimates. 
One of the threats to the validity of a meta-analysis is publication bias. Publication 
bias arises whenever the  probability that a study is published depends on the 
statistical significance of its results. It is also known as the ‘file-drawer’ problem. If 
studies that fail to find statistically significant effects are more likely to be 
consigned to the ‘file drawer’ and less likely to be submitted to journals or accepted 
for publication, then published results tend to overstate the size and significance of 
the effect being investigated (Stanley 2001:146). The presence of publication bias in 
a meta-analysis dataset can be assessed informally by plotting effect size for each 
study against the standard error of the effect size (Sutton et al 2001:142). In the 
absence of publication bias the resulting plot should be shaped like a funnel. Rose 
(2004a) investigates the possibility of publication bias in his third meta-analysis and 
finds visual evidence of it from funnel plots. Publication bias can be tested more 
formally using statistical tests that are based on the same symmetry assumptions as 
a funnel plot inspection (Sutton et al 2001:143). Rose (2004a) uses various 
statistical tests and all confirm the presence of publication bias in his meta -analysis. 
It appears that studies that find a strong trade effect associated with common 
currencies are more likely to be published. Interestingly, there is still significant 
publication bias, even if the Rose studies are not taken into consideration. One 
might have expected the opposite, since much of the research on the trade effect of 
currency unions was motivated by the desire to destroy the infamous Rose effect. 
According to Rose (2004a:13), one of the reasons for publication bias could be that 
currency unification is an intensely political issue and the political preferences of 
researchers might have an influence on the reported findings. 
A significant limitation of Rose’s meta-analysis is that each study is given an equal 
weight in the conclusion. However, since a number of studies rely on the same 
dataset, the number of truly independent observations is much lower. For example, 
it is not a coincidence that Rose (2000), Rose and Engel (2002) and de Sousa and 
Lochard (2003) all arrive at a trade-creating effect of 235 percent, since the three 
studies are based on the same dataset and a similar specification. Furthermore, Rose 
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(2004b) and its criticism, Subramanian and Wei (2003) are not independent either. 
These studies take a big common currency effect as given and are not directly 
concerned with currency unions. 
Equal weighting of the different studies also implies that there is no discrimination, 
although later research on more relevant databases and using more sophisticated 
methodologies has typically yielded lower estimates. Meta-analysis in general is 
plagued by the problem that studies are not of the same high quality. The inclusion 
of poor or flawed studies in a meta-analysis can bias the pooled result and even 
mean that the meta-analysis comes to the wrong qualitative conclusions (Sutton et 
al 2001:143). Nevertheless, the quantitative survey of the literature shows 
convincing evidence that currency union has a positive effect on trade. 
7.6 Conclusion  
Rose’s quantitative survey of the literature shows persuasive evidence that currency 
union membership has a positive effect on trade. The combined estimated effect is 
large in terms of both economic and statistical significance. According to Rose’s 
conclusions from his latest meta-analysis, the trade-creating effect of common 
currencies is in the region of 30 to 90 percent. This is below the combined estimate 
of approximately 100 percent found in earlier versions of the meta -analysis, 
indicating that the estimated trade-creating effect of common currencies is getting 
smaller as more evidence is accumulated. The estimates are heterogeneous and not 
consistently tied to most features of the studies, with two notable exceptions. First, 
studies that focus on the euro find a lower effect of currency union on trade. Second, 
studies co-authored by Rose find a higher effect. These two results are confirmed by 
simple graphical representations of the estimates and an examination of quartiles. It 
is probable that Rose’s estimates might bias the overall conclusion of the meta-
analysis, not because his estimates are generally higher, but because there are a 
great number of Rose studies. The overrepresentation of Rose and the fact that 
many studies date back to the era before the introduction of the euro suggest that the 
effect of a currency union on trade is lower than suggested by Rose’s meta -analysis, 
and probably falls in the range of 20 to 60 percent. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the effect of common currencies 
on trade. The potential increase in trade is regarded as one of the most important 
benefits of a currency union. A country’s costs and benefits from joining a currency 
union depend on how closely integrated its economy is with those of its potential 
partners. The traditional theory of optimum currency areas identifies those specific 
characteristics that are relevant for choosing the likely participants in a currency 
union. The intensity of trade with other potential members of the currency union 
and the extent to which domestic business cycles are correlated with those of other 
countries are among the most important criteria. The more two countries trade with 
each other and the more similar their business cycles are, the better candidates they 
are for a currency union. 
Empirical studies trying to identify optimum currency areas in the world on the 
basis of the criteria suggested by OCA theory generally find that the costs of 
adopting a single currency are too high for most regions. However, these studies are 
by necessity backward looking and ignore the possibility that the costs and benefits 
of participating in a currency union may change over time. Contrary to the 
traditional OCA theory that postulates that a high degree of real integration is 
necessary for a monetary union to be successful, the endogeneity hypothesis 
postulates that countries do not need to meet many of the criteria before integration. 
In terms of the endogeneity argument, convergence will follow from joining a 
currency union and the integration process itself will turn the countries into optimal 
currency areas. The causality between economic integration and monetary 
integration is two-way and mutually reinforcing. In other words, the adoption of a 
common currency can foster more trade and synchronize business cycles between 
countries, thus increasing the benefits and reducing the costs of sharing a common 
currency. Therefore, instead of asking if a certain area forms an optimum currency 
area one should rather ask if a proposed currency union is a feasible currency area. 
Since the similarity in a number of the OCA criteria is expected to increase as a 
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consequence of membership in a currency union, the case for common currencies is 
stronger than previously thought.  
In line with the endogeneity argument, advocates of currency unions argue that an 
increase in trade is an important benefit of adopting a common currency. However, 
indirect evidence from studies on the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade does 
not support this claim. The relationship between exchange rate volatility and levels 
of international trade is both theoretically and empirically ambiguous. On a 
theoretical level, it is possible for increased exchange rate variability to have a 
positive effect on trade, since changes in exchange rates do not simply represent 
risk, they also create profit opportunities. However, the idea that exchange rate 
volatility could promote trade goes against economic intuition. On an empirical 
level, most s tudies fail to find a consistent link between exchange rate volatility and 
trade. Some find a negative but modest effect, and there are some that find that the 
relationship is actually positive. Overall, the main empirical findings support the 
hypothesis that exchange rate variability does not have a significant impact on trade, 
which means that exchange rate volatility does not seem to be a serious obstacle to 
trade. This is bad news for the proponents of currency unions, since their arguments 
are weakened by this result. 
Although volatility studies do not support the argument that the adoption of a 
common currency will encourage trade between members of a currency union, this 
cannot be taken as the final word on the relationship between trade and common 
currencies. The conclusion that common currencies do not have a significant impact 
on trade is based on the assumption that the adoption of a common currency is 
equivalent to the reduction of exchange rate volatility to zero. In a direct study of 
the effect of common currencies on trade Rose separated the currency union effect 
on trade from the effect of eliminating exchange rate volatility. Rose estimated that 
countries that share a common currency trade three times more than those that do 
not. Furthermore, the common currency effect on trade is separate from and 
additional to the effect of the complete elimination of exchange rate variability. The 
important finding is that a currency union is different from a fixed rate regime and 
has a significantly stronger effect on international trade. 
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While the trade -creating effect of common currencies is considerable, the existence 
of different national currencies only gives a partial explanation of the tendency to 
trade much more within countries than across borders. The border effect is much 
larger than the currency union effect. The adoption of a common currency can 
reduce some of the barriers to trade, but the exact reason behind the effect is not 
properly understood. However, the currency union effect on trade deserves serious 
attention, because more trade can lead to higher economic growth.  
The study of the trade effect of common currencies is impeded by the fact that there 
are very few examples of currency union formations. One line of research therefore 
attempted to draw conclusions about the currency union effect on trade on the basis 
of the effect of currency union dissolutions on trade. However, if a currency union 
dissolution is found to have a negative effect on trade, it cannot be simply assumed 
that a currency union formation would have a symmetrical positive effect on trade. 
Furthermore, the conclusion of early research must be treated with care since the 
large estimated trade effect of common currencies is based mostly on the experience 
of small, poor, de veloping countries. Because of the different characteristics of the 
countries, the result cannot be applied to the monetary unification plans of major, 
developed economies.  
Rose’s methodology has been criticized on various points. Numerous authors 
attempted to correct for different methodological problems, such as non-random 
selection, non-linearities, simultaneity and aggregation bias. The various studies 
arrived at heterogeneous estimates, although the majority of the estimates is lower 
than the original Rose effect. However, even those studies that claim to have shrunk 
the currency union effect, generally find a positive estimate. While Rose’s original 
estimate of factor three is highly implausible, even if in reality the effect is just a 
small fraction of that, it can still have a significant impact on trade and growth.  
In order to find a more accurate estimate of the impact of common currencies on 
international trade some researchers extended their data set back into the late 19th 
and early 20th century, an era characterized by the gold standard. The remarkable 
finding of most studies is that the trade -promoting effect of monetary integration a 
century ago was similar in size to the Rose effect. The gold standard proved to be 
more important than tariff policy and just as important as decreasing transport costs 
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in fostering trade. However, there is also indication that the various currency areas 
of the era were formed because of existing strong trade links, in line with the 
traditional theory of optimum currency areas. The strong correlation between 
currency arrangements and trade intensity has survived the historical test, but the 
direction of causation is uncertain. There is also no guarantee that the historical 
evidence on the trade effect of common currencies would be relevant to 
contemporary monetary integration. 
With the formation of the European Monetary Union it has at last become possible 
to estimate the effects of a common currency on trade directly.  From the six studies 
on the topic to date the general consensus emerges that the trade impact of the euro 
is positive but modest in size compared to the estimated impact derived from 
evidence on other currency unions.  It remains to be seen whether the effect is low 
because the euro is still in its infancy. It is possible that more trade will be created in 
the long run. However, it is also conceivable that EMU is indeed a special case and 
the bulk of the trade-creating effect has been realized before the adoption of the 
euro, in anticipation of EMU. Nevertheless, the euro studies added support to the 
hypothesis that currency unions promote international trade, while at the same time 
increased the doubt that the effect is indeed as large as previously claimed.  
In a quest to summarize and evaluate the various research results in a formal and 
objective way, and to arrive at a single representative estimate of the common 
currency effect on bilateral trade, Rose turned to meta -analysis. His quantitative 
survey of the literature shows persuasive evidence that currency union membership 
has a positive effect on trade. The combined estimated effect is in the region of 30 
to 90 percent, indicating that the estimated effect of common currencies on trade is 
getting smaller as more evidence is accumulated. Nevertheless , the effect is still 
significant, both statistically and economically. 
Rose's meta-analysis finds that the estimates are heterogeneous and not consistently 
tied to most features of the studies. However, even simple graphical representations 
of the estimates and an examination of quartiles clearly show that studies that focus 
on the euro find a lower effect of currency union on trade, while studies co-authored 
by Rose find a higher effect. Rose’s estimates might bias the overall conclusion of 
the meta-analysis, not because his estimates are generally higher, but because there 
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are a great number of Rose studies. The overrepresentation of Rose and the fact that 
many studies date back to the era before the introduction of the euro suggest that the 
effect of a currency union on trade is somewhat lower than suggested by Rose in his 
meta-analysis and rather falls in the range of 20 to 60 percent. 
The qualitative conclusion is that currency union formation has a positive effect on 
trade. However, it would be unwise to maintain that the results lead to the 
conclusion that countries should form currency unions to increase their trade and 
economic growth. The trade -promoting factor should definitely be considered in a 
country’s decision to join a currency union, together with other factors. How much 
weight should be attached to this specific factor, is debatable, and will depend on 
the characteristics of the specific countries involved.  
It is important to remember that the estimated trade effect is a percentage change. 
Even if the currency union effect on trade is as large as 100 percent, if two countries 
had no trade relations before the formation of the currency union, their trade will not 
increase at all in terms of the estimated trade effect. Whether a common currency 
has a doubling or tripling effect on trade does not make any difference, since any 
multiple of zero is still zero. The implication is that two countries must be natural 
trading partners to benefit from the trade-creating effect of common currencies. A 
cur rency union is not a magic wand. Just because two countries adopt a currency, 
they will not suddenly start to trade with each other. On the other hand, if the 
volume of trade between two countries is high, then forming a currency union can 
lead to substantial trade benefits in absolute terms, even if the percentage value of 
the trade effect is low. Finally, if two countries have strong trade links, it must be 
asked whether the high volume of trade is due to anticipations about the formation 
of a prospective currency union. If trade has increased because of future 
expectations about a common currency, then trade may not increase further once the 
currency union is actually formed. 
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